UPT to UAVs...what a deal!
10-22-2008, 07:47 PM
#111
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jan 2006
Position: Spartan
Posts: 3,652
Originally Posted by Buzz
Last week Columbus dropped two UASs (it's an Unmanned Aerial System, not Vehicle, who made O-7 for that one?). 1 T-1 grad and 1 T-38 grad. Every class in fiscal '09 can expect the same drop as well as RC-12s and U-28s continuing to drop.
10-22-2008, 11:10 PM
#112
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2007
Posts: 829
Originally Posted by Flameout
Again, I realize this is not exactly what the military pilot community wants to hear -- but it's a logic-based approach to manning UAVs, an approach I'm convinced is coming down the pike now, and rapidly.
By the way, it is coming down the pike - but, that does not make it smart. As a matter of fact, given recent history of USAF decisions, that makes it not so smart. Let me highlight a few other recent USAF decisions: lease tankers instead of buying them (at a higher cost I might add - and some went to jail), botch the subsequent tanker contract to the point where it is shelved, committed entire global air superiority mission to 189 F-22's, attempted to eliminate B-52 fleet for more F-22's, eliminated F-117 fleet for more F-22's, is probably going to eliminate most F-15's from AD, decided to offer VSP with obvious signs that an overall shortage of pilots was looming, decided to award some multi-million dollar no-bid Thunderbird PR contract to a friend of some generals, decided to make untested and unproven Anthrax shots which just happened to be made in a laboratory partly owned by Gen Fogleman mandatory, etc, etc, etc.
10-23-2008, 05:47 AM
#113
Line Holder
Joined APC: Jul 2008
Position: B737 Captain
Posts: 36
Here's the latest -- official:
Air Force creates new pilot programs for drones
By LOLITA C. BALDOR, Associated Press Writer Lolita C. Baldor, Associated Press Writer 1 hr 54 mins ago
WASHINGTON – Scrambling to meet commanders' insatiable demands for unmanned aircraft, the Air Force is launching two new training programs, including an experimental one that would churn out up to 1,100 desperately needed pilots to fly the drones over Iraq and Afghanistan.
As many as 700 Air Force personnel have expressed some interest in the test program, which will create a new brand of pilot for the drones, which are flown by remote control from a base in Nevada. That new drone operator will learn the basics of flying a small manned plane, but will not go through the longer, more rigorous training that their fighter jet brethren receive.
A senior Air Force officer told The Associated Press that by the end of September 2011, the goal is to have 50 unmanned combat air patrols operating 24 hours a day, largely over Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently there are 30.
To generate the pilots for the increased flights, the Air Force hopes to create separate pilot pipelines for its manned and unmanned aircraft, said Col. Curt Sheldon, assistant to the director of air operations for unmanned aircraft issues.
"I don't know that you could ever get (a drone) to everybody who wants one," Sheldon said. "I believe it is virtually insatiable. We are pedaling fast, we are working hard to meet that need."
Besides the new test program, Sheldon said the Air Force is planning to shift about 100 manned-aircraft pilots directly from training into jobs flying the drones. The unmanned aircraft are mostly Predators — hunter-killer planes that fly in the war zone but are operated by pilots sitting at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada.
Until now, Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) pilots have had to complete at least one tour of flight duty before moving to the drone jobs.
The urgent push for more drone pilots has been spurred by blunt demands from Defense Secretary Robert Gates. He has criticized the Air Force's failure to move more quickly to meet war commanders' needs. And he set up a task force in April to find more innovative ways to get the aircraft to the battlefield more quickly.
Predators are playing a crucial role on the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan, providing real-time surveillance video to troops on the ground, targeting and firing Hellfire anti-tank missiles at militants, and homing in on enemy efforts to plant roadside bombs.
Earlier this year, for example, a Predator — probably one operated by the CIA — fired on a suspected terrorist safehouse in Pakistan's north Waziristan region, killing Abu Laith al-Libi, a key al-Qaida leader.
