Originally Posted by Boomer

I seem to recall Bombardier was stuck with a bunch of ASA/Comair Brasilias back in 2003. I don't know the details though.

Originally Posted by scambo1

Oh byte me....

http://images.huffingtonpost.com/200...llian20300.jpg

Originally Posted by vprMatrix

I have not heard DALPA touting increased jobs as a result of the 717 deal. From what I can gather ALPA admits the changes in the contract will cost jobs but will hopefully be offset by early retirements. Since thay are admitting that with the “planned” early outs we will be pilot neutral I would expect them to be clearly explaining the number of growth position we can expect from the 717s as well as the MD90s and 737-900s. Since they are not this leads me to believe that the total result of aircraft deliveries and retirements will not result in any noticeable increase in pilot staffing.

To make a better decision on whether this TA is a good deal or not it would be nice to have an idea where Delta’s fleet count will end once the dust settles. If the 717s end up being mostly replacement aircraft as the MD90 have been, and the 737-900s are slated to be, this could end up in a fleet count not much more that the “767” mainline aircraft trigger Delta needs to exceed to start converting 70 seaters to 76 seaters. In order to convert all 70 seaters to 76 seat aircraft would require a fleet of 801 aircraft. The current mainline fleet is 720 so Delta would have to increase its mainline count by 81 (over an 11% increase in the fleet) aircraft to take advantage of the 3-1 language thanks to our current grievance settled contract language.

There are 20 DC9s that will be parked and Delta has already said it will be parking A320s, 757s, and 767s going forward so even without adding any additional 319s or MD88s that might be retired it already appears hard for Delta to take advantage of our current contracts 3-1 language. Also, note that Delta would have to get out of payments and contract on the 70 seat aircraft and park all of them in order to do this.

The company has already tried successfully to go around our contract and increase the number of 76 seat aircraft by putting orders on the books to take the mainline fleet above 767 but not accounting for the planned parking of other aircraft. This resulting in a grievance where DALPA allowed Delta to keep that aircraft that were in violation but they had to agree to actually abide by the contract language going forward. Shortly after this Delta again violated section 1 of our contract by purchasing several aircraft over the weight limit allowed in our contract for Delta Private Jets. After pressure from the pilot group there was another grievance filled resulting in a cease and desists for these aircraft. Now out of the blue these aircraft show up in the TA as permitted aircraft types.

Delta clearly violated the PWA and agreed to settle two grievances on scope with no monetary penalty, yet now we are giving back the language that was violated on both issues for no reason or monetary reward. By allowing Delta to start buying 76 seat aircraft and removing the requirement to increase the mainline fleet above “767” we are guaranteeing that the mainline fleet will not increase significantly if at all above this amount. This does not even take into account not having to park the 70 seat aircraft at the same time. We are also agreeing to outsource 5 addition aircraft that Delta already violated our contract with once before.

What is the benefit of our contract if we continually roll over on blatant violations of it? The ball is in our court, our current contract language is the companies fleeting opportunity.

vpr

Originally Posted by Roadkill

quick help--what's the runtime for this quarter's CQ cd due tomorrow?
thx.

Originally Posted by DeadHead

The very fact this TA contains language that "excuses" prior grievance concerns/section 1 violations should be reason enough to believe the grievance claims had plenty of merit.

I, personally, do not feel we are enforcing our current TA to the full extent that we should be. My apprehension with this TA is that it excuses past breach of contracts from the management side while leaving us open to similar breaches in the future.

If there aren't any hard, concrete penalties outlined in the TA when management violates the agreement, then the conditions themselves are meaningless. It's the legal equivalent of having some of the harshest criminal penalties in the world for individuals who commit crimes, but not having a police presence to capture criminals or a judicial system to try them under.

Originally Posted by TheManager

Very interesting prespective;



To say I'm less than enamored with this TA should be obvious to anyone who knows me. I'll start by apologizing to the North pilots about some of the references I'll be making because my experience is as a former LEC Chairman in CVG who served during to the run-up to and during all but the last month of our C2K. Even that MEC had factions that were relatively more or less aggressive in dealing with management. While that contract resulted in what was probably the gold standard of all time in terms non-cargo compensation and work rules, many of us felt strongly that money was left on the table. Consider that within weeks of the ink drying on the signature blocks, Delta went out and spent millions on hundreds of new plasma tvs(expensive new tech at the time) to put in gatehouses around the system. Proves nothing, right?

