The problem
#22
Today, we fly very reliable airplanes; consequently, it’s very easy to fall into the complacency trap that makes us believe we are great pilots because we grease the landing after an uneventful flight. Lets do our profession a favor and don’t fall for that fallacy.
Lets face it, anybody can be a “good” pilot when everything is working properly or an “abnormal” is easily found in the QRH. In contrast, professionals excel when they are faced with exceptional situations.
#23
Not all 3,000 hours are equal… For example, a pilot who has been exposed (for 3, 000 hours) to the sheltered environment of FAR 121 flying ONLY, may not be prepared for the 1% of the time that can potentially expose him/her to a catastrophic event (e.g., dual engine failure after bird strikes on take-off, or a stall in night IMC at low altitude). On the other hand, a pilot who has flown 3,000 hours in many different environments, such as single pilot, CFi, night freight, charter, military – in several different airplanes, is more likely to be prepared to handle the demands of that 1% of the time. That’s what experience is all about.
Today, we fly very reliable airplanes; consequently, it’s very easy to fall into the complacency trap that makes us believe we are great pilots because we grease the landing after an uneventful flight. Lets do our profession a favor and don’t fall for that fallacy.
Lets face it, anybody can be a “good” pilot when everything is working properly or an “abnormal” is easily found in the QRH. In contrast, professionals excel when they are faced with exceptional situations.
Today, we fly very reliable airplanes; consequently, it’s very easy to fall into the complacency trap that makes us believe we are great pilots because we grease the landing after an uneventful flight. Lets do our profession a favor and don’t fall for that fallacy.
Lets face it, anybody can be a “good” pilot when everything is working properly or an “abnormal” is easily found in the QRH. In contrast, professionals excel when they are faced with exceptional situations.
+1 on this post too!
I've been reading the various threads on this crash, and wanted to post some thoughts, but Skybolt summed it up perfectly. Pilots need to have a solid background in airmanship before they get into Part 121 ops. I've been flying 121 for 13 years now, and had 7 years of military flying before that. Most of my 121 time is exactly the same hour repeated a few thousand times. Still, the basic stick and rudder skills that I learned early on keep me right in the center of the envelope when flying passengers. Nice, safe, and comfortable.
When you look at the NTSB reenactment of the Colgan crash and see the airspeed drop 50 knots or so in a space of less than a minute, you have to ask yourself: What pilot could allow this to happen? I don't care how tired you are; when you're in the approach phase, your eyes are on the instruments whether you're the flying pilot or the pilot monitoring. Another example is the Pinnacle RJ crash. The pilots climbed to FL410 and the airspeed was what, a hundred and eighty knots indicated or something? No alarm bells going off here?
How much money is Colgan (and their insurers) going to lose in the lawsuits? Probably hundreds of millions. How much would it have cost them to pay their pilots more, thereby attracting much better pilot applicants? I dunno, maybe 2 or 3 million. I hope the lawyers stick it to them, and maybe, just maybe, the rest of the industry will wake up. Not holding my breath, though.
#24
Super Moderator
Joined APC: Dec 2007
Position: DAL 330
Posts: 6,865
[quote=skybolt;612597]My point is simply that pilots who ENTER the airline business having never learned to deal with the edge of the envelope will NEVER be trained by the airlines to deal with that possibility. If a pilot has poor stick and rudder skills and inadequate stick and rudder sense, the airline flying and training environment will NOT impart those qualities to that pilot. A pilot must gain good flying "sense" from somewhere other than the airline training department.
Bolt - Great thread. I was fortunate enough to be a Standardization pilot in Navy primary training and as such got to train other instructor pilots. The best part of the syllabus was out of control flight training or OCF. We would put the instructor trainee in numerous situations such as inverted flight, zero airspeed departures (90 degrees nose up and zero airspeed), approach turn stalls, skidded turn stalls, spins etc - it was a blast, and the best part was that you would soon be recovering the aircraft instinctively. I am sure that civilian aerobatic pilots have similar training experiences.
I think this would be a huge advantage in recovering an aircraft, just as the "windshear" simulation in recurrent would help us in a actual windshear type of situation. Think about how much more difficult an actual windshear recovery would be without the training - same thing applies for upsets.