To date, the Air Force has been using experienced fighter pilots to operate the drones. But as the demand has skyrocketed, the service has struggled to find enough pilots to fill both the manned and unmanned jobs.
"The pipeline that produces manned operators is full," said Sheldon. "We're pushing them through there as fast as we can."
The two new programs are just beginning.
Two pilots have just been selected to go directly from training to the unmanned program. Once there they will get an additional four to six weeks of schooling on how to operate the drone, how the weapons systems work, and how to coordinate with troops on the ground.
Eventually that will expand, sending as many as 100 a year through the drone program for the next three years.
Meanwhile, the test program for non-pilots is aimed at Air Force captains who have four to six years of experience, but no flight training. Their schooling would take up to nine months, and they would not have to meet all of the more stringent standards that jet fighter pilots must.
Unmanned pilots, for example, will not have to meet certain height or vision requirements, and also would not be eliminated due to physical conditions that might prevent them from flying at high altitudes.
In pressing the Air Force to be more aggressive getting drones to the war, Gates hinted at such a plan, calling for "bold" thinking.
"All this may require rethinking long-standing service assumptions and priorities about which missions require certified pilots and which do not," Gates said in April.
Under the fledgling program, the drone pilots would go to Pueblo, Colo., for about six weeks of flight training. Sheldon said they would learn to fly a small Mitsubishi single-engine propeller plane, probably do a solo flight and get a handle on basic aircraft controls.
They would also train on flight simulators, and then go through the unmanned aircraft training.
Officials quickly reject temptations to compare the drone pilots to video gamers who have a far easier job at their computer screens than pilots sitting in cockpits.
An F-16 fighter jet, said Sheldon is easy enough to fly from one spot to another. The harder part, he said, is deploying the weapons.
The same is true for the drones.
"It's not particularly difficult to fly a (drone) from point A to point B," said Sheldon. "It is challenging to fly it in a combat environment, coordinating with a guy on the ground who wants you to hit a target over here that's got (friendly) folks only 50 meters from it."
Air Force captains have until Nov. 3 to apply for the new program. They will be screened and tested, and the first 10 will begin classes Jan. 5. A second class of 10 will begin in April.
The test program will also get reviewed by the Federal Aviation Administration in the coming months. Officials could not provide any cost estimates for the new training programs.
___
On the Net:
Defense Department: U.S. Department of Defense Official Website
Air Force creates new pilot programs for drones
By LOLITA C. BALDOR, Associated Press Writer Lolita C. Baldor, Associated Press Writer 1 hr 54 mins ago
WASHINGTON – Scrambling to meet commanders' insatiable demands for unmanned aircraft, the Air Force is launching two new training programs, including an experimental one that would churn out up to 1,100 desperately needed pilots to fly the drones over Iraq and Afghanistan.
As many as 700 Air Force personnel have expressed some interest in the test program, which will create a new brand of pilot for the drones, which are flown by remote control from a base in Nevada. That new drone operator will learn the basics of flying a small manned plane, but will not go through the longer, more rigorous training that their fighter jet brethren receive.
A senior Air Force officer told The Associated Press that by the end of September 2011, the goal is to have 50 unmanned combat air patrols operating 24 hours a day, largely over Iraq and Afghanistan. Currently there are 30.
To generate the pilots for the increased flights, the Air Force hopes to create separate pilot pipelines for its manned and unmanned aircraft, said Col. Curt Sheldon, assistant to the director of air operations for unmanned aircraft issues.
"I don't know that you could ever get (a drone) to everybody who wants one," Sheldon said. "I believe it is virtually insatiable. We are pedaling fast, we are working hard to meet that need."
Besides the new test program, Sheldon said the Air Force is planning to shift about 100 manned-aircraft pilots directly from training into jobs flying the drones. The unmanned aircraft are mostly Predators — hunter-killer planes that fly in the war zone but are operated by pilots sitting at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada.
