Originally Posted by Scoop (Post 2119007)

The Original Poster is on to something. I don't think his worry over lack of WB aircraft is the primary threat to DAL becoming a dead-end job. Yes it would be great to have more WB but still plenty of variety with the most varied/inefficient/versatile/agile/costly/numerous (pick your favorite) fleet around.

The real long term threat to a DAL career is the same exact threat that every US airline will face, - cabotage, shell game schemes (think NAI), the ME three etc.


Just look at what happened t the merchant marine industry and you will see the real threat to US airline careers.

Scoop

Originally Posted by Molon Labe (Post 2119052)

It's the reason behind why there is a lack of widebody aircraft...That reason is that via codesharing Delta management is already using the merchant marine model against us. The JV with China Eastern is a great example out of many...Look at the main deck cargo, 14 NWA freighters worth of main deck Cargo go through Anchorage every day filled with NWA/Delta Cargo...The list goes on and on. The next step in flag of convenience granted is NAI, but the model has already hit us hard.

Originally Posted by Bucking Bar (Post 2119073)

Your conclusion is not totally wrong, but your presentation could be improved. Please do not confuse codesharing and Joint Ventures.

Codesharing is paying someone else to carry your passengers. GOL is an example of a codeshare which benefits us as we carry something in the neighborhood of 10 times as many of their passengers on Delta jets than they carry of ours.

Economically a Joint Venture is a merger. The critical difference is commingling the money in a secret commercial agreement and then hiding the result somewhere in consolidated results.

You are correct that a JV has a very high risk of labor arbitrage. Northwest invented this sort of arrangement in 1993 with KLM and was the first to experience a withdrawal from secondary markets and focus on larger widebodies to serve it's partner's hub cities.

Delta had (and has) taken a different approach and had (has) a different, small gauged, widebody fleet to serve it's smaller destinations.

The key to enjoying industry leading pay and working conditions while avoiding Delta's use of partners' certificates to reduce pilot costs is effective scope language.

As pilots, we need to push for changes which will optimize the Delta-ALPA's enforcement of scope.

Originally Posted by Molon Labe (Post 2119085)

Delta Alpa doesn't enforce scope....That's why we are where we are now.

Originally Posted by Bucking Bar (Post 2119073)

Your conclusion is not totally wrong, but your presentation could be improved. Please do not confuse codesharing and Joint Ventures.

Codesharing is paying someone else to carry your passengers. GOL is an example of a codeshare which benefits us as we carry something in the neighborhood of 10 times as many of their passengers on Delta jets than they carry of ours.

Economically a Joint Venture is a merger. The critical difference is commingling the money in a secret commercial agreement and then hiding the result somewhere in consolidated results.

You are correct that a JV has a very high risk of labor arbitrage. Northwest invented this sort of arrangement in 1993 with KLM and was the first to experience a withdrawal from secondary markets and focus on larger widebodies to serve it's partner's hub cities.

Delta had (and has) taken a different approach and had (has) a different, small gauged, widebody fleet to serve it's smaller destinations.

The key to enjoying industry leading pay and working conditions while avoiding Delta's use of partners' certificates to reduce pilot costs is effective scope language.

As pilots, we need to push for changes which will optimize the Delta-ALPA's enforcement of scope.

Originally Posted by Bainite (Post 2118699)

When I was hired in 1998 guys were telling our class we would be captains in 5 years. 16 years later I still had never been senior enough to hold capt on anything. Now at 18 years, still 8100+ out of 13000. No way to know what the future holds.

Originally Posted by Molon Labe (Post 2119085)

Delta Alpa doesn't enforce scope....That's why we are where we are now.

Originally Posted by JamesBond (Post 2119094)

That is a good treatise and summation Buck. Your last statement is the lynch pin though. How do you accomplish that? Liquidated damages? A penalty for non-compliance. Good luck getting those kinds of things into the contract. I agree with what you are saying, but I would think they would be extremely difficult to pull off.

Originally Posted by Bucking Bar (Post 2119114)

Glad you asked. Network and revenue management allocate flying. The company's plan for the allocation of flying does not include consideration of scope compliance. Worse, because we have quite long measurement periods followed by cure periods; harm to pilots can accumulate during an extended period of noncompliance before an actual "violation" occurs.

In successive administrations (including this one) our Scope Compliance and Analysis Chairman is not permitted to interface with network management. Rather, only a very select group of senior leaders are permitted to participate in network meetings based mostly on political considerations. In fact, the Scope Compliance and Analysis Chairman is not allowed "to advocate for scope" compliance. This has been reiterated as "we do not see the SC&A Chair as an advocacy position."

The improvement I suggest (and which is on the agenda for the May 11th C44 LEC meeting) is that we change the policy manual to include participation in the network meetings in the Scope Compliance & Analysis Chairman's responsibilities, including providing feedback to the company on their scope compliance with the goal of proactively seeking (advocating even) for scope compliance.

Every other functional committee interfaces with their equivalent at the company, working together on scheduling, safety and a host of other tasks which make Delta a better airline. We can improve scope compliance by letting our Scope Compliance and Analysis Chair do their job.

We need support for this resolution. Some feel this is somehow diminishes the power of the MEC Chairman. But in reality the MEC Chairman usually delegates these ministrative tasks. The MEC Chairman still selects (and fires) the Scope Chairman. The Chairman's power to determine who is in the room is not diminished in any way.

My reasoning for cementing this change in the policy manual is that we have to think of the future. John Malone's administration has already adopted some of the suggested improvements, for this work to last it needs to be written policy.