SLI Post Hearing Briefs
#41
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Am I reading this correctly from the UAL side?
"6. Until the first bid period 5 years following the implementation of the ISL, premerger UAL pilots involuntarily furloughed as of Oct 1, 2010 shall be subject to furlough (in their reverse seniority order) prior to the furlough of any pre-merger CAL pilot."
Why would the UAL side propose that?
"6. Until the first bid period 5 years following the implementation of the ISL, premerger UAL pilots involuntarily furloughed as of Oct 1, 2010 shall be subject to furlough (in their reverse seniority order) prior to the furlough of any pre-merger CAL pilot."
Why would the UAL side propose that?
#42
CONCLUSION
We have never ended a brief, whether before an arbitrator or a court, with a conclusion longer than one or two lines asking the tribunal to rule for us for the reasons stated in the brief. This case is an exception. Airline mergers and the attendant pilot seniority integrations have proven to be the most stressful periods in an airline’s evolution. That stress manifests itself in a variety of ways that pose serious problems for the respective pilot groups and for ALPA as an institution. The expectations that competing integration proposals create in the minds of the merging pilot groups – and the hostility engendered by these competing proposals – leave scars that do not heal well, if at all. Twenty years after the Award in Northwest-Republic, and five years after Northwest’s merger with Delta, former Northwest and Republic pilots are still known as Red Book or Green Book pilots and the two groups still find it difficult to function as a cohesive group. Shortly after the Awards in Atlas-Polar and America West-US Airways, the merged pilot groups left ALPA for the Teamsters and USAPA, respectively – in both cases as a direct result of the SLI process. And although not accomplished under ALPA Merger Policy, the American-TWA SLI remains a matter of significant controversy, is in danger of infecting American’s merger with US Airways, and has resulted in a multi-million dollar jury verdict against ALPA.
While there are surely many explanations for the tumult created by the SLI process, the leading culprit is the unrealistic expectations of many of the pilot groups. In our experience, those unrealistic expectations translate into extreme SLI proposals, and those extreme proposals are what allows the rhetoric and the animosity that flows from the fight over a scarce resource – a position on a combined seniority list – to spiral out of control.
Unfortunately, language in recent awards issued by arbitration boards charged with resolving these seniority disputes have exacerbated rather than calmed these forces. Perhaps out of a belief that principles of arbitral evenhandedness (coupled with George Nicolau’s admonition that “the proposals advanced by those in contest rarely meet [the fair and equitable] standard”) requires equal condemnation of both pilot groups’ proposals, arbitrators in America West-US Airways and Delta-Northwest described in text the proposals of both pilot groups as “unreasonable.” Thus, in America West-US Airways, George Nicolau said, “ the Board has repeatedly expressed misgivings as to the fairness of each group’s full proposal.”America West- US Airways at 24. And in Delta-Northwest, the three-member board said “[e]ach [side’s proposal] does little more than stack the deck for their own constituencies in ways that are neither fair nor equitable.”Delta-Northwest at 14.
But these conclusory sentiments simply did not reflect the real views of these boards as evidenced by the Awards they issued. In America West-US Airways, the US Airways pilots proposed a date of hire solution while the America West pilots proposed a status and category solution with all US Airways furloughees placed below active America West pilots. George Nicolau totally rejected the US Airways pilots’ proposal and adopted the America West pilots’ proposal (including tailored equipment fence) with some modest changes on matters independent of the principle tenants of their proposal. In Delta-Northwest, the Northwest pilots proposed a date of hire solution while the Delta pilots proposed a status and category solution. The Board in that case rejected entirely the Northwest pilots proposal (and its alternative “non-proposal” for a Dynamic List”) and adopted the structure of the Delta pilots’ proposal (including the specific proposed equipment fences), modified only to accommodate the difference in the near-term attrition rates of the two pilot groups.
Despite the results in those cases, the language used by the Boards sent the incorrect message to pilots of airlines that subsequently merged (and will in the future merge) that neither side benefitted from having made a realistic, reasonable proposal or was adversely affected by having made an unreasonable one. And that incorrect message “empowers” pilot groups to continue making unrealistic SLI proposals on the mistaken belief that doing so has no decisional consequences. But as past cases have demonstrated, acting on that mistaken belief does have consequences. It turns pre-arbitration negotiations and mediation – the desired manner for resolving SLI disputes – into meaningless exercises and effectively mutes the voice of the group making an unreasonable proposal in the subsequent SLI arbitration process because the arbitration board has no real guidance from one of the contesting parties.