Until now, Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) pilots have had to complete at least one tour of flight duty before moving to the drone jobs.
The urgent push for more drone pilots has been spurred by blunt demands from Defense Secretary Robert Gates. He has criticized the Air Force's failure to move more quickly to meet war commanders' needs. And he set up a task force in April to find more innovative ways to get the aircraft to the battlefield more quickly.
Predators are playing a crucial role on the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan, providing real-time surveillance video to troops on the ground, targeting and firing Hellfire anti-tank missiles at militants, and homing in on enemy efforts to plant roadside bombs.
Earlier this year, for example, a Predator — probably one operated by the CIA — fired on a suspected terrorist safehouse in Pakistan's north Waziristan region, killing Abu Laith al-Libi, a key al-Qaida leader.
To date, the Air Force has been using experienced fighter pilots to operate the drones. But as the demand has skyrocketed, the service has struggled to find enough pilots to fill both the manned and unmanned jobs.
"The pipeline that produces manned operators is full," said Sheldon. "We're pushing them through there as fast as we can."
The two new programs are just beginning.
Two pilots have just been selected to go directly from training to the unmanned program. Once there they will get an additional four to six weeks of schooling on how to operate the drone, how the weapons systems work, and how to coordinate with troops on the ground.
Eventually that will expand, sending as many as 100 a year through the drone program for the next three years.
Meanwhile, the test program for non-pilots is aimed at Air Force captains who have four to six years of experience, but no flight training. Their schooling would take up to nine months, and they would not have to meet all of the more stringent standards that jet fighter pilots must.
Unmanned pilots, for example, will not have to meet certain height or vision requirements, and also would not be eliminated due to physical conditions that might prevent them from flying at high altitudes.
In pressing the Air Force to be more aggressive getting drones to the war, Gates hinted at such a plan, calling for "bold" thinking.
"All this may require rethinking long-standing service assumptions and priorities about which missions require certified pilots and which do not," Gates said in April.
Under the fledgling program, the drone pilots would go to Pueblo, Colo., for about six weeks of flight training. Sheldon said they would learn to fly a small Mitsubishi single-engine propeller plane, probably do a solo flight and get a handle on basic aircraft controls.
They would also train on flight simulators, and then go through the unmanned aircraft training.
Officials quickly reject temptations to compare the drone pilots to video gamers who have a far easier job at their computer screens than pilots sitting in cockpits.
An F-16 fighter jet, said Sheldon is easy enough to fly from one spot to another. The harder part, he said, is deploying the weapons.
The same is true for the drones.
"It's not particularly difficult to fly a (drone) from point A to point B," said Sheldon. "It is challenging to fly it in a combat environment, coordinating with a guy on the ground who wants you to hit a target over here that's got (friendly) folks only 50 meters from it."
Air Force captains have until Nov. 3 to apply for the new program. They will be screened and tested, and the first 10 will begin classes Jan. 5. A second class of 10 will begin in April.
The test program will also get reviewed by the Federal Aviation Administration in the coming months. Officials could not provide any cost estimates for the new training programs.
___
On the Net:
Defense Department: U.S. Department of Defense Official Website
10-24-2008, 10:19 PM
#115
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Joined APC: Feb 2007
Position: The IPA EB speaks for me
Posts: 520
10-25-2008, 07:44 AM
#116
Super Moderator
Joined APC: Jul 2006
Posts: 5,555
Originally Posted by shane123
crewdawg....if possible, can you post on here once the drop comes down and how many UAVs are handed out vs. how many slots total?
'preciate it.
'preciate it.
RC-12
NSA
F-22
F-15C
F-15E x 2
F-16 x 2 (1 Guard)
A-10 x 2 (1 Guard)
T-6
T-38
B-1
14 assignable (don't count guard guys) with 3 UAVs, but a pretty good drop overall. Rumor has it 2-3 put UAVs down number 1 on their list. The RC-12 guy seemed happy.