Shortly after that TA, I was contacted be a friend still on the MEC, one of four NO voters, to help write the CON Paper, a requirement of the Policy Manual at the time. The resulting product was completed and turned over to the MEC Communications Committee. Despite content that included clearly delineated fact and supposition, and without our approval, the teeth of that paper was edited out and released to the pilot group. Shortly thereafter, the requirement for a CON Paper disappeared from MEC practice. I illustrate the example to make the following point: Your dues money is being used to communicate only a positive message about this agreement, and opinions, like those of the DTW LEC, will reach a limited number of us. It is also my opinion that those on the MEC that have implied that they voted on an agreement they disagreed with in principle to pass it on to their pilots, are symptomatic of this pilot group as a whole. Not all, but plenty of those who will vote for this TA are way too comfortable being pushed around, and, in my opinion, unaware of what value our unique skill set deserves.

I'm a relatively junior DTW 777A (though still a CVG Council 108 member) so my nest is pretty well feathered compared to those fighting the various quirks unique to more junior pilots. But we have several things in common too, like our hatred for flying being farmed out to those not on our seniority list. Coming from Cincinnati, the original nesting ground for 50 seat RJs, nobody is more aware of the folly of that POS. Did you know that a CRJ was never designed to make money? That it was only created to lose less money on thin, high revenue feeder routes to hubs than an available mainline A/C? Ever see an airline flying 50-seaters standing on its own without a code share, and profitable? No! They need the voodoo accounting practices of Fee-for-Departure invented by Delta's own Ron Allen back in the early 90's. This realization is all too apparent to today's management that really feel the pain under the current price of fuel. The cost of continuing their operation is real leverage in negotiations, and the move to profitable 76-seaters is a no-brainer for management. The cost of bags and pax left behind on poorly designed a/c is significant.

But there are scope issues that affect my end of the seniority list also. Taxi into CDG and see the dozens of 747s,777s,330s, and the occasional 380 sitting there at any given time, and you have to ask yourself why we, as one of the largest airlines in the world, have less than 30 combined 777s and 747s. (No slight to our 330 brethren, just trying to make a point.) At the beginning of this process, I was assured by our MEC Chairman that two contract comparisons would be published this time. One with our domestic competitors, and one for international. They did go talk to our amis in Europe but decided they couldn't publish those stats, due to privacy concerns agreed to. My suspicion is that our brothers and sisters overseas, with their lifetime medical and retirements, with their shorter flying months, with their annual strikes that add to their vacation time, probably cost their respective companies considerably more than we cost ours. But rather than stating proof for or against this supposition in general terms, our leaders didn't think we'd need that information. So if my supposition has any validity, why does Delta continue to farm out as much Int'l flying as they do? They won't when they have this agreement. There will be 777-300 order shortly after we agree to this agreement. Yes, this is a good thing. But is it worth accepting a TA that everyone's first reaction to is 'That'll never pass' or 'that'll be the end of ALPA on the property!?'

The combined concessions of the Delta south pilots in SLA 46 and Bankruptcy SLA 51 cut the annual cost of that pilot group from about $2.9 billion to about $1.5, if my memory serves me. (I don't know the cost of concessions to the north pilots, but I think we can assume similar percentages.) In the years since those were inked, that's over $8 billion we voted this company. Think about that the next time you taxi by Concourse F in ATL or into the Ramp at JFK. Think about that when we strap on a 737-900 in a few years, or read about the corporate debt being paid down, or the $7+billion cash on hand. I do. These are all good things for us as part of the Delta family. Is there no room for better payback for pilot groups that helped navigate bankruptcy, fought off a unnatural takeover bid, and whose merger was as seamless as any in the industry? The pay rates that came out of this TA are the result of crossing a line of becoming way to cozy with management in our joint interests mentioned above. Add in the pattern bargaining pressure National uses to make their job easier and less threatening to their bottom line and you have just put yourself in an uncomfortable position of being told the requirement to press-to-test has disappeared. Hence, another TA presented with a we'll get 'em next time sentiment. Fool me once.....

Lastly, the work rules and quality of life issues are lost in a rushed to agreement. The 3:15 vacation bank is still well short of the 3:40 to 3:45 the company first valued it at when we lost touching trips around 1990. And that was with a sixth and sometimes a seventh week of annual vacation. There are no real seniority rights on reserve when we don't recover our previous 'low-yellow.' This would have been a further balancing of the new gains and concessions in reserve scheduling. This list could go on, but we now know that surveying the pilots is only a square to fill.

In conclusion, this for me is an easy albeit expected No vote. We used to ignore SWA pay rates in the past because they didn't compare well, them not having nearly our pension plan. Now they have similar ones (or better,) and any agreement must start with equaling or exceeding their 737 rates. We are still in the dark on how our code share partners value and reward their pilots. we have not achieved nearly enough quality of life improvements. We have not improved our retirement enough. Let's go back and do this right, even if it means sacrificing the security being offered. The pressures on managements business plan are probably such that there's more on the table.

(Name deleted)
777A-DTW

Originally Posted by Justdoinmyjob

I did it in 2 1/2 hours yesterday.