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Ethiopian 737 MAX 8 crash

Old 03-16-2020, 07:15 AM
  #881  
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Time for some akro training?
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Old 03-17-2020, 08:37 AM
  #882  
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Originally Posted by 727C47 View Post
right, even though those AA check airmen ended up vertical the first time they tried to replicate it in the sim even though they knew what was coming....
Remind me... what has been the ďRun Away Stabilizer TrimĒ procedure from the B707 to the B727 and the B737 from the -100 to the -900ER?
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Old 03-17-2020, 09:39 AM
  #883  
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And you would do better than the check airmen ,ok ...if it was purely a runaway event it wouldnít still be grounded
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Old 03-18-2020, 11:21 PM
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Originally Posted by 727C47 View Post
And you would do better than the check airmen ,ok ...if it was purely a runaway event it wouldnít still be grounded
But if they knew what to do, then why didnít they just flip those switches to the cut out position? Sounds like some other information that was originally given to the reporter, may have been accidentally (purposely) lost after that interview.

Boeing released the software update to avoid any MCAS errors not even a month after the second crash. They also committed to completing 1,500HRs of flight tests, over 800+ flights before submitting an FAA review. I personally believe Boeing is waiting for the final report on ET302. Ever since the second accident every article has been biased with incomplete information, and others have even gone as far as lying to keep their numbers up. Itís fairly difficult to find the information you want, regarding this situation, or even just the 737 in general. Iíd bet if you googled ď737-200Ē the only thing youíd see is a bunch of articles about the deadly max and how Boeing employees basically mocked there supervisor. These articles tell maybe 1/3 of the story.

Some people really think that the crews were fantastic, and that they did everything they could to save the aircraft, but that darn MCAS kept activating.

I really do wonder how and why the pilot performance is being ignored worldwide. Itís way overlook compared to what everyone is actually looking at. I mean honestly, I get the role that Boeing has in this situation, but is it any worse than Lion Air buying an AoA sensor that was mis-calibrated by whatever company they purchased it from, and then skipping the required test that should have been completed before installing it. Instead they installed it anyway. The plane ends up crashing. And now they decide to lie about it, using the same test that needed to be completed, and was completed, but on an older aircraft, saying it was the test for the accident aircraft. THEN, they turn around and force the families to sign documents agreeing that they would not sue Lion Air, or Boeing.

Again, Iím honestly asking, because if you ask me it is a lot worse, and it sounds like a lot more negligence from Lion Air brought down JT610 than Boeing.

From what Iíve gathered about JT610, is that the crew just straight up forgot the procedure, but they were able to identify the unreliable airspeed. Despite all of that, neither checklist was completed. Also the fact that they were doing okay because the Captain was re-trimming the airplane everytime MCAS activated, 21 times to be exact. Until he transferred control to the F/O who resorted to holding back pressure to fight MCAS, and unfortunately the stabilizer out did the elevator because it was allowed to drive the stab to zero.

With ET302, Iíve read that the crew identified not only the unreliable airspeed, but the runaway stab as well. They even knew which side was receiving the faulty data. In the end, they completed the final step on the runaway stab procedure, but skipped everything else, and as a result they were left in a situation to re engage the pitch trim motors because they couldnít manually trim, all from the crews actions. Between both accidents, neither crew completed a single step on either checklist for unreliable airspeed or a runaway stabilizer.

Why? If the plane was really throwing pilots off with mysterious elements that they couldnít make out, then why hasnít a lot more than two crashes happened, I mean we donít even know of many incidents that were similar, but ended in a successful landing, except for the flight before JT610, which was the same aircraft, but successfully performed the procedure, manually trimmed and landed safely. In total there are 5 ó737/Max aircraft in Ethiopia, and 15 in Indonesia, while the US has 75, and the only problem we hear about is a check airman who knew what was coming and still had difficulty recovering. All in a simulator?
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