Are we next?
05-02-2026 | 05:56 PM
#21
Line Holder
Joined: Feb 2014
Posts: 1,986
Likes: 112
From: Lineholder
So, the question of "are we next?" is pertinent. But the answer has little to do w/ a temporarily disabled union...
05-02-2026 | 09:10 PM
#22
Almost there
Joined: Apr 2021
Posts: 2,011
Likes: 144
Your points here are valid and more interesting things to think about than the slop previously posted. Just one comment on the lease cancellations--those were not free. Usually, lease cancellations come with high cash costs, and I suspect that will continue to be the case moving forward.
The recent deal with AerCap was more complex than a simple lease cancellation. Frontier knows that they don't have enough profitable route pairings to take up capacity as much as they had planned for, but also has only been kept afloat due to cash from SLBs. Meanwhile, AerCap would rather not have a customer in financial distress, and simultaneously wants more planes and engines to take advantage of the current pricing environment. So, AerCap allowed Frontier to return 24 planes early in exchange for Frontier "deferring" their 2027-2030 deliveries to 2031-2033, with AerCap stepping in and taking over those slots. With the planes being returned early and an announcement of 48 new engines in their spare engine pool, it seems like AerCap may be parting out the planes and using the engines as spares given the high rates for spares currently. AerCap also has somewhat improved their lessee base--they now have less planes with Frontier and monetized the lease cancellations...in a hypothetical scenario where they had not done that, and Frontier went under later in 2026 or 2027, AerCap would not have a direct claim to the incoming Frontier orders; by preemptively doing this transaction, they reduce their Frontier exposure and secure the valuable 2028-2030 deliveries without paying an SLB premium. And to put some high-level math on it, using Frontier's average gain on SLBs, and discounting back to the present, we get to a present value of the SLBs of about $650M for the 69 planes that Frontier pushed out from 2027-2030. Frontier management sees $90M in annual savings from cancelling those 24 leases, which we can estimate as equivalent to a present value of about $460M for the 8 years of savings, so AerCap got some value here.
The above shows that the transaction is not proof that leasing is better than owning; lease rates are higher than debt costs for any airline that can raise debt (JetBlue is in firmly stressed territory and just raised new debt against their planes at under 7%), and you have more control over the planes, no maintenance reserves, etc. Instead, it is just another benefit of the extraordinarily well timed pandemic neo family order that IndiGo (both Frontier and Wizz) placed. I would also note that with current capacity trends, Frontier probably would have rather deferred 2026 deliveries as well, if not for the cash/SLB issues...they require the SLB cash to continue to operate, and the plan is obviously to try to stabilize the operations before 2027. If that doesn't work, however, 2027 will no longer have the several hundred million dollar cash infusion from SLBs, and the true operating profitability of the airline will become apparent.
The recent deal with AerCap was more complex than a simple lease cancellation. Frontier knows that they don't have enough profitable route pairings to take up capacity as much as they had planned for, but also has only been kept afloat due to cash from SLBs. Meanwhile, AerCap would rather not have a customer in financial distress, and simultaneously wants more planes and engines to take advantage of the current pricing environment. So, AerCap allowed Frontier to return 24 planes early in exchange for Frontier "deferring" their 2027-2030 deliveries to 2031-2033, with AerCap stepping in and taking over those slots. With the planes being returned early and an announcement of 48 new engines in their spare engine pool, it seems like AerCap may be parting out the planes and using the engines as spares given the high rates for spares currently. AerCap also has somewhat improved their lessee base--they now have less planes with Frontier and monetized the lease cancellations...in a hypothetical scenario where they had not done that, and Frontier went under later in 2026 or 2027, AerCap would not have a direct claim to the incoming Frontier orders; by preemptively doing this transaction, they reduce their Frontier exposure and secure the valuable 2028-2030 deliveries without paying an SLB premium. And to put some high-level math on it, using Frontier's average gain on SLBs, and discounting back to the present, we get to a present value of the SLBs of about $650M for the 69 planes that Frontier pushed out from 2027-2030. Frontier management sees $90M in annual savings from cancelling those 24 leases, which we can estimate as equivalent to a present value of about $460M for the 8 years of savings, so AerCap got some value here.
