great term International RJ. I would have been willing to let the supersonic jet “soak” until next time since it’s just a phantom plane now. The XLR is coming the LR is here and this TA hasn’t addressed them. I would argue that it’s easier to negotiate for them now when they aren’t huge threat than later when they have a foot hold.

 

Couldn't have said it better myself.

 

Since when do we trust Airbus on its performance “promises”

 

It doesn’t expire in 2025, it begins.
There’s a very lengthy transition language as we move to the 8 quarter measurement period. The first whole-8 quarters ends Q425. That is when the theater block hour floor is first compared and then measures every quarter thereafter. Between now and Q425, read page 10+11 of NN. Long explanation of what happens in the in between. (1.X.3+4)

[To me the theater floors are nice, but the 80% of 2018/2019 is low.]

Unrelated, anyone else notice the extra flying that wasn’t previously covered? The partner codeshare with more than 30% delta pax or 120 seats. Old language capped codeshare (language hasn’t gone away), the new language additionally COUNTS those codeshare flights now for scope ratio, in addition to those with 20% ownership, in addition to JV flights.

 

You’re right I miss read the ending. It’s getting late for me I guess.

I did notice the “extra flying”. That is under the section describing partner flying:
“Partner Global Flying” means all flight segments on twin-aisle widebody aircraft or supersonic aircraft operated by a foreign partner (its affiliate(s) or contract carriers)
The 30% 120 seats and 20% ownership parts below that you mentioned do not negate the header of that section requiring widebody or super sonic aircraft.

I’m done for tonight see you all later to dissect these agreements some more.

 

I still don't understand why supersonic aircraft from JVs are being treated as a greater threat than to our WB flying than NBs. Neither exist as viable technology but one surely seems closer than the other...

 

NB is unlikely to gain massive amounts of international flying in the next few years. Therefore, we should realize substantial gains now, and then fight for NB scope protections on 31 Dec 2026 when we are still in a pilot shortage. To not do so is a serious fail.

 

Overall, I like it. Questions I came up with while reading it (haven't finished the NN yet, so maybe they're answered there):

• I'm cautious about AeroMexico, Latin America, and (now, potentially!) Canada being excluded, but as stated earlier, they're still covered by 1.E.
• India: "Atlantic Theater" is defined as all flying west of 90*E (all of India), but "Pacific Theater" is defined by referencing 1.B.45, which states: "flying on all routes (a) across the Pacific or Arctic ocean between North America (including Hawaii), on the one hand and Asia or Oceania, on the other hand". So is India counted as Atlantic of Pacific? -
• Block hour floors: These are nice, but what do they represent? What proportion of 2019 flying? 2022 flying? Do the hours take into account whatever growth may exist with LATAM and the new Korean Air? - Answered in the NN. 80% of 2018/19
• As stated here, what happens when a partner starts flying NB in theaters?
• What happens to the block hour floor during [choose your favorite global disaster here]? (I understand there's 2.X.13) "Circumstance over which the Company does not have control" excludes "the state of the economy", but that didn't age well with the Pacific hour block floor during COVID. What excuse did they use there? Why protections do we have against that here?
• Company can add two LAX-SYD flight pairs, allowing KLM to fly three additional AMS-JFK flights. It's one downside to using BH, but I think the NC makes a good case that the upsides far outweigh that potential downside.

 

I think the concern over NB across the Atlantic misses a couple of things:

First, airport capacity and slots favor WB flying because you just can’t park, unload and load NBs with the frequency at LHR (as the easiest example) needed to eclipse the WB seats. If we (or our JVs) are going to trade a WB slot across the Atlantic for a NB and go from 240(ish) seats (32 of D1), plus belly cargo (I know, I know, there’s no money in that) in exchange for a NB with 140(ish) seats (the extra range comes at a cost in seats), no belly cargo (hurray, we’re saved from that loss), then we are truly doomed by management that probably can’t feed themselves without assistance.

But what about secondary airports like Gatwick or London City you say?

Second, hub efficiencies favor WB flying. The ability to tap into our JV’s extended network when going through a hub means we need to continue to concentrate traffic into that airport. London or Paris might have the strongest case for hitting secondary airports because of the amount of originating and terminating traffic, but that doesn’t work if passengers are connecting into a JV network, and it gives away the economies of scale that go with efficient hubs (our own numbers show that we make a ton on flights that go through our hubs). RDU-CDG sounds reasonable on NB metal until you realize that you’re giving away the opportunity to land a WB in that slot and giving up the significantly higher revenue that goes with it.

Third, the real danger isn’t JB or a JV cutting our throats BOS-LHR on NB metal, it’s a JV adding LHR/FRA/CDG/RCO to AUS/SJC/CLT on a WB while we hemorrhage traffic and withdraw from secondary European destinations instead of growing as well. The BH measurement probably means we eventually max out slots to AMS/CDG/LHR and add new WBs that replace our ERs to all of those secondary places in Europe with greater frequency.

 

Funk you did a great job of explaining why the business case of hub to hub NB is hard to make. That is what I was glossing over when I said some segments favor a 350.
My worry is growth to secondary markets on a NB that we would be excluded from.