excellent stuff... thank you DD

 

 

I'm curious, did the company take any action against the crew?

 

16:19:19
CAM-2 parking brake?
16:19:21
CAM-1 sh— should I set it? I guess yeah.

I found a tad bit of comic relief in that, only because no one was injured.

 

The only thing worse than going off the end of the runway would be having the plane roll away while deplaning

 

Or not having the overrun and going off the cliff. Not sure which end they went off of.

 

I have no idea, but just by reading the CVR I assume they are gone, especially after the Colgan incident. Not mentioning the sterile cockpit, then failing to follow and adhere to the checklist (wrong flap setting). Then instead of aborting trying to set the flaps to the proper setting while rolling down the runway at take off thrust. Then after that (never flew a CRJ or even a jet) but aborting after V1 for a config warning, I would assume was against procedure as well.

Reading that transcript is sobering, as it was just another flight, and just another convo like any of us have had prior to departure, and then in just 2 seconds it all went wrong. Just kind of a wake up call of how much can go wrong, in such a small amount of time, and the consequences of it.

 

Things to take note of. The captain did initially call for flaps 20 at 16:08:44. Unfortunately the FO put in flaps 8 and the error was not caught in the subsequent checklists. For those unfamiliar with the CRJ, flaps 8 is the most used flap setting.

Based on the CVR there is a ten second or so gap between V1 and power reduction, but only the the FDR can confirm the accuracy of that. I am unsure as to why they got a spoiler configuration warning....any ideas?

It is also worth noting that the FO did not call Vr.

Reading CVR reports like this one makes my stomach churn. We have all had some moronic conversations at work that we would not like anyone to hear....so I hope that no one holds the content of their discussion against them. Only that they should not have been so involved as to lose situation awareness.

I have heard many stories of successful flaps 8 takeoffs, when the flap setting should have been 20. It is a mistake that a lot of crews have made. Changing the flap setting during takeoff roll, not so much.

I thought the crew did pretty well at staying calm at the end of the runway. Just imagine the 10,000 thoughts running through your head in a moment like that. With the most blaring one being that your career is quite possibly over. I am not sure how I would handle that. I imagine most people would go into full shock.

As mentioned before, it is always better to learn from the mistakes of others. We can all learn from this accident.

And remember, pull the damn CVR circuit breaker before you go into CYA mode!!!!

 

Have done two aborts one low speed (less than 40kts) and one highspeed (over 100kts). Both times we got a CONFIG SPOILERS after the abort was initiated.

When you idle both thrust levers the spoilers come up if you are above I think 30kts (not really sure). The logic must sense the high thrust setting and the spoilers being up and give the warning.

 

Thrust levers physically at auto causes spoilers to deploy. Actual fan speed above 77.9% causes the config warning. The engines don't spool down as fast as you bring the levers back, therefore for a split second you get the config warning.


It looks like this crew tried really hard to kill themselves and were saved by the complete luck of having EMAS at the end. Any other airport and this would've been another Colgan 3407 aftermath.