If that were the only consequence, the harm would be limited to disappointing the pilot group that acted unreasonably. But that isn’t the only consequence. When an Award fails to call out the fact that one side has made an entirely unreasonable proposal – that has been in essence ignored in the final Award – that encourages, or fails to discourage, continuing unreasonable proposals; it also encourages the very conduct that inflames the SLI process and leads to the bitter recrimination that haunts the merged pilot group and ALPA for decades after.
In this case, the United Committee – like the America West and Delta Committees – has made a reasonable proposal. The Continental Committee – like the US Airways and Northwest Committees – has not. 41 Assuming the Board reaches the same conclusion, we urge in the strongest terms that it say so in its opinion so that future merger committees will take this Board’s admonitions to heart and the damaging consequences of unreasonable posturing will be eliminated or at least minimized in future mergers.
With that said, for the reasons set out in this Post-Hearing Brief, the United Committee respectfully requests that the Board adopt the United Committee’s Proposed ISL together with its proposed Conditions and Restriction.
#44
Using ASMs like you did is just silly, though.
#45
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in our pre-hearing statement and those addressed during the hearing itself, the Continental Merger Committee submits that the Arbitration Board should integrate the Continental and United pilot seniority lists by ratioing Captains with Captains and First Officers with First Officers, subject to appropriate conditions.
"Stalking Horse"
The term stalking horse originally derived from the practice of hunting,[1] particularly of wildfowl.[2] Hunters noticed that many birds would flee immediately on the approach of humans, but would tolerate the close presence of animals such as horses and cattle.
Hunters would therefore slowly approach their quarry by walking alongside their horses, keeping their upper bodies out of sight until the flock was within firing range. Animals trained for this purpose were called stalking horses. Sometimes mobile hides are used for a similar purpose.
The term stalking horse originally derived from the practice of hunting,[1] particularly of wildfowl.[2] Hunters noticed that many birds would flee immediately on the approach of humans, but would tolerate the close presence of animals such as horses and cattle.
Hunters would therefore slowly approach their quarry by walking alongside their horses, keeping their upper bodies out of sight until the flock was within firing range. Animals trained for this purpose were called stalking horses. Sometimes mobile hides are used for a similar purpose.
So at the bitter end the truth is out. Doesn't say give us a 1:1 ratio with a staple job for the end. It says use a ratio which is the same thing as asking for straight up relative seniority.
All that nonsense for this!!!!!!
#46
Part of the CAL argument was that they were a larger international carrier than UAL based on number of departures, but they included RJ routes in Canada and Latin America flown by CALEX. In terms of disputing who was the larger and more powerful company ASMs are informative.
#47
Let me see if I can summarize the CAL summary:
1) We can't agree on what longevity means so you can't use it.
2) We made the 767-400 pay the same as a 74 and a 73 pay the same as a 75 so you can't give any credence to category.
3) You don't have to follow the ALPA merger policy 'cuz it says the arbitrators can do what is "fair and equitable" however they want.
So, hence, ergo, QED . . . forget that stupid ALPA policy and just give us straight up relative seniority for active pilots only.
1) We can't agree on what longevity means so you can't use it.
2) We made the 767-400 pay the same as a 74 and a 73 pay the same as a 75 so you can't give any credence to category.
3) You don't have to follow the ALPA merger policy 'cuz it says the arbitrators can do what is "fair and equitable" however they want.
So, hence, ergo, QED . . . forget that stupid ALPA policy and just give us straight up relative seniority for active pilots only.
Last edited by Sunvox; 07-23-2013 at 11:49 AM.
#48
Part of the CAL argument was that they were a larger international carrier than UAL based on number of departures, but they included RJ routes in Canada and Latin America flown by CALEX. In terms of disputing who was the larger and more powerful company ASMs are informative.
CAL was obviously trying to make any argument that it could to make itself appear to be a bigger, more powerful airline, but under the light of the obvious truth, that was all just a facade.
#49
Part of the CAL argument was that they were a larger international carrier than UAL based on number of departures, but they included RJ routes in Canada and Latin America flown by CALEX. In terms of disputing who was the larger and more powerful company ASMs are informative.
#50
1. Continental’s Fleet Was Superior to United’s.
This just says it all. After reading this section the entire argument is based on the AGE OF CALs FLEET!!!! They claim superiority because of airplanes that are newer by a few years. Of course they are counting deliveries after the merger as well LOL.
Pilots don't want to fly 747s or 777s. They just want to fly what's "new".
Really!!! Not kidding...
This just says it all. After reading this section the entire argument is based on the AGE OF CALs FLEET!!!! They claim superiority because of airplanes that are newer by a few years. Of course they are counting deliveries after the merger as well LOL.
Pilots don't want to fly 747s or 777s. They just want to fly what's "new".
Really!!! Not kidding...
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