They also burnt a piano in memory of their classmate and IP that were killed back in May.
10-25-2008, 08:18 AM
#117
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Joined APC: Mar 2008
Position: FAA 'Flight Check'
Posts: 13,837
One directly into F-22s huh?
Years and years ago the USN was overstaffed with SNAs (Student Naval Aviators). They instituted a program that the bottom 10% of the SNAs receiving their wings would go on a 1-2 year BOAT tour - meaning Fuels Officer on the Iwo Jima or something like that.
I'm wondering how many would have jumped at the chance to go UAVs rather than ship's company.
USMCFLYR
Years and years ago the USN was overstaffed with SNAs (Student Naval Aviators). They instituted a program that the bottom 10% of the SNAs receiving their wings would go on a 1-2 year BOAT tour - meaning Fuels Officer on the Iwo Jima or something like that.
I'm wondering how many would have jumped at the chance to go UAVs rather than ship's company.
USMCFLYR
10-25-2008, 08:23 AM
#118
Super Moderator
Joined APC: Jul 2006
Posts: 5,555
Originally Posted by USMCFLYR
One directly into F-22s huh?
USMCFLYR
USMCFLYR
10-26-2008, 07:19 AM
#119
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2007
Posts: 829
Need proof that the USAF can not learn from the lessons of the past. There are multiple studies out there (several mentioned in this project) dealing with the subject of UAS manning, unfortunately we don't have access to them all. This is just one of them, and unfortunately it was from a different era of UAS employment.
A research paper from 1999 on the subject of UAS manning requirements:
https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay1999/saas/tobin.pdf
Take into account that this paper was written in 1999, when the capabilities and scope of employment of the systems were infantile when compared to today. There are very little similarities to the Predator of 1999 and the ones today. Any discussions of difficulty of employment from this paper would be magnified by multiple factors today. Also, keep in mind that the author of the paper admits that his personal opinion going in to this project was different than his conclusion.
Select quotes:
"It was not until late into my research when I had the opportunity to spend some time with the 11 RS and experience their operations first hand that I realized the single best analogy for those operators—their job is identical to what any other pilot does except for where they sit. Considerable airmanship and piloting skills are required to maximize mission effectiveness, to ingrate UAV operations with the rest of the Air Tasking Order (ATO) process, and to fly safely in and among other manned aircraft."
"The focus group discussions also revealed a belief that manned flying experience was required for Predator AVO training. The respondent's major emphasis was that all tasks and experience meld together to teach airmanship. Their belief was that, regardless of where the Air Force decided to draw their AVO candidates from, the AVO pipeline training should be similar to undergraduate pilot training (UPT)."
"The primary emphasis of Air Force training is on airmanship. This is a somewhat nebulous term used to encapsulate a myriad of skills, qualities, and attributes. Airmanship represents the pilot’s ability to assimilate a comprehensive understanding of the aircraft, its systems, its environment, the surrounding threats, the plethora of rules and regulations regarding its
operation, the mission, etc. From all of this, the pilot must deduce sound judgements and courses of action. Thus, the role of the UAV operator is synonymous with the role of a pilot in any other aircraft. They are responsible for every aspect of the mission from receiving the tasking, carefully and thoroughly planning the mission, successfully executing the
mission, safely recovering the aircraft, and completing any post mission requirements. The stick-and-rudder skills are only one aspect of what makes a successful pilot.
"The Air Force needs effective employers of weapon systems, not just operators. The vast majority of potential UAV systems envisioned by the Scientific Advisory Board (see Table 1) would operate in the heart of the airspace structure. This will occur at the altitudes and in the geographic area where other air assets operate, potentially hundreds of other aircraft. Consequently, there is significant potential for future UAV operations to include multiple systems, with different objectives, flying to satisfy various target sets. As such, the requirements for operators of these vehicles should be synonymous the requirements to operate the manned systems with perhaps the exception of certain physiological requirements not relevant to a stationary ground control station."
