The problem
05-17-2009, 01:55 PM
#11
Doesn't Get Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jun 2007
Posts: 2,598
The problem is that all airlines train "approach to stalls" and not stall and spin recovery. When you recover from an approach to stall you add power and maintain pitch or in some aircraft increase pitch. After doing this over and over again in the sim, I can see why one would pull up rather than nose over in an actual stall. If you pulled back 50 times in the sim when you got the shaker, you'll pull back when you get the shaker in the airplane.
Next time you have a PC ask the instructor to let you recover from an actual stall at 1500 feet and then another one at FL370. If you have never done it, you will shortly find out that you don't want to see it for the first time after a long day in the ice going into BUF.
Next time you have a PC ask the instructor to let you recover from an actual stall at 1500 feet and then another one at FL370. If you have never done it, you will shortly find out that you don't want to see it for the first time after a long day in the ice going into BUF.
05-17-2009, 02:15 PM
#13
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jun 2007
Position: Legacy FO
Posts: 4,096
Originally Posted by RockyBoy
The problem is that all airlines train "approach to stalls" and not stall and spin recovery. When you recover from an approach to stall you add power and maintain pitch or in some aircraft increase pitch. After doing this over and over again in the sim, I can see why one would pull up rather than nose over in an actual stall. If you pulled back 50 times in the sim when you got the shaker, you'll pull back when you get the shaker in the airplane.
Next time you have a PC ask the instructor to let you recover from an actual stall at 1500 feet and then another one at FL370. If you have never done it, you will shortly find out that you don't want to see it for the first time after a long day in the ice going into BUF.
Next time you have a PC ask the instructor to let you recover from an actual stall at 1500 feet and then another one at FL370. If you have never done it, you will shortly find out that you don't want to see it for the first time after a long day in the ice going into BUF.
The difference is, we are supposed to be profesional airline pilots. If you can't read your flight manuals and learn the differences between approach to and post stall recovery and/or ask for the training when you have 5 minutes in your recurrent training, then you probably aren't a professional airline pilot.
At this point in our careers, we are armed with enough tools to figure out what our strong and low points are. And we should be using that information to make oursevles better, safer pilots. This isn't the type of job where you should be the epitome of "just meets standards". Yes, the standard is good enough, but if you aren't keeping yourself in the books and trying to learn bigger and better things, then this probably isn't the career for you.
05-17-2009, 02:16 PM
#14
Underboob King
Joined APC: May 2005
Position: Guppy Commander
Posts: 4,412
Originally Posted by Killer51883
If i remember correctly renslow was hired in 2005 or so with as he quoted on the CVR 670 hours. Working for colgan for 3 years averaging 900 hours a year accounting for the occasional vacation and training events, you end up just around 3000 hours or so. is this not expierence? Expierence is not the god send to aviation that you think it is. Ive flown with very expierenced captains who were some of the most dangerous people I have ever seen in an airplane. I have also flown with brand new captains who had just been in the right place at the right time and were perfectly safe with low total hours. The reason this crash happend was momentary lack of attention that allowed the airspeed to decrease at a rapid rate. Even Sully could have a momentary lack of attention and allow that to happen. Does he have enough expierence for you?
05-17-2009, 07:30 PM
#15
Gets Weekends Off
Thread Starter
Joined APC: Nov 2005
Posts: 758
Originally Posted by Killer51883
If i remember correctly renslow was hired in 2005 or so with as he quoted on the CVR 670 hours. Working for colgan for 3 years averaging 900 hours a year accounting for the occasional vacation and training events, you end up just around 3000 hours or so. is this not expierence? Expierence is not the god send to aviation that you think it is. Ive flown with very expierenced captains who were some of the most dangerous people I have ever seen in an airplane. I have also flown with brand new captains who had just been in the right place at the right time and were perfectly safe with low total hours. The reason this crash happend was momentary lack of attention that allowed the airspeed to decrease at a rapid rate. Even Sully could have a momentary lack of attention and allow that to happen. Does he have enough expierence for you?
The airline training department is specialized in teaching the systems and operations of a specific airplane, and teaching the maneuvers required on a PC and type ride. A pilot could go through decades of recurrent and PC's and still not ever get any training about flying when the doodoo hits the fan.
My position is that pilots must gain that flying ability before they get to the sheltered airline training/operating environment.
It's about skills and abilities, not about hours or Expierence (sic).
05-17-2009, 07:40 PM
#16
Gets Weekends Off
Thread Starter
Joined APC: Nov 2005
Posts: 758
Originally Posted by RockyBoy
The problem is that all airlines train "approach to stalls" and not stall and spin recovery.
A pilot needs to have the basic stall recovery techniques ingrained in his brain well before he learns how to deal with an incipient stall in airline training. Stall recovery (reduce the angle of attack) is different than recovering from a low energy approach to stall.
When you recover from an approach to stall you add power and maintain pitch or in some aircraft increase pitch. After doing this over and over again in the sim, I can see why one would pull up rather than nose over in an actual stall. If you pulled back 50 times in the sim when you got the shaker, you'll pull back when you get the shaker in the airplane.
