This is not going to enhance public or industry perception regional pilots...

http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation...022/439435.pdf

Think about what you're saying on the hot mike...

 

I didn't have time to read it 100% just yet but I did read from takeoff roll to overrun and then some.

We all agree that it's not appropriate to move the flaps from the current setting to the desired takeoff setting while barreling down the runway. But, if all of this did actually take place before V1, I wonder how they ran out of runway. Maybe just didn't get on the brakes quick enough.

 

Please correct me if I am wrong, but if you have the parking brake set while waiting out a delay, you can engage in conversation normally...

It is a shame to see a self-induced incident. My only real problem with what they did prior to takeoff was not taking the time to get back into the game after the delay. Once they started moving, the conversation should have stopped, and they should have double checked all settings. I have had more almost-f'ed-myself moments following a ground hold than any other time. You really almost need to start your flight over from the beginning, as if you were at the gate. We are creatures of habit, and a ground delay often forces us to break up our normal flow. After a few missed items under similar circumstances, I now take the last five minutes of a delay to go through the flight plan and the FMS pages, and read the departure pages again.

I know people will be critical of the phone calls prior to getting the actual situation under control, but in all fairness the captain said he did not know what to do. Making at least one call could be seen as a positive step towards ensuring everyone's safety. That said, he ended up getting too wrapped up in the calls and seems to be unaware of most of what was going on in the cabin and outside.

Good judgment comes from good experience, and good experience comes from bad judgment. Lets try to use the examples of bad judgment in this case enhance our good experience and good judgment. I would rather learn from everyone's collective mistakes than make all the same mistakes myself down the road. Everyone made it out of this one ok, so lets skip the personal attacks and harsh criticisms, and point out specific things we can learn from.

 

not only that but adhering to sterile cockpit - now we've all done it, but sometimes its good to have a reality check to remind us how important it is to be focused on what you're doing and not going on with the small talk. I really thing some changes need to be made though - especially with pay and schedules. Its hard to be all business and focused when you're doing 8 legs a day and getting paid crap and treated like crap. Professionalism starts to fly out the window with your sanity. Add any kind of distraction in the cockpit or in your personal life and it can spell disaster. So many accidents go back to fatigue, lack of focus, small talk and not realizing whats happening (ala buffalo etc), not just because of training, hours etc. It can happen to anyone - granted proper training and experience can help prevent or correct things that go wrong nobody is invincible. Its amazing how things go from small talk to OH MY GOD WHATS HAPPENING?! Be safe everyone. Just my humble thoughts.

 

Spot on - well said.

 

There's no doubt that the Capt was in shock and had frozen up....not surprising in the least....it would happen to many of us in that kind of stressful situation.

However, there are two things to aid you if you ever find yourself in this kind of situation. First, most Flight Ops Policy Manuals that I have seen have some sort of Post Accident/Incident checklist that will help you get the aircraft secured and the passengers safely taken care of. It will tell you who to notify and what items to safeguard. Second, keep the ALPA Accident/Incident Hotline card in your wallet and call the number....follow the advice on the back of the card and do not discuss the nature of the difficulty with anyone, including out loud while the CVR is running. There will come a time to discuss what happened, but not while you're under that kind of stress and shock.

 

It is tough to tell when exactly they made the decision to abort but the flaps were moved and V1 was called 5 seconds later and then the master warning went off 2 seconds after the V1 call. The "sound of engine RPM decrease" was not until 11 seconds after the V1 call.

 

True, and they were talking about G-rated subjects...it could have been worse.

But the timeline does not make it clear when they were taxiing and when they weren't...based on the checklists I think they mostly stuck to sterile cockpit.

I was referring to what was said after the plane came to a stop...the CA was pretty much frozen with indecision. The FO kept prompting him to something...

In any situation like that, notify ATC, secure the airplane, and make an evacuation decision. A few choice expletives would be in order, but after that stick to business.

 

I am all for getting paid more and I thing we should be. However, if we can't do the job professionally now, why do you think paying us more money will make us more of a professional?

 

don't mean to sound rude.. but while this guy was panicking and on his cell phone...did he ever stop to check on anyone else but himself? Bad stuff...full on conversations in the flight deck on the cvr. Where was the F/O in any of this ? It took one read to to see the flaps eight even after they'd both briefed a 20 dept. Sucks and i understand the frustrations but wow ... the situational awareness was really lacking.
I like the F/A comment about the story the pax were about to get from the capt. post runoff. Oh well... another obvious lesson for us.