tomgoodman

Huggy may suspect that you are an attorney working on a lawsuit.

resolater

Sure thing. Except any attorney working on a case has access to the same NTSB online documentation as everyone else, and could even compel the production of evidence. So now every discussion on an anonymous pilot forum about accidents have to be muffled by the exaggerated perceived threat of lawsuits that don't even exist? These mishaps were years ago. More distractions and evasions and excuses...what a crock. While were on that, why shouldn't there be a lawsuit if the ATAC Hunter guys died because something was wrong with the kit? If there wasn't anything wrong or anything to hide, then what's the problem with just giving a straight answer like normal people would?

Adlerdriver

I'll take a stab at this. While there are those in the public with a morbid interest in aviation accidents, those who have true professional interest in the hope of advancing safety and applying lessons are in the minority.

We're not talking about an accident involving a Cessna or the like operated by thousands of private pilots worldwide or even a modern airliner in use by the hundreds or even thousands. This is a 1950's vintage military aircraft with pilots who currently fly it worldwide numbered maybe in double digits. I guarantee you that should any of those operators want to discuss the line of questions you've posed here that they will be able to find answers and probably already have.

You or me and any other person not operating the aircraft can claim "learning from the mistakes of others"...."cornerstone of safety".... blah, blah but that's just a load of BS. What safety improvements for the general public are going to occur if you're able to solve the stall warning system question, determine the viability of the ejection seat or pinpoint the rationale behind the actions of a pilot in a military jet with a slow-spool, axial flow engine designed more than 6 decades ago?

Exactly... none. You just want to know because you're curious. The NTSB report has plenty of data points you can use to draw your own conclusions. That should be enough. It was for the NTSB.

Huggy and others who knew these pilots probably simply have no interest in dragging their brother aviators through the mud just because a few looky-loos feel like they need to know.

USMCFLYR

You make a lots of statements about Hunterss and stalls:
All pilots are taught to recognize stalls. This pilot was trained to recognize stalls. Did he have a moment of inattention in the landing pattern, in an airplane less forgiving than the airplane that he was more comfortable flying and it bit him in the butt?
It seems to be the case.

The fact that you don't do stall/spin training in the syllabus and the fact that at no time in regular Hunter flying for ATAC are you in a position where you would fly in that manner has seen a good Hunter safety record with regard to stall/spin mishaps.

The same stall warning systems that other 1950s era fighters had - the airplane talks to you.

I have first hand knowledge of the ejection seats working on aircraft used by ATAC. How do you know the brakes are going to work in your car when you get it? They are installed, maintained by people who know what they are doing, and sometimes - when required and used properly - I have seen them work.

You do not know if they could have/should have ejected safety. You think this, and we hope this - but only the person in the seat knows.

I have no knowledge of this mishap and no opinion on it.

Why don't you share with the forum your aviation background so that we may have a yard stick by which to measure our responses to you?
Do you have ANY flying experience? Do you have ANY jet experience? Do you have ANY tactical jet experience?
Again = what is your interest in this? Is it really just curiosity? DO you have a connection to the company or someone from the company? It is you who have been somewhat of the vein "More distractions and evasions and excuses...what a crock...."

I'll freely talk about my experiences. I wish I were back flying with them right now. If it wasn't for this dang 0730-1600, M-F job of mine I'd still be flying them!

resolater

Hi Adlerdriver,

OK, so I’m curious, then. From reading NTSB reports and evidence dockets about 3 experienced American ex-military pilots dying in Hunters operated by partners Lortie Aviation and Airborne Tactical Advantage Company is that it is very unlikely that, regardless of the cause, 3 out of 3 times the pilots failed to eject. There have been zero successful ejections from this Lortie Aviation fleet, and all 3 ejection situations were unsuccessful and fatal. This is a significant anomaly in ejection seat aircraft accidents. So I asked a question: Are the ejections seats in this fleet really live and safely operational or not? The level of avoidance and evasion by those who know the answer is telling enough, I suppose. But then USMCFLYER finally decided to answer after you. So, thanks anyway.

resolater

Hi USMCFLYR:

I'd say that brakes can be tested before and after the car moves, just like in an airplane. No so for ejection seats, though. Seeing other aircraft fleets or types with successful ejections is the point I am drawing – they should and do work, at least if initiated (and yes, inside the envelope) but didn’t work to save the 3 pilots in the Hunter fleet, who presumably had the experience and training to do so when needed. It is 100% certain in those 3 cases that not ejecting answered the “should have” question. My question is whether they “could have” if the seats don’t actually work (are not live). If they should have but could not have, I bet the pilots didn’t know that.

OK, my background, if it helps: yes I have flying experience, jet experience and tactical jet experience, and plenty of all three. Yes I am curious. No I am not connected to the company or anyone in it. If I were, I would have asked them my questions. Thanks for your reply, though. It seems at least the pilots believe the seats are live.

resolater

Here's the short summary (long report link is at the end):

NTSB Identification: NYC03FA164.

The most relevant part is the ejection seat not saving the pilot also in a stall situation (among many other errors), the non A&P working on Hunter with no records, and the airplane’s owner and unlicensed mechanics literally taking off from the scene of the accident over the Canadian border after stating to FAA officials they would remain for interviews. The remaining jets from this purchase joined the Airborne Tactical Advantage Company Hunter fleet.

