LOA17 is out
#291
Line Holder
Joined: Mar 2022
Posts: 43
Likes: 0
Doesn’t seem anywhere close to ironclad. The pilot count and block hour requirements can be violated for $5M, barely a speed bump. And the renewal terms say “if each of these requirements are not met” instead of “if any of these requirements are not met” meaning they can meet one requirement, violate the others and still renew. Also, the international requirements aren’t broken down by region, like Caribbean, EU, etc.
#294
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Oct 2012
Posts: 3,213
Likes: 34
From: 190 captain and “Pro-pilot”
This what baffles me in regards to anyone voting yes, what exactly does this strengthen in the future? Not a damn thing to a company that plays fast and loose with language or in this case just blatantly violates sections of our contract, open your eyes and don’t screw us in the future with a yes vote
But but they wouldn’t do that. Except for the fact that because they did do that we are here and still have people saying they wouldn’t do that. Think about that
#295
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Oct 2012
Posts: 3,213
Likes: 34
From: 190 captain and “Pro-pilot”
I doubt very much they gave us the actual power to just do away with the NEA. No way.
This is jetblue the same company that said they didn’t take away premium pay they just removed the trigger.
#297
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Jul 2011
Posts: 474
Likes: 0
#298
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Feb 2016
Posts: 108
Likes: 0
Voting Yes could put plans for significant growth behind us. According to government attorneys,
“JetBlue will share revenues that American earns on transatlantic service to and from Boston and New York City. Thus, any effort by JetBlue to undercut American on price would reduce the revenues JetBlue earns under the revenue-sharing arrangement. As a consequence, JetBlue will have less incentive to compete aggressively with American in those markets, whether by lowering fares or improving service. JetBlue will also have less incentive to enter new transatlantic markets where it would compete with American.” (emphasis added)
“JetBlue will share revenues that American earns on transatlantic service to and from Boston and New York City. Thus, any effort by JetBlue to undercut American on price would reduce the revenues JetBlue earns under the revenue-sharing arrangement. As a consequence, JetBlue will have less incentive to compete aggressively with American in those markets, whether by lowering fares or improving service. JetBlue will also have less incentive to enter new transatlantic markets where it would compete with American.” (emphasis added)
#299
The REAL Bluedriver
Joined: Sep 2011
Posts: 6,935
Likes: 0
From: Airbus Capt
#300
The REAL Bluedriver
Joined: Sep 2011
Posts: 6,935
Likes: 0
From: Airbus Capt
We could ask that same question of why did we decided to negotiate an LOA with the company to settle this if an arbitrator's ruling in our favor is a lock and our leverage only improves?
I'm not happy with the MGIA and it's attempt to circumvent 1.F.7, but the risk of letting one person determine it's not a JV as defined by the CBA and therefore free from the other 1.F.7 restrictions is opening a pandoras box of pain especially at an airline like jetblue that has codeshare agreements with numerous airlines, big and small, domestic and international and is always on the lookout for more partners.
What does the LAX base look like with an Alaska codeshare that includes an MGIA? FLL and MCO with an Azul codeshare and accompanying MGIA? Both of those airlines, in the case of Alaska, or their country, in the case of Azul, are mentioned in our CBA. Allowing an MGIA with Azul would steer clear of 1.F.7.d protections. I don't want to see how jetblue's greed exploits a MGIA loophole across the rest of our network.
There's potential for a very consequential loophole to be opened up if the arbitrator rules in favor of the company for 1.F.7. A 'No Vote' doesn't guarantee us protection of our scope language. A 'Yes Vote' at least sets the precedent that the MGIA in the NEA is a JV because the company negotiated a settlement with us. The LOA also keeps Javitz as the arbitrator for any further related grievances, which he surely won't look at too keenly since his reputation is on the line.
The camel got its nose in the tent with LOA 12 and the creation of the NEA. The company's greed and disregard for us pilots tried to wiggle it in farther. While far from perfect, LOA 17 stops it from going any further, ties the company's hands more with the new collars for the whole NEA, and gives us pilots the ability to kill the NEA in eight years just by withholding consent for it to continue. That's an eternity from now, but it's an expiration date for temporary scope relief that could give us a huge amount of leverage should the company need it to continue. That's no guarantee, but neither was Delta's profit sharing when it began.
