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Old 01-19-2012, 12:34 PM   #1  
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Question Immediate Action Items from memory

The CRJ-200 Immediate Action Items for Stabilizer Trim Runaway requires the flight crew to pull two circuit breakers without reference to the Check List...apparently the FAA thinks these are "memory items" and should be done without following the step-by-step list provided in the Quick Reference Handbook.
1.) if you fly the CRJ-200 is this required by your airline?
2.) if you fly an aircraft (besided the CRJ-200) that has "immediate actions" do any of that involve pulling a Circuit Breaker from MEMORY? If so, what aircraft and what is it for?
I understand how important it is to stop the runaway, however I am concerned that requiring a crew to pull a circuit breaker from memory is not safe.
Thank you for your time.
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Old 01-19-2012, 06:12 PM   #2  
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BE 1900D

Unscheduled Rudder Boost Activation:

Control Wheel Disconnect Switch: Depress And Hold (1st level)
Rudder Boost/Yaw Control Test Switch: Off

If Condition Persists:
Rudder Boost Circuit Breaker: Pull
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Old 01-19-2012, 09:38 PM   #3  
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It's been several years since I flew the CRJ-200, but we never had pulling CBs in our checklist. Here's the QRH I used at ACA/IDE:

Conditions: Abnormal/Uncommanded change in pitch attitude. Higher
or lower than normal and increasing or decreasing pitch
control forces.

CONTROL WHEEL ............................ ASSUME MANUAL CONTROL
STAB TRIM.............................................. .....................DISCONNECT


1. Assign PF/PNF.
2. Maintain airspeed of not more than 250 KIAS (M 0.70).
3. PASS SIGNS .................................................. ...............................ON
4. Autopilot, stab trim and mach trim are not available.
5. Land as soon as possible.
6. Notify ATC and Company as soon as practical.
7. GND PROX FLAP .................................................. ..................OVRD
8. Land with flaps 20°.
9. Develop plan, consider and review:
• Multiply the flaps 45 Landing Field Length (see TLR or Speed
Cards) by the appropriate factor in the table below to determine
a landing distance that allows the airplane to stop within 60% of
the total runway available.
• If an airport with a runway equal to or greater than the distance
calculated above is not available, Actual Landing Distance (see
TLR or QRH, Page 15-39) may be multiplied by the appropriate
factor in the table below. This distance is the actual horizontal
distance necessary to land and stop from a point 50’ above the
landing surface, at VREF, touch down 1000’ from the threshold,
using maximum braking. Use a longer runway to allow for error.
Without Thrust Reversers 1.25 (25%)
With Thrust Reversers 1.20 (20%)
• Fuel / time remaining.
• Weather and available approaches.
• NOTAMS.
• Field conditions.
• TLR performance data.
10. Brief the flight attendant using the “TEST” items as a guide.
11. Establish bottom lines, establish backup plan, brief plan.
-----------END----------
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Old 01-19-2012, 11:32 PM   #4  
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None of our memory items require CB pulling. Not a great idea, in my opinion.
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Old 01-20-2012, 07:11 AM   #5  
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Quote:
Originally Posted by CRJ1000 View Post
The CRJ-200 Immediate Action Items for Stabilizer Trim Runaway requires the flight crew to pull two circuit breakers without reference to the Check List...apparently the FAA thinks these are "memory items" and should be done without following the step-by-step list provided in the Quick Reference Handbook.
1.) if you fly the CRJ-200 is this required by your airline?
2.) if you fly an aircraft (besided the CRJ-200) that has "immediate actions" do any of that involve pulling a Circuit Breaker from MEMORY? If so, what aircraft and what is it for?
I understand how important it is to stop the runaway, however I am concerned that requiring a crew to pull a circuit breaker from memory is not safe.
Thank you for your time.

When I flew the CRJ-100/200ER, we had the same memory action item. IIRC on our aircraft the CB's were highlighted with high reflectivity tape, you couldn't miss them. It is necessary to pull them in some cases to stop a trim runaway. It's been a few years, but I think 2F5 and 4A1 were both along the FO's right ankle so you'd transfer control to the LH side.

I'd agree that yanking breakers in an emergency from memory may not be the best approach, but in the sim, it was nice just reaching down and yanking them out, stopping the runaway. As long as you know the memory item and the CB's are marked so they stand out, I don't see much of an issue as long as you've trained for it.
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Old 01-20-2012, 09:56 AM   #6  
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I'd rather pull the C/B and not die from a runway that can't be stopped by the switches.

If you pull the wrong C/B so what just push it back in. There isn't much on that airplane that there aren't 3 of.

From what I recall the background of this is a few challengers had trim run aways that were caused by corrosion on circuit boards that caused electrical shorts. The theory was it could potentially disable the disconnect switches. The only sure fire way to kill the run away was remove power from the system.
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Old 01-20-2012, 10:59 AM   #7  
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Quote:
Originally Posted by FlyingNasaForm View Post
I'd rather pull the C/B and not die from a runway that can't be stopped by the switches.

