Quote:
Originally Posted by RiddleEagle18
The LOA doesn’t force the company to acknowledge that a MGIA is a violation of our scope.
It only says that we will no longer pursue it in this case. That this a settlement of this disagreement.
They could sign another one tomorrow and our only recourse would be arbitration again. Which I keep being told we would lose anyway?
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You're correct, it's a grievance settlement with relief for 1.F.7 and 1.F.8 and not a full in admission that an MGIA is a direct violation of 1.F.7. I'm sorry I spoke inaccurately. This is a complex issue and I'm clearly no lawyer, but as I understand it from our own, the company asking for relief from that language in this settlement sets a precedent should it happen again. That gives 1.F.7 some teeth and forces the company to consider the consequences of any further attempts to establish a similar commercial agreement. Legalese is difficult to decipher, so I'm listening to those reps and lawyers who we pay plenty of money to represent and inform us. If anyone believes there's a problem with the integrity of their conduct, then there's deeper issues here requiring remedial actions, but I'm not seeing that right now.
This is a murky situation without a clear path after either a 'Yes' or 'No' vote. Each one has its own unknown risks and uncertainties. But there are people here who are claiming the only way to protect scope is to vote 'No' and that's just not true for the reasons I explained in my original post. It is possible, should LOA 17 be voted down, the arbitrator gives us a clean sweep. If that happens I'll gladly eat crow and admit I was wrong. But even in that best case scenario there's an associated risk with potentially very serious negative implications should he rule in favor of the company on 1.F.7.
To reiterate, I feel the potential downside of voting 'Yes' on LOA 17 is mitigated by the collars and kill switch in B.3.b enough to outweigh the potential negative downsides of letting the arbitrator neuter a critical part of our scope language.
Looking at the upside of the equation, I see a 3% raise that's insufficient, but is an improvement that not only brings us up to, but above many similar rates at the big 3, that frees up negotiating capital to bargain for more gains in other areas of the CBA (perhaps stronger 1.F.7 language among other areas) and gives the pilot group a strong standing to fight for and earn a CBA in the upper echelon of all airlines, not just being tethered near the peer set group of Alaska, Hawaiian, etc., allowing us to see long term contractual gains as a result. This is the first round of that fight. We can fight that battle more effectively with LOA 17 and an NEA with an expiration date much better than we can if an arbitrator undercuts 1.F.7 and allows an MGIA to be rubberstamped into our other codeshare agreements.
Contract language matters because we make it matter. The company ignored parts of our CBA and we called them out on it and went through the process to rectify it. We've done it before and we'll do it again.
Arbitration is a process stacked in favor of the wealthy and powerful. 3A illustrated that for many of our pilots. Kasher did that for Alaska's. There's a reason many companies are forcing people to sign away class action lawsuit rights in favor of forced arbitration. It needs to be reformed and I'm all for fighting that fight, but LOA 17 isn't it. Unfortunately it's an imperfect system but we have no choice but to fight the hardest we can within the framework as it currently is, take the wins where we can, and get back up after a loss to fight again.