737-400 cargo jet emergency landing in ocean
#122
Another example of why it makes sense to match thrust levers after an engine has been secured:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Io71Bh-9bUs
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Io71Bh-9bUs
#123
Line Holder
Joined APC: Jan 2014
Posts: 96
Yup, we trained accident by how we flew LP. One common training event was 3-engine approach, landing or go-around with an engine idled to simulate the failed engine. Most IPs always failed 1 or 4, as it was most challenging on the 3-engine go. That DOV was partly on the training profiles, the lack of CRM, too. If the PF had all four throttles open hand, it wouldn’t have happened.
#124
Disinterested Third Party
Joined APC: Jun 2012
Posts: 5,923
But how do you match levers when the engine is running at idle. That's the problem. But there is another rare safety issue when in flight simulated engine out work is done. I'm the IP on a T-38 ride and we come back to do a SE overhead (before they were banned). Make it around final turn and roll out with airspeed trending down. "Airspeed", "power" with no response so, "I got it" grab the idle lever and match both while cramming them into max AB. I ignored the screaming until we were stable. What's the matter? My hand is stuck. Got him free with no permanent damage.
In a transport category Boeing, we don't do that. We have a simulator, and in the simulator, when we have severe engine damage, an engine failure, or a fire, we shut the engine down in a four-step memory procedure that disconnects the autothrottle, retards a thrust lever to verify engine response or lack thereof, fuel-chop the engine with the fuel control, and as appropriate, t-handle the engine to shut off fuel, hydraulic, and electric. It's the manufacturer procedure, it's how the training is done, and it's how the aircraft is flown. We don't typically go do it in the airplane because it's a lot easier on airplanes, and a lot less expensive, and a lot safer, to do it in a simulator. Consequently, there's no real concern with flying around with one thrust lever at idle while we "simulate" an engine shutdown. It IS shutdown.
I can't see a valid reason to idle a suspected engine failure/fire/severe damage, when the procedure clearly involves shutting it down and securing it. That done, once secured and the fuel control has been placed to cutoff, then the thrust lever can be returned to the pilot flying so that he has the same fist full of throttles that he had when both were working.
#126
ON the CRJ fuel cutoff is achieved by lifting the red lever on the back of the affected thrust lever and moving the lever aft to cutoff position, releasing the red lever locks the thrust lever in the cutoff position. Boeing, Embraer and Airbus have separate fuel cutoff levers/knobs that would allow the affected trust lever to still be moved in coordination with the good one.
#127
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2008
Posts: 112
Final report is out: "We determined the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The flight crewmembers’ misidentification of the damaged engine (after leveling off the airplane and reducing thrust) and their use of only the damaged engine for thrust during the remainder of the flight, resulting in an unintentional descent and forced ditching in the Pacific Ocean. Contributing to the accident were the flight crew’s ineffective crew resource management, high workload, and stress."
DCA21FA174.aspx (ntsb.gov)
DCA21FA174.aspx (ntsb.gov)
#128
Final report is out: "We determined the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The flight crewmembers’ misidentification of the damaged engine (after leveling off the airplane and reducing thrust) and their use of only the damaged engine for thrust during the remainder of the flight, resulting in an unintentional descent and forced ditching in the Pacific Ocean. Contributing to the accident were the flight crew’s ineffective crew resource management, high workload, and stress."
DCA21FA174.aspx (ntsb.gov)
DCA21FA174.aspx (ntsb.gov)
#129
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Mar 2017
Posts: 285
Final report is out: "We determined the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The flight crewmembers’ misidentification of the damaged engine (after leveling off the airplane and reducing thrust) and their use of only the damaged engine for thrust during the remainder of the flight, resulting in an unintentional descent and forced ditching in the Pacific Ocean. Contributing to the accident were the flight crew’s ineffective crew resource management, high workload, and stress."
DCA21FA174.aspx (ntsb.gov)
DCA21FA174.aspx (ntsb.gov)
#130
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: May 2021
Posts: 316
It’s gonna be interesting to see if the FAA grants the certificate holder the ability to resume operation of their 737s now that the final report is out. I can’t imagine anybody would want to fly for them anyways. The other 737 cargo operator has basically doubled their aircraft in HNL and appear to be dominating the market.
Also, when I was loudly proclaiming the day after that the only cause possible was a mis-ID of the failed engine so many told me I was crazy - guess I'm not that crazy... I can sleep well tonight.
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