The above shows that the transaction is not proof that leasing is better than owning; lease rates are higher than debt costs for any airline that can raise debt (JetBlue is in firmly stressed territory and just raised new debt against their planes at under 7%), and you have more control over the planes, no maintenance reserves, etc. Instead, it is just another benefit of the extraordinarily well timed pandemic neo family order that IndiGo (both Frontier and Wizz) placed. I would also note that with current capacity trends, Frontier probably would have rather deferred 2026 deliveries as well, if not for the cash/SLB issues...they require the SLB cash to continue to operate, and the plan is obviously to try to stabilize the operations before 2027. If that doesn't work, however, 2027 will no longer have the several hundred million dollar cash infusion from SLBs, and the true operating profitability of the airline will become apparent.
The lease rejection was even more complex than you describe. Those Aercap leases were mostly 8 year leases that, as recently as early 2025, had been extended to 15 year leases. Then obviously the quick about-face happened in late 2025. As to your point of “not enough profitable route pairings” I disagree. After the rejection announcement I dug a little deeper and noticed that the pilots were flying near their max capacity block hours for the month of March yet the aircraft were only at 80% utilization. In short, we were paying for aircraft we couldn’t fully utilize because we didn’t have the crews to fly them. ULCC and not max utilization lead to pain and suffering which you clearly know and our balance sheet showed. The time it would take to get the company fully staffed for these aircraft would be well over a year and at our loss rate that is an unacceptable timeline. So while I was pretty bummed at first with the rejection I think this was a very clever move on their part. Jimmy seems to be correcting Biffles bad moves.
I also did some modeling with the rejections and the reduced flying on T/W and it made even more sense. They are just too expensive of an aircraft to sit on the ground, ever, vs an older owned one vis-a-vis Allegiant. A credit to your owned aircraft point.
Thankfully for us Jimmy D has acknowledged we need to be profitable without SLB. We here are all ready for that day.
05-02-2026 | 11:31 PM
#24
On Reserve
Joined: Apr 2015
Posts: 117
Likes: 3
If you are worried about it, maybe see where you can help improve costs. Single Engine taxi, cost Index even on the go home leg, minimize APU use (it takes about 8 minutes worth of single engine fuel burn at these prices to pay the maintenance contract cost for starting the APU last I heard)
Let the negative comments and downvotes commence.
Let the negative comments and downvotes commence.
i had a senior captain tell me he “doesn’t get paid enough to taxi single engine or shut down the apu”. I get the frustration, but this isn’t going to help us.
05-03-2026 | 07:15 AM
#25
On Reserve
Joined: Oct 2025
Posts: 23
Likes: 10
Agree with you 100%. As pilots we should be doing what we can within our scope to help frontier be profitable. Only, when this company gets in the black, can we have any hope of higher compensation.
i had a senior captain tell me he “doesn’t get paid enough to taxi single engine or shut down the apu”. I get the frustration, but this isn’t going to help us.
i had a senior captain tell me he “doesn’t get paid enough to taxi single engine or shut down the apu”. I get the frustration, but this isn’t going to help us.
05-03-2026 | 07:39 AM
#26
Line Holder
Joined: Jan 2024
Posts: 902
Likes: 158
Allegiant and Sun Country make money
The network carriers make money
There is probably room for something in between. Basic Economy killed ULCC as a large airline model, but that doesn't mean there isn't room for one moderate size ULCC that stays in its lane.
The network carriers make money
There is probably room for something in between. Basic Economy killed ULCC as a large airline model, but that doesn't mean there isn't room for one moderate size ULCC that stays in its lane.