2003 in PITTSTON, PA:
The pilot of the Hawker Hunter performed three aborted takeoffs in the 4 days that preceded the accident flight. A witness reported that each time, the pilot reported the brakes were dragging. The pilot also reported the engine was running "cool", but was OK. On the fourth attempted takeoff, witnesses reported the engine did not sound as loud as they expected and the airplane appeared slow. At the end of the 7,500 foot runway, the airplane abruptly pitched up, became airborne with wings rocking from side to side, and then disappeared below the level of the runway. The airplane impacted in an open field, below the level of the runway, in a nose high attitude and traveled into a wooded area. The pilot initiated ejection; however, the canopy did not separate from the airplane and the seat went through it. Three of the four canopy locks were found still locked. Water was found in the fuel filter. The airplane had received a replacement engine a month earlier, but was not signed off as airworthy. When the engine was ground run after the change, it was found to not meet two separate acceleration tests. The owner reported the maintenance records were on the airplane; however, none were found, and he never produced any documents to determine the airworthiness of the airplane. The last known annual inspection occurred 13 months prior to the flight. The airplane had been in non-preserved storage for over a year. The owner had de-registered the airplane with the FAA, with the intent of moving it to Canada; however, he had not applied for Canadian registration. After each aborted takeoff, the airplane was worked on by two non-certificated mechanics.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
• The pilot's failure to abort the takeoff, after the engine experienced a partial power loss for undetermined reasons. Factors were the pilot's improper preflight planning by his failure to determine if the airplane was airworthy, and the operators inadequate maintenance on the airplane, the use of non-certificated mechanics to perform the work on the airplane, and his failure to ensure the airplane met the minimum standards necessary for flight.

The long report is here: https://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.a...03FA164&akey=1

resolater

Andre Lortie Northern Lights July 22, 2003

Mr.Lortie was contacted in Canada. He gave his contact phone number and address. Mr.Lortie said he was the owner of the airplane, and the plan was to relocate it to Burlington, Vermont, where application would then be made to import the airplane into Canada. He had not applied for a Canadian airworthiness certificate or Canadian registration at the time of the accident.

When asked who was on the airplane with him, he reported that John Taylor, an employee of Northern Lights, and Tim Story, an employee of Aero Group also knows as Resource Financial were on board the airplane.

Mr. Lortie reported that he observed the accident and was asked to provide a written statement of his observations. He never complied with the request.

Mr.Lortie was forwarded via email the NTSB accident report form. In follow-up conversations, he reported that he had filled it out and sent to the NTSB; however, the form has never arrived.

Mr. Lortie was requested to make himself available for an interview along with company personnel involved in returning the airplane to service. Those interviews never took place.

resolater

Steve Hudak FAA Airworthiness Inspector July 23, 2003:

Mr. Hudak reported that he was standing near Mr. Lahovski when he also observed the takeoff. The airplane was not accelerating and engine did not seem to be running at full power. The airplane appeared to use nearly all of the runway, and then rapidly came into the air. The airplane continued straight ahead and disappeared from view as it settled below the level of the runway.

Mr. Hudak observed a Piper Navajo, Canadian registration C-GLUM returned to land after the accident. He approached the occupants as they deplaned from the airplane, and the occupants and asked who they were. After identify themselves, he then asked if they owned the Hawker Hunter that just crashed, and who identified himself as Andre Lortie, the president of Northern Lights said that yes, he did own the airplane. Mr. Hudak then asked that individual if he knew where the maintenance records were for the airplane, and Mr.Lortie reported that he they were on the airplane that just crashed. The FAA inspector further reported that he asked Mr. Lortie if he would remain in the area until the FAA had a chance to interview him, and he replied that he would.

Mr. Hudak reported he and Mr. Lahovski traveled to the accident site and were there between 1 and2hours.

Upon returning to the airport, the Navajo C-GLUM. along with the Mr Lortie had departed.

resolater

Tom Lahovski FAA Operations Inspector July 23,2003

An FAA operations inspector reported that he engaged in conversation with the pilot earlier in the morning. The conversation was general in nature. At one point, the FAA inspector asked the pilot if he knew how long it had been since the airplane had flown. The pilot reported that he thought it was 2 or 3 months. The FAA inspector reported that he turned to a mechanic who was familiar with the airplane and the mechanic reported that it had been over a year. At that point, the pilot exhibited a facial expression that the FAA inspector interpreted as surprise. The conversation terminated shortly thereafter, and the two parted company. The FAA inspector reported that he was left with a feeling that the pilot was confident that the airplane was airworthy, and that he could handle any emergency, which might arise in the flight. The pilot added that he had made several high-speed aborts, the reason for which were not specified.

Mr. Lahovski observed the takeoff from the Tech Aviation hanger. He was standing outside, and could clearly see the last half of the runway. He observed the airplane on the runway and it was not accelerating like the thought it should.

In addition, the engine noise was not as loud as he expected it would be. The airplane did not rotate until the very end of the runway, at which time the pilot appeared to pull the airplane abruptly into the air. The airplane gained an altitude of maybe 20 to 30 feet, and then started to sink. The wings appeared to be rocking from side to side, as the airplane disappeared from view below the level of the runway. Less than a minute later, he saw a column of black smoke arising from the general direction the airplane was traveling.

Mr. Lahovski reported that he examined the four canopy locks on the airplane, and only the left forward lock was released. The other three remained in a locked position.