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Detpilot says:
Sure sounds good. But this is absolutely not what alpha floor does... Do you have an Airbus type? First, it's wrong. Alpha floor is an auto thrust only function. Second, it's inhibited below a certain altitude (although the gear being up might have blocked that inhibition, been off the plane for a while). My understanding was that the airplane was in alternate law at impact, due to the hydraulic issues and being single generator. I could be wrong, sure. But, you're throwing alpha floor around like someone who hasn't flown the bus, which casts doubt on the rest of your "analysis US Airways Training Manual RC-7 Page 58 High Angle of Attack Protection Under Normal law, when the angle of attack becomes greater than αprot, the system switches elevator control from normal mode to a protection mode, in which the angle-of-attack is proportional to sidestick deflection. That is in the αprot range, from α-prot to α MAX, the sidestick commands α directly. However, the angle-of-attack will not exceed αMAX, even if the pilot gently pulls the sidestick all the way back. If the pilot releases the sidestick, the angle-of-attack returns to αprot and stays there. This protection against stall and windshear has priority over all other protections. The autopilot disconnects if the α protection is active. Detpilot is correct that Alpha floor – is a thrust condition protection only. My bad, so sorry. There is α-floor, αprot, αMAX. They are crowded together in the “tiger tail” a black and amber band on the airspeed tape. Vαprot at the top and VαMAX at the bottom. Sully remained in the Alpha Protection range which allowed him to use full back stick prior to impact while not exceeding Alpha Max. Yes I do have an Airbus Type and considerable time in type in both seats.Your correction sent me back to the manuals, in a corner of the basement. However I have been retired for several years and as you know the Airbus is easy to fly and sometimes hard to understand. Sully stated, but I have no reference, that he started the APU both for an opportunity for a start and to protect Normal law in the ditch. Some cabin lighting and the galleys were load shed when the aircraft went to single generator. There were two generators available immediately prior to impact, the APU and engine #1. Condition of the Aircraft at water impact. http://www.exosphere3d.com/pubwww/pd...ket/441039.pdf Page 1 of 54Submission to the National Transportation Safety Board For theUS Airways Flight 1549 A320-214 N106US Landing in the Hudson River Weehawken, New Jersey January 15 2009 Accident Investigation AIRBUS S.A.S • This multiple bird strikes led to a loss of thrust on both engines to the extent that continued level flight could not be maintained. However the N2 of engine number 1 was still at a level sufficient for its associated electrical generator (–IDG-) to remain on-line. • The crew immediately started the APU, and followed the QRH “ENG DUAL FAILURE” procedure. • During the remaining portion of the flight, the Aircraft remained in Normal Law, and on occasion was flown within the alpha protection range. Notably from approximately 150 ft down to the water impact the Aircraft was in slats/flaps configuration 2. During this time period the Aircraft was in the alpha protection mode which allowed the flight crew to remain focused on their priorities, conversely if the Aircraft had been a non fly-by-wire aircraft, the flight crew would have had to fly in and out of the stick shaker to maintain the desired descent profile. • The QRH “ENG DUAL FAILURE” procedure has been designed for events occurring at high altitude, with enough time to go through the complete procedure. It is not designed for emergency situation such as the one experienced during this event. •The cockpit crew had insufficient time to complete the “ENG DUAL FAILURE” check-list It is important to note that the electrical generation provided by the engines through the IDG’s remains on line as long as its respective engine N2 remains above 56.3 %. During this event, the engine N°1 IDG remained on-line up to the time of the engine N°1 re-start attempt. From the APU Master Switch selection to ON and the APU start, it normally takes approximately 1 minute for the APU Electrical generation to become available. The DFDR data, confirms that the APU electrical power was already available at the time of the engine N°1 re-start attempt took place, thus allowing the aircraft to remain in Normal law, and all displays to remain available to the crew. https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=73240 Project Summary: Aviation Investigation - 123 Docket Items - DCA09MA026 Description: USAirways flight 1549, Airbus Industrie A320-214 equipped with CFM engined ditched in Hudson River on takeoff from LGA Mode: Aviation NTSB Number: DCA09MA026 Date of Accident: 01/15/2009 City: Weehawken State/Region: NJ Country: United States Project Type: Investigatio https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=73240 Captain Sullenberger stated he attempted to start APU and believed he heard an electrical transfer but was not aware if RAT deployed. He said they selected flaps to 2 for landing, he thought he felt the flaps but did not recall if he checked the ECAM to confirm if flaps got to 2. Note the placement of the APU start about one-third of the way down the QRH checklist. |
Originally Posted by Allegheny
(Post 3250144)
Detpilot says:
Sure sounds good. But this is absolutely not what alpha floor does... Do you have an Airbus type? First, it's wrong. Alpha floor is an auto thrust only function. Second, it's inhibited below a certain altitude (although the gear being up might have blocked that inhibition, been off the plane for a while). My understanding was that the airplane was in alternate law at impact, due to the hydraulic issues and being single generator. I could be wrong, sure. But, you're throwing alpha floor around like someone who hasn't flown the bus, which casts doubt on the rest of your "analysis US Airways Training Manual RC-7 Page 58 High Angle of Attack Protection Under Normal law, when the angle of attack becomes greater than αprot, the system switches elevator control from normal mode to a protection mode, in which the angle-of-attack is proportional to sidestick deflection. That is in the αprot range, from α-prot to α MAX, the sidestick commands α directly. However, the angle-of-attack will not exceed αMAX, even if the pilot gently pulls the sidestick all the way back. If the pilot releases the sidestick, the angle-of-attack returns to αprot and stays there. This protection against stall and windshear has priority over all other protections. The autopilot disconnects if the α protection is active. Detpilot is correct that Alpha floor – is a thrust condition protection only. My bad, so sorry. There is α-floor, αprot, αMAX. They are crowded together in the “tiger tail” a black and amber band on the airspeed tape. Vαprot at the top and VαMAX at the bottom. Sully remained in the Alpha Protection range which allowed him to use full back stick prior to impact while not exceeding Alpha Max. Yes I do have an Airbus Type and considerable time in type in both seats.Your correction sent me back to the manuals, in a corner of the basement. However I have been retired for several years and as you know the Airbus is easy to fly and sometimes hard to understand. Sully stated, but I have no reference, that he started the APU both for an opportunity for a start and to protect Normal law in the ditch. Some cabin lighting and the galleys were load shed when the aircraft went to single generator. There were two generators available immediately prior to impact, the APU and engine #1. Condition of the Aircraft at water impact. http://www.exosphere3d.com/pubwww/pd...ket/441039.pdf Page 1 of 54Submission to the National Transportation Safety Board For theUS Airways Flight 1549 A320-214 N106US Landing in the Hudson River Weehawken, New Jersey January 15 2009 Accident Investigation AIRBUS S.A.S • This multiple bird strikes led to a loss of thrust on both engines to the extent that continued level flight could not be maintained. However the N2 of engine number 1 was still at a level sufficient for its associated electrical generator (–IDG-) to remain on-line. • The crew immediately started the APU, and followed the QRH “ENG DUAL FAILURE” procedure. • During the remaining portion of the flight, the Aircraft remained in Normal Law, and on occasion was flown within the alpha protection range. Notably from approximately 150 ft down to the water impact the Aircraft was in slats/flaps configuration 2. During this time period the Aircraft was in the alpha protection mode which allowed the flight crew to remain focused on their priorities, conversely if the Aircraft had been a non fly-by-wire aircraft, the flight crew would have had to fly in and out of the stick shaker to maintain the desired descent profile. • The QRH “ENG DUAL FAILURE” procedure has been designed for events occurring at high altitude, with enough time to go through the complete procedure. It is not designed for emergency situation such as the one experienced during this event. •The cockpit crew had insufficient time to complete the “ENG DUAL FAILURE” check-list It is important to note