rvfanatic

As a pilot, I do see value in it. I had a great experience interviewing at UPS and what stood out to me was the fact that candidates are scored on FLYING and not just HR, testing, etc. The sim
event was not a pass fail ride from what I hear. I think it’s treated more like the HR panel where a score is given based off flying and added to the total score.

I think the pool system (not first in first out like most companies) at UPS is inconvenient and costing them quality candidates. I would hesitate to follow their lead in many ways, but I think they got the sim portion of their interview right.

Maybe UPS’s round dial, no FD, no AP, ILS in the wx simulator is exactly what we want in light of recent crashes in our industry? At the end of the day, the company will hire who they want, but pilots at each company should have a say.

Mesabah

My understanding was at high AoA, the nacelle produces lift, the MCAS was installed to counteract that, which the FAA reluctantly approved. This characteristic is not allowed under FAR 25.

rickair7777

Nacelle lift is not allowed? That would be hard to eliminate on almost any configuration with a high AoA?

Or do you mean pitch up moment with thrust increase?

rickair7777

I don't think round dials are necessarily the way to evaluate candidates in all cases. You could be at a top-tier interview today and have never once in your life flown round dials. RJ's are glass, and many GA trainers are now glass. You could also have been in glass for years, and applying for a job flying glass jets... what exactly would be the point of evaluating you on steam at that point?

IMO the most accurate sim test would be representative of what the applicant CURRENTLY flies. A generic non-motion PC-based trainer could be selected to the appropriate configuration with the flip of a switch. If not that, then something representative of what the applicant will be flying if gets the job.

Mesabah

Apparently, at high AoA, the nacelle lift generated is so far forward of CG that control back pressure releases near the stall. MCAS is added to simulate linear control pressure throughout. FAR 25.672 talks about augmented control systems to comply with FAR 25.173.

1wife2airlines

MCAS is not there for pitch up moment with thrust increase. It's there because the forward placement of the LEAP engines nacelles gives additional pitch up moment at high AOA. That causes the Cm vs AOA to become non linear at high AOA and not in compliance with a part 25 criteria that the original 737 was certified under. There might or might not be a change to the thrust increase effect in the Max vs the NG but MCAS is not for that. In fact the LEAP engines were moved forward and UP so there might not be a difference because the thrust line was moved up.

Firefighter

Hello, I have had a friend of mine comment on one of my posts, it was just an article about the crash and he left this

“MCAS was not installed as a safety feature. Not buying that sales pitch crap. It was installed to offset a design flaw, specifically that the bigger powerful engines had to be moved forward and higher on the wing which then would tend to push the nose up. It changes the center of gravity of the airplane. Airplane software is great when it's operating like cruise control -- not when it's being asked to correct a design problem. And the design problem was a marketing decision. FAA's approval of a software solution to an aerodynamic problem. Software should be intended to improve planes, and not to patch bad designs, nor make it fly. To rush out a new narrowbody and maintain parity with Airbus 320 NEO, Boeing purposely created a plane that was aerodynamically unstable because the company did not want the aircraft to require certification as a new plane, a - with good reason - lengthy process .”

Now I wanted to do research but it’s kind of hard pin pointing this exact info for someone who’s not a pilot so for the best knowledge, I wanna ask pilots about this. Again please excuse any ignorance in my question or please help yourself with correcting anything.

Mesabah

MCAS is a compliance issue, it's not a safety feature. Augmented control systems are allowed provided they don't malfunction according to FAR 25.672. The question for the FAA will be whether the 2.5 vs 0.6 trim degree change is considered too excessive a control input, if so, the aircraft will require some form of design change. This is quite simple to do, but performance would be reduced IF that's the case.

The investigation will figure out whether or not Boeing hid the issue to market the aircraft. So, wait and see is the best answer to your question.

1wife2airlines

The airplane is not unstable. In fact the autopilot does not need MCAS. It just puts attitude where it needs to be without being aware of column force. If you told most pilots that the stick force would get light when they got near high AOA clean they most likely would deal with it and put the aircraft's attitude where they wanted it irregardless of the stick force. But part 25 requires that feel to be linear or such.

1wife2airlines

If Boeing hid the issue why was the Brazilian Certifying Authority aware of MCAS and actually listed it as a "B" training item in their OER with a Chief Boeing Technical Pilot listed as participating? Did some authorities bye the "info overload" rationale to not train on MCAS while Brazil did not. But I was surprised that GOL grounded their fleet after the second incident being that per ANAC they would have already been trained as to MCAS existence. Maybe they thought whatever they trained was insufficient.