He also addresses the use of enlisted, non-rated, and contractor personnel. In his discussion, he points out that the pre-training required to make qualified mission commanders would resemble UPT if your actual intent was to duplicate the capabilities of the rated operator. The current USAF leadership is going to try to skip this step.
The new class of non-rated personnel is going to go through the same exact syllabus at Creech as all of the previous rated personnel. Putting aside any bias, can you honestly say that previous aviation experience is so invaluable that a non-rated person and a rated person with previous experience are going to come out of the same syllabus with the same potential to perform combat operations? Were the previously trained rated operators receiving that much useless additional training? If they are not going to have the same inherent capabilities, how are you going to provide them additional training and supervision in a combat squadron that is already experiencing 24/7/365 real world operations with a near unsustainable ops tempo?
What will happen in reality was foreshadowed in a discussion in the paper concerning the satellite community (although it was unintentional on the author's part). When they transitioned the role of satellite operator from officer to enlisted, they went from assigning those positions to personnel with engineering degrees to those with potentially no college degree. When the enlisted personnel got to the training, they found that it was too difficult with respect to the technical aspects. The result was that they changed the training by reducing the technical degree of difficulty. The author then goes on to say that there was no reduced operational degradation associated with this. According to who, and by using what criteria? People tend to underestimate the requirements of fields they are not in, but hold to the requirements of the field they are in. That is because they are thoroughly familiar with what is actually required. I am sure an engineer-degreed satellite operator could expound on exactly what the potential cost of that reduction would be.
That is the way of the USAF leadership, just say "It is so" and it will be so. How can you reduce the quality of the training without sacrificing capability? Can we cut the UPT syllabus in half and still produce the SAME caliber of pilots? Can we lower the minimum level of proficiency required to graduate UPT and still produce the SAME caliber of pilots? Need non-flying analogies - are you willing to cut the medical training of our doctors in half? How about the training required of police officers? When you reduce the entry requirements, and you reduce the training requirements, you WILL reduce the operational capabilities - the question you have to ask is "how much of a reduction of capabilities are we willing to accept?".
No general is qualified in any UAS system, therefore no general understands what is exactly required to effectively employ these systems. No general has talked to Army personnel who received sub-standard support from a UAS system, therefore no general understands the potential cost of lowering the capabilities of those who operate them. Let me be more cynical and say that, to some generals, expediency and preservation of career progression may actually take precedence to the potential cost of reduced UAS support to the ground troop.
These programs were set in motion before the messages were released, and the decisions were made with NO REFERENCE TO COMBAT CAPABILITY. When it comes to the lives of our soldiers (the same soldiers my entire career was devoted to - after all the USAF is inherently a combat-support organization), I know what the priority is.
A research paper from 1999 on the subject of UAS manning requirements:
https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ay1999/saas/tobin.pdf
Take into account that this paper was written in 1999, when the capabilities and scope of employment of the systems were infantile when compared to today. There are very little similarities to the Predator of 1999 and the ones today. Any discussions of difficulty of employment from this paper would be magnified by multiple factors today. Also, keep in mind that the author of the paper admits that his personal opinion going in to this project was different than his conclusion.
Select quotes:
"It was not until late into my research when I had the opportunity to spend some time with the 11 RS and experience their operations first hand that I realized the single best analogy for those operators—their job is identical to what any other pilot does except for where they sit. Considerable airmanship and piloting skills are required to maximize mission effectiveness, to ingrate UAV operations with the rest of the Air Tasking Order (ATO) process, and to fly safely in and among other manned aircraft."
"The focus group discussions also revealed a belief that manned flying experience was required for Predator AVO training. The respondent's major emphasis was that all tasks and experience meld together to teach airmanship. Their belief was that, regardless of where the Air Force decided to draw their AVO candidates from, the AVO pipeline training should be similar to undergraduate pilot training (UPT)."