Next time you have a PC ask the instructor to let you recover from an actual stall at 1500 feet and then another one at FL370. If you have never done it, you will shortly find out that you don't want to see it for the first time after a long day in the ice going into BUF.
05-17-2009, 07:48 PM
#17
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Apr 2007
Position: A320
Posts: 1,308
Originally Posted by BoredwLife
That would be a great start!!
ATP as a minimum!
ATP as a minimum!
05-17-2009, 07:49 PM
#18
Banned
Joined APC: Feb 2009
Posts: 110
Getting back to post, yes the best pilots are more expensive. And the public may very well see a move to more expensive pilots in the future. In turn, this will naturally increase the price of a ticket and therefore a drop in demand. I think its a good thing... it will keep the public more safe. But will economics allow this?? Afterall, its still just a businness.
05-17-2009, 07:58 PM
#19
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Apr 2007
Position: A320
Posts: 1,308
Originally Posted by skybolt
Regarding: spin training, stall tng vs speed awareness, Gulfstream, PFT, commuting, pilot pay, and whatever other current topics have been offered to explain the reason Colgan 3407 fell out of the sky. All are valid topics, but they don't address the real problem. That problem is actually very simple. It's a two part problem, but it IS simple.
Part One. Pilots who have not learned their craft have been allowed to sit in the seat of an airliner. More later.
Part Two. The airline pilot certification system is not capable of catching the pilots who don't YET belong in the seat of an airplane carrying people for hire.
About my first point. For decades, a pilot spent many years as a civilian actually flying airplanes. Either as an instructor, or freight dawg flying checks, or any one of hundreds of other positions that allowed/forced the pilot to gain real stick and rudder time. Military pilots accelerated the process, but the large majority of their time was spent either training, or being trained. Either way, both backgrounds allowed a pilot to learn real flying skills and build real world experience. These pilots had the experiences that allowed flying to become somewhat instinctive. Flying, just as driving, becomes somewhat instinctive after many miles and hours.
Over the last fifteen (or so) years, the industry exploited the intent of the certification system and started putting people into airliners that just didn't belong in an airliner at that stage of their career. Management justified this because it met the letter of the law. But the rules were written in a time when the only pilots being hired into an airliner with less than 1000 hours were highly trained military pilots. (I'm civilian trained, but I recognize that a Navy trained F18 guy with 250 hours is better trained than the average civilian commercial pilot applicant)
Thinking back to when Pinnacle had an empty leg crash and on this Colgan crash, it is obvious that the aeronautical knowledge, decision making and skills of pilots who go straight to an airliner with only a few hundred hours are potentially lacking when a situation arises that demands good flying instincts.
When one thinks about it, the airline environment is sheltered. We never overbank, over pitch, underpitch etc. We always keep everything in the middle of the envelope. If a pilot didn't develop skills necessary to deal with the edge of the envelope, he/she WILL NOT develop those skills in the airline training environment. If the industry and the FAA insist on allowing 250 hour pilots in transport category aircraft, they must also insist that these pilots demonstrate the ability to recognize and recover from operations near or at the edge of the envelope.
Part One. Pilots who have not learned their craft have been allowed to sit in the seat of an airliner. More later.
Part Two. The airline pilot certification system is not capable of catching the pilots who don't YET belong in the seat of an airplane carrying people for hire.
About my first point. For decades, a pilot spent many years as a civilian actually flying airplanes. Either as an instructor, or freight dawg flying checks, or any one of hundreds of other positions that allowed/forced the pilot to gain real stick and rudder time. Military pilots accelerated the process, but the large majority of their time was spent either training, or being trained. Either way, both backgrounds allowed a pilot to learn real flying skills and build real world experience. These pilots had the experiences that allowed flying to become somewhat instinctive. Flying, just as driving, becomes somewhat instinctive after many miles and hours.
Over the last fifteen (or so) years, the industry exploited the intent of the certification system and started putting people into airliners that just didn't belong in an airliner at that stage of their career. Management justified this because it met the letter of the law. But the rules were written in a time when the only pilots being hired into an airliner with less than 1000 hours were highly trained military pilots. (I'm civilian trained, but I recognize that a Navy trained F18 guy with 250 hours is better trained than the average civilian commercial pilot applicant)
Thinking back to when Pinnacle had an empty leg crash and on this Colgan crash, it is obvious that the aeronautical knowledge, decision making and skills of pilots who go straight to an airliner with only a few hundred hours are potentially lacking when a situation arises that demands good flying instincts.
When one thinks about it, the airline environment is sheltered. We never overbank, over pitch, underpitch etc. We always keep everything in the middle of the envelope. If a pilot didn't develop skills necessary to deal with the edge of the envelope, he/she WILL NOT develop those skills in the airline training environment. If the industry and the FAA insist on allowing 250 hour pilots in transport category aircraft, they must also insist that these pilots demonstrate the ability to recognize and recover from operations near or at the edge of the envelope.
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