bcrosier

If I understand correctly, there is also a MUCH longer mandatory upgrade time than you find (at least intermittently) in the states. Again, based in my limited understanding, the European model is significantly different from what we have in the states, and not really comparing apples to apples.

That said, historically the US model has historically produced pilots and airlines as good as anywhere, that process has been derailed/broken for the past few years. There are positive aspects to be drawn from both systems, and we should do so as we re-tool the US system.

SaltyDog

Agree it wasn't a split flap. Sorry for the poor posting, was responding (poorly when I reread) that the Captain and F/O may have thought it was a split flap based on the inputs and her unilaterally moving them back to previous position. The roll off after she put the handle too 15 may have triggered them to both think the roll off was a split flap, thus the focus on all the counteraileron (which is keeping with a split flap) rather than stall recovery. Then it was very late to realize it wasn't a split flap and in a deep stall. Have trained split flap to 121 crews in large transports, most crews react to the split flap with alot of aileron to counteract the rapid rolloff with nose up input to keep from rolling the aircraft. Often takes rudder input as well to maintain control until the flaps are repositioned to the previous setting. Sadly, many crews do not recover and crash. Reason for training on the near impossible condition.

MU3001a

Wow that's scary.

I have never experienced split flap training in the simulator, but I have had lots of uncommanded thrust reverser deployment training which is far and away the worst adverse asymmetric control situation I have experienced, far worse than typical engine out scenarios. Based on this I would have expected the instinctive and correct reaction would be to unload the wings with forward pressure on the yoke before attempting to use full aileron, accompanied by rudder to counteract adverse yaw.

squawkoff

Of course we can "Monday morning quarterback" this thing till we're blue in the face but I think the stick shaker activated so close to when she put the flaps down because the speed was 131KIAS. 3 seconds after selecting the flap to 15 the stick shaker activates. This may have caused them to believe that they had a split flap or tail stall. Apparently no one was monitoring the speed. The speed rapidly bled off after the gear was selected down. Speed went from 176K to 131K in 23 seconds. There was a point where the captain got the wings level and the speed started coming back up and if he would have reduced the AOA he might of salvaged the situation. The aircraft had rolled through 90 degrees when she put the flaps up. When I had originally read the CVR transcript I had thought it amazing that someone would select the flaps up when trying to recover from a stall. I thought that that may have contributed greatly to the accident but it appears to me that the airplane had already left controlled flight.

Not trying to be critical but trying to analyze the facts.

Centerline34

You are right juice. No memory items in this case in the DH8D QRH.

q100

except that the dash8 design is not susceptible to split flaps. If a flap actuator jams, the whole flap drive system stops. If the flap driveshaft that powers all actuator jackscrews splits, the secondary driveshaft picks up the slack (I speak from real life experience on this one - beware the C-Check!). There is no split flap training in Dash8 sylabi, nor the QRH.

Split flap, like ice, is, in this case, a red herring.

Very simple. Crew responded to stick shaker, caused by rapid decay in airspeed below the increased ref stick shaker speed, by pulling back on yoke. Probably because that is the response they'd been trained to make in part 121 sim training in stick shaker recoveries (untrimmed, hold altitude). Why they continued to fight the stick pusher is beyond me.

The main thing I take from 3407, and I'm not the only one, is that 121 stall training is awful. The standard method of hand flying an out of trim aircraft to stick shaker and then powering out (while holding back pressure on the yoke...) is completely unrealistic and nothing more than a demonstration of skill in performing that particular maneuver. Worse than unrealistic, I think we've just seen that it's bloody dangerous!

q100

If the crew thought it was a tail stall, or split flaps, then Colgan's training dept. has some serious 'splaining to do! Dash8 series suffers from neither one.

They have some 'splaining to do anyway on why it ever be SOPs to automatically, without any verbalization, to move Conditions Levers to MAX as part of gear down flow. Not much thought required to see the pitfalls on that one...

Cruise

What??? Why couldn't/shouldn't 'condition levers MAX' be part of a gear down flow?

q100

Just off the top of my head...

You put the gear down. You don't get three green. You have to troubleshoot. You get distracted and don't catch the fact that your airspeed is now bleeding off rapidly with power near idle. You get a stick shaker. Etc.

More relevant, having the PF command "Condition Levers MAX" serves as a useful reminder to the PF that they may need to adjust power if they wish to maintain airspeed. When a crew is fatigued and or distracted, little memory joggers like that can be very helpful...

I know I'm not the only present/former Dash8 driver that expressed surprise that this seems to be Colgan SOPs. I personally believe that Condition Levers MAX is a power/configuration change, and as such should really only be done by or at the direction of the PF. The one exception I might make is for landings at reduced RPM, where the PNF/PM pushes Conditions Levers MAX before DISCing is used.

If I remember, at Allegheny we configured something like:

Command/Action:

"Gear Down"
"Flaps 15"
"Condition Levers 1050 (or MAX - if required), Before Landing Checklist"

Made sense to me.

sigep_nm

Maybe during training they need to make a call along the lines of "power levers forward" since they apparently forgot to do that.