"The primary emphasis of Air Force training is on airmanship. This is a somewhat nebulous term used to encapsulate a myriad of skills, qualities, and attributes. Airmanship represents the pilot’s ability to assimilate a comprehensive understanding of the aircraft, its systems, its environment, the surrounding threats, the plethora of rules and regulations regarding its
operation, the mission, etc. From all of this, the pilot must deduce sound judgements and courses of action. Thus, the role of the UAV operator is synonymous with the role of a pilot in any other aircraft. They are responsible for every aspect of the mission from receiving the tasking, carefully and thoroughly planning the mission, successfully executing the
mission, safely recovering the aircraft, and completing any post mission requirements. The stick-and-rudder skills are only one aspect of what makes a successful pilot.
"The Air Force needs effective employers of weapon systems, not just operators. The vast majority of potential UAV systems envisioned by the Scientific Advisory Board (see Table 1) would operate in the heart of the airspace structure. This will occur at the altitudes and in the geographic area where other air assets operate, potentially hundreds of other aircraft. Consequently, there is significant potential for future UAV operations to include multiple systems, with different objectives, flying to satisfy various target sets. As such, the requirements for operators of these vehicles should be synonymous the requirements to operate the manned systems with perhaps the exception of certain physiological requirements not relevant to a stationary ground control station."
He also addresses the use of enlisted, non-rated, and contractor personnel. In his discussion, he points out that the pre-training required to make qualified mission commanders would resemble UPT if your actual intent was to duplicate the capabilities of the rated operator. The current USAF leadership is going to try to skip this step.
The new class of non-rated personnel is going to go through the same exact syllabus at Creech as all of the previous rated personnel. Putting aside any bias, can you honestly say that previous aviation experience is so invaluable that a non-rated person and a rated person with previous experience are going to come out of the same syllabus with the same potential to perform combat operations? Were the previously trained rated operators receiving that much useless additional training? If they are not going to have the same inherent capabilities, how are you going to provide them additional training and supervision in a combat squadron that is already experiencing 24/7/365 real world operations with a near unsustainable ops tempo?
What will happen in reality was foreshadowed in a discussion in the paper concerning the satellite community (although it was unintentional on the author's part). When they transitioned the role of satellite operator from officer to enlisted, they went from assigning those positions to personnel with engineering degrees to those with potentially no college degree. When the enlisted personnel got to the training, they found that it was too difficult with respect to the technical aspects. The result was that they changed the training by reducing the technical degree of difficulty. The author then goes on to say that there was no reduced operational degradation associated with this. According to who, and by using what criteria? People tend to underestimate the requirements of fields they are not in, but hold to the requirements of the field they are in. That is because they are thoroughly familiar with what is actually required. I am sure an engineer-degreed satellite operator could expound on exactly what the potential cost of that reduction would be.
That is the way of the USAF leadership, just say "It is so" and it will be so. How can you reduce the quality of the training without sacrificing capability? Can we cut the UPT syllabus in half and still produce the SAME caliber of pilots? Can we lower the minimum level of proficiency required to graduate UPT and still produce the SAME caliber of pilots? Need non-flying analogies - are you willing to cut the medical training of our doctors in half? How about the training required of police officers? When you reduce the entry requirements, and you reduce the training requirements, you WILL reduce the operational capabilities - the question you have to ask is "how much of a reduction of capabilities are we willing to accept?".
No general is qualified in any UAS system, therefore no general understands what is exactly required to effectively employ these systems. No general has talked to Army personnel who received sub-standard support from a UAS system, therefore no general understands the potential cost of lowering the capabilities of those who operate them. Let me be more cynical and say that, to some generals, expediency and preservation of career progression may actually take precedence to the potential cost of reduced UAS support to the ground troop.
These programs were set in motion before the messages were released, and the decisions were made with NO REFERENCE TO COMBAT CAPABILITY. When it comes to the lives of our soldiers (the same soldiers my entire career was devoted to - after all the USAF is inherently a combat-support organization), I know what the priority is.
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