Probably, since they already HAVE hardwired trim cutout switches.

Also probably some sort of cockpit indication that MCAS is functioning. Probably also a limit on repetitive MCAS operations, so it doesn't keep repeating the process indefinitely in response to bad data. It doesn't move the trim that far or that fast, the problem is when it keeps doing it over and over again intermittently.

I probably did not make myself clear and apologize. What kind of failure would it take for the system not to be blocked out when the flaps are deployed? Would the failure of a (single?) flap position sensor allow for the system to engage with the flaps deployed when both AOA sensors sensed a high AOA at lift-off or landing? Does the MAX have or does it need two flap position sensors in addition to the other fix?

I'm sure they do since they still support the plane. But that's not the same as being able to build it, they would essentially have to start from scratch, minus whatever old-timer 757 vets are still employed there (or could be enticed out of retirement). They might even still have the tooling stored away, in case they had to build a major structural part for some reason.

Boeing and Airbus are good at what they do, but their ecosystems are not designed or evolved to restart long-dead production lines. Much harder than you might think.

It would be an economically ludicrous proposition anyway. They are not even sure they can make a business case for a NEW design NMA...

Beats me. One single actuation of the MCAS is not going to make an aircraft uncontrollable. The problem was there were multiple cumlative activations of nose down trim. That too has been addressed. In your scenario, Boeing has a disagree logic. If the flap handle and any the trailing/leading edge devices aren’t in agreement you are notified. They could easily make sure MCAS does not engage unless the handle and the devices agree flaps are up.

They are not stupid, but they did take shortcuts to get the max approved. It will cost them plenty.

The problem is, the system was designed to kick in multiple times. In not, then in an actual stall, with a nose up trim, the system will activate, you will click the thumb switch to relieve the perceived pressure which will kill the MCAS. In that configuration with substantial nose up trim and in a stall you may not recover unless you apply nose down trim.

Not sure on this. but didn't Boeing re start the 767 line so they could build the USAF some tankers?

I would much rather be flying around in an updated, and quite capable, quite tested, and very proven B 757 then trying to put the round peg in the square hole from a design perspective with these new Maxxed out 737's.

Boeing should simply say this: The Mission of the B737 is X. The mission of the B 757 is Y. Which jet do you want? We can and will build what you need.

I guess we are being forced to wait for the 797 to get the replacement for the 757?

Nope Boeing sold FDX 76s at a discount to keep the line open.

I think you will find it is no longer designed to kick in multiple times before the max ever flys again. At least that is what The Seattle Times says Boeing says. It was never supposed to be able to move the trim that much. But the designers failed.

First I’m not saying this happened. But this could happen.

Climb out normal. Autopilot on. AOA sensor fail. Airspeed disagree. Autopilot will disconnect. That situation could be handled perfectly by keeping everything the same. Same pitch same power. You are now hand flying. Now enter MCAS. This complicates things and can lead - even at first application - to pitch oscillations.

And the accident sequence. It’s not one thing that will get you.

Would this apply to 767 crews too?