05-03-2026 | 08:29 AM
#27
Line Holder
Joined: Feb 2014
Posts: 1,986
Likes: 112
From: Lineholder
smh
Let's take your suggestion and extrapolate. We continue to be paid less. Attrition stays high (despite the flood of NK pilots into the market). Training costs stay high (ioe gets even longer), veteran pilot corporate knowledge decreases and the EXACT conditions we have now (not profitable) stay that way or get worse. Premium scabs become more plentiful and we already have a tail strike problem. Lack of cooperation w/ the company increases. Nothing changes and the vicious cycle of waiting for profitability before pay raise never happens.
The ONLY way forward is to pay market rates. That would end attrition and increase accessions. It would be temporary cost that would soon (18-24 months) be supplanted by profits as we can now expand, offer greater flight options and expand into additional markets. There need to be raises across the board (all labor groups) to increase customer service. We need to INVEST in wifi. We need a cash infusion on the level of probably a 1/2B (maybe more). NO COMPANY on earth starts for free and pays less forever - Indigo purchased F9 in 2013.
Growth costs money. Indigo has it. Franke just needs to find someone he believes will make the cost worthwhile in the end. Is that Dempsey? No idea. But the only certain thing is our current strategy and pay rate will end in only one way.
Last edited by dracir1; 05-03-2026 at 08:54 AM.
05-03-2026 | 10:01 AM
#28
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Joined: Apr 2025
Posts: 11
Likes: 1
ULCC works... but...
ULCC can really work well, but it needs the whole company to stay disciplined. For us pilots, ULCC usually makes us focus on saving fuel, and it’s more than just a suggestion—it’s enforced because that’s where the big bucks are. Airlines using ULCC strategies worldwide have some pretty strict fuel policies. They often set specific CI speed limits unless ATC says otherwise, require flaps 3 for landings, have packs off during departures without APU, minimal APU usage and encourage one-engine taxiing, among other things. These aren't just guidelines; airlines actually keep an eye on pilots monitoring personality who don’t stick to the rules. When they crunch the numbers, they see that operational costs have to be kept really low—otherwise, investors lose interest, and the airline could struggle to survive. ULCC can be profitable, but it’s got to be managed right since the profit margins are super tight.
Let's assume a 700 departure day, if they can save 100lb each leg, it's 70.000lb in one day alone or 25.550.000lb of fuel per year.... just 100lb per leg means millions of dollars in a year..... for a business with such tight margins this is big a deal. That's how ULCC Business are.... penny by penny.
Let's assume a 700 departure day, if they can save 100lb each leg, it's 70.000lb in one day alone or 25.550.000lb of fuel per year.... just 100lb per leg means millions of dollars in a year..... for a business with such tight margins this is big a deal. That's how ULCC Business are.... penny by penny.
05-03-2026 | 10:10 AM
#29
Line Holder
Joined: Aug 2024
Posts: 879
Likes: 270
ULCC can really work well, but it needs the whole company to stay disciplined. For us pilots, ULCC usually makes us focus on saving fuel, and it’s more than just a suggestion—it’s enforced because that’s where the big bucks are. Airlines using ULCC strategies worldwide have some pretty strict fuel policies. They often set specific CI speed limits unless ATC says otherwise, require flaps 3 for landings, have packs off during departures without APU, minimal APU usage and encourage one-engine taxiing, among other things. These aren't just guidelines; airlines actually keep an eye on pilots monitoring personality who don’t stick to the rules. When they crunch the numbers, they see that operational costs have to be kept really low—otherwise, investors lose interest, and the airline could struggle to survive. ULCC can be profitable, but it’s got to be managed right since the profit margins are super tight.
Let's assume a 700 departure day, if they can save 100lb each leg, it's 70.000lb in one day alone or 25.550.000lb of fuel per year.... just 100lb per leg means millions of dollars in a year..... for a business with such tight margins this is big a deal. That's how ULCC Business are.... penny by penny.