If you pull the wrong C/B so what just push it back in. There isn't much on that airplane that there aren't 3 of.

From what I recall the background of this is a few challengers had trim run aways that were caused by corrosion on circuit boards that caused electrical shorts. The theory was it could potentially disable the disconnect switches. The only sure fire way to kill the run away was remove power from the system.
Good info, however if there is a DESIGN flaw, then FIX the airplane!
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Old 01-20-2012, 10:37 PM   #8  
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Quote:
Originally Posted by FlyingNasaForm View Post
I'd rather pull the C/B and not die from a runway that can't be stopped by the switches.
In a modern JET there are very few items that need to be accomplished by memory. The only ones I can think of off the top of my head are O2 and runaway stab. All others can wait a few mins.

More airlines and operators need to move to eliminating memory items. The more you have the more chance you have at screwing it up.
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Old 01-23-2012, 02:39 PM   #9  
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From a paper:

LINE PILOT PERFORMANCE OF MEMORY ITEMS

Howard Au
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group*
P.O. Box 3707 MC 67-TC
Seattle, WA 98124, USA

* This research was paid for through out-of-pocket expenses by the author. It was conducted while the author was a
student at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in partial fulfillment for the degree of M.S. Aeronautics.

Even though the method used in this study did not
induce stress, it allowed for an evaluation of the pilots’
knowledge of the memory items without prior
preparation. Pilots generally perform well during their
PCs, and possibly better than inflight, because they
expect an evaluation and can prepare for it. Pilot
performance observed in this study may be closer to
that in an inflight emergency, in which the pilots are
unprepared to perform their memory items.

Clearly, an inflight emergency places a pilot under a
great deal of stress. Based on the literature review, it
can be inferred that errors similar to those observed
here may occur inflight during an actual emergency,
and may even occur more frequently due to increased
stress. Conducting a similar study in a full-flight
simulator may provide a level of stress similar to what
is experienced in a real emergency. The results
obtained from a simulator could be a more realistic
representation of the results obtained inflight.


The results demonstrate that pilots have difficulty
identifying the cause of the failure and selecting the
correct procedure. After identifying the situation,
knowledge of the appropriate memory items is such
that pilots commit errors in recall even during
unstressed conditions with a poster of the flight deck
for context.

None of the five failure scenarios in this study had a
distinct indicator light that would annunciate the
condition. Pilots were forced to analyze the cues and
determine the appropriate procedure. This is an
uncommon and involved task, and not performing it
may force pilots to complete only those tasks they are
familiar with, such as following an illuminated LOW
OIL PRESSURE light to the Low Oil Pressure
checklist during an aborted engine start, or fixating on
abnormal engine noises and performing the Engine
Fire/Severe Damage/Separation checklist, instead of
the more appropriate Engine Limit/Surge/Stall
checklist.

The observed checklist step errors showed that pilots
commit a number of errors. The majority of the
commission errors were steps performed by pilots to
resolve a failure based on their knowledge of the
airplane systems. Some of these commission errors
The results demonstrate that pilots have difficulty
identifying the cause of the failure and selecting the
correct procedure. After identifying the situation,
knowledge of the appropriate memory items is such
that pilots commit errors in recall even during
unstressed conditions with a poster of the flight deck
for context.

None of the five failure scenarios in this study had a
distinct indicator light that would annunciate the
condition. Pilots were forced to analyze the cues and
determine the appropriate procedure. This is an
uncommon and involved task, and not performing it
may force pilots to complete only those tasks they are
familiar with, such as following an illuminated LOW
OIL PRESSURE light to the Low Oil Pressure
checklist during an aborted engine start, or fixating on
abnormal engine noises and performing the Engine
Fire/Severe Damage/Separation checklist, instead of
the more appropriate Engine Limit/Surge/Stall
checklist.

The observed checklist step errors showed that pilots
commit a number of errors. The majority of the
commission errors were steps performed by pilots to
resolve a failure based on their knowledge of the
airplane systems. Some of these commission errors
demonstrated a misunderstanding of how the systems
in the 737 functioned. Other errors were a result of
either knowledge gained during a real experience in
the past, or a belief carried over from previous
organizations and airplanes, which may no longer be
applicable.

Implications

Even though the method used in this study did not
induce stress, it allowed for an evaluation of the pilots’
knowledge of the memory items without prior
preparation. Pilots generally perform well during their
PCs, and possibly better than inflight, because they
expect an evaluation and can prepare for it. Pilot
performance observed in this study may be closer to
that in an inflight emergency, in which the pilots are
unprepared to perform their memory items.

Clearly, an inflight emergency places a pilot under a
great deal of stress. Based on the literature review, it
can be inferred that errors similar to those observed
here may occur inflight during an actual emergency,
and may even occur more frequently due to increased
stress. Conducting a similar study in a full-flight
simulator may provide a level of stress similar to what
is experienced in a real emergency. The results
obtained from a simulator could be a more realistic
representation of the results obtained inflight.
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Old 01-23-2012, 04:24 PM   #10  
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Iceman,

Do you have a link to the actual study results or full paper?
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