Scoop
Bolt - Great thread. I was fortunate enough to be a Standardization pilot in Navy primary training and as such got to train other instructor pilots. The best part of the syllabus was out of control flight training or OCF. We would put the instructor trainee in numerous situations such as inverted flight, zero airspeed departures (90 degrees nose up and zero airspeed), approach turn stalls, skidded turn stalls, spins etc - it was a blast, and the best part was that you would soon be recovering the aircraft instinctively. I am sure that civilian aerobatic pilots have similar training experiences.
I think this would be a huge advantage in recovering an aircraft, just as the "windshear" simulation in recurrent would help us in a actual windshear type of situation. Think about how much more difficult an actual windshear recovery would be without the training - same thing applies for upsets.
Scoop
#25
Great post skybolt. I think we can all agree that experience is needed. However where do you draw the line? Both had experience (121 and CFI). Would an ATP suffice? The captain had one and it still happened. The FO was a flight instructor with more than enough time to obtain an ATP and it still happened. Anybody can be trained to PTS standards to pass a checkride. Pilot factories like ALLATPs are proof positive of this. Cooperate to graduate.
What bothers me most about this accident is the overlooked fact that the FO raised the flaps. You're slow, have a bunch of ice on the aircraft and make a configuration change. I think this cardinal sin is being forgotten by everybody, including ourselves. I think this is the fundamental part that skybolt is talking about.
Experience plays a huge part but no amount of experience can trump a poor decision. We've seen plenty of experienced crews make stupid choices that ended with a smoking hole in the ground.
What bothers me most about this accident is the overlooked fact that the FO raised the flaps. You're slow, have a bunch of ice on the aircraft and make a configuration change. I think this cardinal sin is being forgotten by everybody, including ourselves. I think this is the fundamental part that skybolt is talking about.
Experience plays a huge part but no amount of experience can trump a poor decision. We've seen plenty of experienced crews make stupid choices that ended with a smoking hole in the ground.
#26
Getting back to post, yes the best pilots are more expensive. And the public may very well see a move to more expensive pilots in the future. In turn, this will naturally increase the price of a ticket and therefore a drop in demand. I think its a good thing... it will keep the public more safe. But will economics allow this?? Afterall, its still just a businness.
Of course we are talking about the same people that will put their 2 year old on their lap for the flight to avoid buying another ticket...
#28
Good thread bolt.
Civilian CFIs with 500 hours dual given have been on the edge of the envelope many times.
Military pilots have many training flights at the edge of the envelope.
Repeat from regional thread pertinent to this discussion:
Civilian CFIs with 500 hours dual given have been on the edge of the envelope many times.
Military pilots have many training flights at the edge of the envelope.
Repeat from regional thread pertinent to this discussion:
I think we are making a simple situation more complicated with discussions of muscle memory and what we think we were trained to do in the event of stick shaker.
Stick Shaker = Slow Flight
Recovery is increasing the power and maintaining the pitch while the airplane accelerates. As lift overcomes weight/drag, you'll have to push forward on the controls and/or trim nose down to maintain level flight.
Don't pull back and increase the pitch. You'll end up in a pilot induced pitch oscillation that at the upper pitch attitude will engage the stick pusher.
Stick Pusher = Imminent Aerodynamic Stall
The airplane is automatically doing what pilots would do in successful recoveries of imminent or full aerodynamic stalls.
It's not rocket surgery
Stick Shaker = Slow Flight
Recovery is increasing the power and maintaining the pitch while the airplane accelerates. As lift overcomes weight/drag, you'll have to push forward on the controls and/or trim nose down to maintain level flight.
Don't pull back and increase the pitch. You'll end up in a pilot induced pitch oscillation that at the upper pitch attitude will engage the stick pusher.
Stick Pusher = Imminent Aerodynamic Stall
The airplane is automatically doing what pilots would do in successful recoveries of imminent or full aerodynamic stalls.
It's not rocket surgery
#29
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Sep 2007
Position: B737 CA
Posts: 1,518
jonnyjetprop - Of course it was pilot error, anytime a perfectly good airplane is put in the dirt there is pilot error involved. Once upon a time, investigations ended right then and there: the pilots screwed up. After years and years of crashes caused by pilots screwing up, we eventually came to realize that investigations must go further to find out why the pilots screwed up to have any hope of preventing repeats. There are often cultural and environmental factors that are much, much bigger than the pilots involved. This is one of those cases, I think.
#30
This is what my wife said after watching this on the news. She has 10 hours dual from 20 years ago. She still knows stall recovery. She never even soloed.
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