Let's assume a 700 departure day, if they can save 100lb each leg, it's 70.000lb in one day alone or 25.550.000lb of fuel per year.... just 100lb per leg means millions of dollars in a year..... for a business with such tight margins this is big a deal. That's how ULCC Business are.... penny by penny.
05-03-2026 | 11:05 AM
#30
On Reserve
Joined: Apr 2015
Posts: 117
Likes: 3
NO NO NO
smh
Let's take your suggestion and extrapolate. We continue to be paid less. Attrition stays high (despite the flood of NK pilots into the market). Training costs stay high (ioe gets even longer), veteran pilot corporate knowledge decreases and the EXACT conditions we have now (not profitable) stay that way or get worse. Premium scabs become more plentiful and we already have a tail strike problem. Lack of cooperation w/ the company increases. Nothing changes and the vicious cycle of waiting for profitability before pay raise never happens.
The ONLY way forward is to pay market rates. That would end attrition and increase accessions. It would be temporary cost that would soon (18-24 months) be supplanted by profits as we can now expand, offer greater flight options and expand into additional markets. There need to be raises across the board (all labor groups) to increase customer service. We need to INVEST in wifi. We need a cash infusion on the level of probably a 1/2B (maybe more). NO COMPANY on earth starts for free and pays less forever - Indigo purchased F9 in 2013.
Growth costs money. Indigo has it. Franke just needs to find someone he believes will make the cost worthwhile in the end. Is that Dempsey? No idea. But the only certain thing is our current strategy and pay rate will end in only one way.
smh
Let's take your suggestion and extrapolate. We continue to be paid less. Attrition stays high (despite the flood of NK pilots into the market). Training costs stay high (ioe gets even longer), veteran pilot corporate knowledge decreases and the EXACT conditions we have now (not profitable) stay that way or get worse. Premium scabs become more plentiful and we already have a tail strike problem. Lack of cooperation w/ the company increases. Nothing changes and the vicious cycle of waiting for profitability before pay raise never happens.
The ONLY way forward is to pay market rates. That would end attrition and increase accessions. It would be temporary cost that would soon (18-24 months) be supplanted by profits as we can now expand, offer greater flight options and expand into additional markets. There need to be raises across the board (all labor groups) to increase customer service. We need to INVEST in wifi. We need a cash infusion on the level of probably a 1/2B (maybe more). NO COMPANY on earth starts for free and pays less forever - Indigo purchased F9 in 2013.
Growth costs money. Indigo has it. Franke just needs to find someone he believes will make the cost worthwhile in the end. Is that Dempsey? No idea. But the only certain thing is our current strategy and pay rate will end in only one way.
During the 2022/2023 hiring boom, I flew with an FO who’s wife was an FO at Alaska. Each month they compared seniority lists. Alaska was losing almost the same percentage of new hires as we were. Frontier could pay us delta rates tomorrow, and we’d still have people leaving.
Wants to fly wide bodies
Doesn't want to fly the same plane for 30 years
Wants access to different bases
Doesn't want to tell the chicks at the bar that they fly for frontier while wearing their giant watch
Grandpa and dad both flew for xyz
I had an FO who was quitting to go to JetBlue simply for access to better pass travel agreements.
Frontier knows this. High pay would slow attrition, but would not eliminate it to legacy levels. That’s delusional thinking man.
For those of you who are new to this airline world, this is how it works: companies are profitable=pilot groups negotiate a higher contract. Companies are not profitable=pilots hope to keep existing contract. These tricky airlines will even come at the pilot group for concessions when they aren’t profitable for extended periods of time, or see a massive downturn. Yes, contracts can be negotiated the other direction. Just for fun, do some research and list all the airlines that have enacted concessionary pilot contracts in their past. I’ll give you a head start: Frontier.
Until frontier starts turning a consistent profit, we have little chance of higher pay. Take your strike lanyards off. They are embarrassing at this point. Go to work. Do what you can within your scope to help make the company profitable. That’s all we can do.
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