q100

The idea is, that for situational awareness, the PNF/PM does not change power or configuration settings without some form of verbalization. Condition Levers MAX is a power change, especially at power setting near flight idle.

I have yet to hear of an airline where, during descent and approach, the PF was not responsible for the power levers. Personally I think the PFs hand should be on the power levers for approach....

It may or may not have made a difference to flight 3407, but perhaps if the CA had actually commanded "Condition Levers MAX" he may have been more clued in to the likelihood of a rapid speed decay. Something caused them to be in level flight, gear down, idle power, high RPM and not paying attention to the speed tape. Maybe a verbal exchange would have broken that major link in the error chain....

MU3001a

Back in my Jetsream days, I would have been very p***ed at any FO that pushed the speed levers up (Garret eng. same as CL's) without getting the nod from me, even though SL's max is on the before landing checklist. Normal routine would be for the FO to put their hand on the SL's when they reached that part of the checklist and call "Speeds" but wait until recieving an affirmative "Speeds high" before moving them. Anyone know if the Colgan SOP's in respect to the props are the same on the Saab?

BE19Pilot

Valid points raised about procedures that are used when changing aircraft configuration/power settings. However, they just don't apply here. Marvin was a SAAB F/O and later Captain. In the SAAB as well as the "Q" when the landing gear is called to be extended by the PM part of the flow is to advance the condition levers to full-foward. I think all of you will acknowledge that there are aural and tactile clues that this has been accomplished. I don't think that this procedure contributed to the accident.
The simple fact remains that BOTH pilots were distracted, lost situational awareness (aircraft/power config.) and when the shaker went off. The Captain panicked, over-reacted (incorrectly) to the shaker and failed to perform the correct approach to a stall recovery procedure.

SaltyDog

Question to Saab drivers, since the Capt was new to the Q, his 'reverted' training may be what he did. Now if the Saab had no mechanical chance of a split flap like you say on the Q, then would agree. If Saab has a split flap scenario or manufactered recommended training, then a possibility since he was 'new' to the Q.

Cruise

Be ****ed because an FO advanced the condition levers w/out a command? Great, but that just doesn't seem to be something to raise your blood pressure about. It's SOP.

I understand some of the questions regarding CL's being part of the flow; however, I don't see a problem with it, at all. To cite not getting three green.....big deal. Time to break off the approach and run a checklist or two. So now you have to add a little power, regardless, for the go around....you're gonna have better climb performance w/ the props forward than in cruise setting. Also, when you're configuring for an approach (and that starts at the first configuration change....regardless whether flap or gear) PF should have a hand on the power levers and paying attention to the instruments. CL's to Max in the flow doesn't need to be commanded. If you feel it must be; perhaps you need to back off the Command high horse just a bit. Now, if your company SOP's require CL call outs, then go for it. Colgan's does not....and there is absolutely nothing wrong w/ that.

My $.02

Besides, bringing the CL's to max will drastically change the ambient sound level in the cockpit. There is no mistaking what just happened.

Cruise

Saab flaps are mechanically interlinked to one another, if I remember correctly. Although there were procedures for Split Flap.....I seem to recall being taught it couldn't occur. It's been awhile and I've brain dumped most of that stuff...so I could easily be mistaken.

BE19Pilot

A J-Ball pilot could just as easily forget to call "speeds" and you wind up with the same scenario. What you are failing to see is the loss of situational awareness, not an incorrect procedure. CL's FULL-FOWARD was the proper procedure, and the crew was trained to do exactly what they did when it came to configuring. I cannot say for certain where the Captain's hands were, but it doesn't make any difference where they were if the distraction/error chain wasn't broken by proper control inputs. Given how quickly the yoke was programmed aft following the shaker, I suspect that Marvin's hand was on the yoke...The rest is history.

MU3001a

If the FO did 'forget' and jammed the props up without waiting for confirmation, then he/she would get an earful from me and wouldn't be likely to make that same mistake twice. I'm not failing to see the loss of SA. Pushing the props up without waiting for confirmation is itself an indication of a loss of SA, one that appears to be built into the Colgan checklists/SOP's.

However, moving the CL's without waiting for a specific confirmation did not cause this accident. It's just bad technique, though largely inconsequential when set against the far more egregious examples of neglect and incorrect technique displayed by this crew.

SmoothOnTop

Very few of us haven't made mistakes that put the aircraft in a condition that needs attention (ie. too fast/slow/high/low).

A pilot with b1900, sf340 and q400 experience would know that bringing the condition or props up would increase drag.

A pilot with an inherent fear of aerodynamic stalls from his primary (think cessna 150) training had an adverse reaction to stick shaker (remember stick shaker is a warning prior to the critical attack AND at their configuration, this was simply slow flight).

...

MU3001a

I would call it an unjustified fear and if we are to significantly improve safety in this area, then we must grab the bull by the horns and require training programs incorporating efforts to identify and eradicate the irrational fear of stalls from within the ranks of professional crews.