that the electrical generation provided by the engines through the IDG’s remains on line as long as its respective engine N2 remains above 56.3 %. During this event, the engine N°1 IDG remained on-line up to the time of the engine N°1 re-start attempt. From the APU Master Switch selection to ON and the APU start, it normally takes approximately 1 minute for the APU Electrical generation to become available. The DFDR data, confirms that the APU electrical power was already available at the time of the engine N°1 re-start attempt took place, thus allowing the aircraft to remain in Normal law, and all displays to remain available to the crew. https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=73240 Project Summary: Aviation Investigation - 123 Docket Items - DCA09MA026 Description: USAirways flight 1549, Airbus Industrie A320-214 equipped with CFM engined ditched in Hudson River on takeoff from LGA Mode: Aviation NTSB Number: DCA09MA026 Date of Accident: 01/15/2009 City: Weehawken State/Region: NJ Country: United States Project Type: Investigatio https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=73240 Captain Sullenberger stated he attempted to start APU and believed he heard an electrical transfer but was not aware if RAT deployed. He said they selected flaps to 2 for landing, he thought he felt the flaps but did not recall if he checked the ECAM to confirm if flaps got to 2. Note the placement of the APU start about one-third of the way down the QRH checklist. Sent from my SM-N975F using Tapatalk |
No problemo...
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Originally Posted by KirillTheThrill
(Post 3250039)
So because it’s a rumor that I don’t have “personal experience” with I can’t ask fellow pilots who may? The whole forum is nothing but rumors and “I heard this”. I’ve never met sully “personally” but people who have met him, have nothing great to say about the guy. It was stated directly from a source on a podcast that an aspiring pilot who looked up to him, introduced himself and his ambitions, was quickly blown off by sully to a point of being disrespected in front of others. So, I think it’s fair to ask this type of question on an open forum.
Sully and Neil Armstrong were supposedly the quiet, serious types. And Neil had his moment of doubt too... on short final to mare tranquility. So maybe there's something to be said for that personality when the chips are down. Now if you were talking about Yeager, I'd let that one slide... a lot of smoke there. |
Originally Posted by rickair7777
(Post 3249980)
I don't recall any jet where the engine fail procedure is TOGA or firewall, as far as I can recall it's always thrust lever idle, then restart checklist.
Now with a dual flameout at low altitude it would be within PIC discretion to try firewall thrust, but I don't think it's SOP and in this case would have clearly risked a catastrophic mechanical failure. |
Hell there are plenty of douchey AB pilots that yell TOGA anytime they hear sully mentioned.
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It’s as if the NTSB didn’t put out a full analysis of this event that anyone can read in it’s entirety. A lot of the BS myths I’ve heard about it and about Sullys performance are thoroughly debunked.
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Originally Posted by Bert Sampson
(Post 3250471)
It’s as if the NTSB didn’t put out a full analysis of this event that anyone can read in it’s entirety. A lot of the BS myths I’ve heard about it and about Sullys performance are thoroughly debunked.
What I find funny, is naturally everyone including the moderator read right through the part where I said, “this sounds like bs, can anyone confirm” and went directly after me. Which, this is a forum, feel free to gun me down, I’m having a good laugh out of it all anyways. |
Originally Posted by KirillTheThrill
(Post 3250485)
What I find funny, is naturally everyone including the moderator read right through the part where I said, “this sounds like bs, can anyone confirm” and went directly after me. Which, this is a forum, feel free to gun me down, I’m having a good laugh out of it all anyways.
If you wanted to know what the guy was like, you could have just asked that without any innuendo. A guy who flew with him provided the answer I think. |
Originally Posted by rickair7777
(Post 3250516)
No, I was griping about slurs on Sully's character, not the TOGA question which I just answered politely.
If you wanted to know what the guy was like, you could have just asked that without any innuendo. A guy who flew with him provided the answer I think. |
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