At the core of this issue is the integrity of our scope language. The purpose of our strong scope language is to protect our jobs by ensuring the company can only generate the overwhelming portion of its revenue from our own flying by our own pilots. That's something we all want, have fought for and continue to fight for. While our CBA has limited exceptions, it ensures an environment where the company can't earn the lion's share of the revenue unless it's a Jetblue plane flown by Jetblue pilots. No matter how much I want to tell the company 'No' a second time, I see that as counter-productive to the ultimate goal of our scope language with too much downside risk in the future by letting the arbitrator rule unilaterally. Voting 'Yes' means strengthening the current CBA language through this process, except for the limited relief, has ensured Jetblue pilot growth throughout this decade, while also earning the ability to kill the whole agreement at the end of the decade if its not to our liking or use that threat to bargain even greater benefits for the pilot group should that leverage exist.
I havent mentioned compensation, UTS, or c91 because, while those are important to me and can be argued on their own merits, this is a scope grievance and the integrity of our section 1 language has been and remains paramount to me, so I felt my reasoning needed to be stated.
I'm not happy with the MGIA and it's attempt to circumvent 1.F.7, but the risk of letting one person determine it's not a JV as defined by the CBA and therefore free from the other 1.F.7 restrictions is opening a pandoras box of pain especially at an airline like jetblue that has codeshare agreements with numerous airlines, big and small, domestic and international and is always on the lookout for more partners.
What does the LAX base look like with an Alaska codeshare that includes an MGIA? FLL and MCO with an Azul codeshare and accompanying MGIA? Both of those airlines, in the case of Alaska, or their country, in the case of Azul, are mentioned in our CBA. Allowing an MGIA with Azul would steer clear of 1.F.7.d protections. I don't want to see how jetblue's greed exploits a MGIA loophole across the rest of our network.
There's potential for a very consequential loophole to be opened up if the arbitrator rules in favor of the company for 1.F.7. A 'No Vote' doesn't guarantee us protection of our scope language. A 'Yes Vote' at least sets the precedent that the MGIA in the NEA is a JV because the company negotiated a settlement with us. The LOA also keeps Javitz as the arbitrator for any further related grievances, which he surely won't look at too keenly since his reputation is on the line.
The camel got its nose in the tent with LOA 12 and the creation of the NEA. The company's greed and disregard for us pilots tried to wiggle it in farther. While far from perfect, LOA 17 stops it from going any further, ties the company's hands more with the new collars for the whole NEA, and gives us pilots the ability to kill the NEA in eight years just by withholding consent for it to continue. That's an eternity from now, but it's an expiration date for temporary scope relief that could give us a huge amount of leverage should the company need it to continue. That's no guarantee, but neither was Delta's profit sharing when it began.
At the core of this issue is the integrity of our scope language. The purpose of our strong scope language is to protect our jobs by ensuring the company can only generate the overwhelming portion of its revenue from our own flying by our own pilots. That's something we all want, have fought for and continue to fight for. While our CBA has limited exceptions, it ensures an environment where the company can't earn the lion's share of the revenue unless it's a Jetblue plane flown by Jetblue pilots. No matter how much I want to tell the company 'No' a second time, I see that as counter-productive to the ultimate goal of our scope language with too much downside risk in the future by letting the arbitrator rule unilaterally. Voting 'Yes' means strengthening the current CBA language through this process, except for the limited relief, has ensured Jetblue pilot growth throughout this decade, while also earning the ability to kill the whole agreement at the end of the decade if its not to our liking or use that threat to bargain even greater benefits for the pilot group should that leverage exist.
I havent mentioned compensation, UTS, or c91 because, while those are important to me and can be argued on their own merits, this is a scope grievance and the integrity of our section 1 language has been and remains paramount to me, so I felt my reasoning needed to be stated.
I do think that this LOA doesn't offer the protection you think it does. No where in the settlement does the company admit the MGIA is a scope violation. Nothing in the LOA prevents them from signing up Alaska/Breeze the day after the LOA is signed, using a MGIA.
And if you can't possibly believe the pilots will actually have the power to shut down the NEA?!? That would NEVER be possible, or be decided in the pilots favor. Ever.
To your original question, why would CK negotiate an LOA if the arbitration is a lock? You know the answer. But I'll add a small amount of color. CK is the one who gave us a no choice, no vote LOA 12... Because he thought it was good for us. He gave us the steaming pile of dung known as LOA 13, and fully supported it's passage, publicly, because he thought it was good for us and because he didn't think we could do better. Well here we are, and as much as I don't think LOA 17 is good enough, or values or respects the pilots contract appropriately, it is much better than LOA 13. Even if CK knew the pilots would win the arbitration, if it jeopardized the NEA, he would never support that course of action. He doesn't recognize the value of having leverage, something contractual that the company wants/needs from us. He simply wants to secure the NEA without risk or drama, as his first priority.
This company doesn't give a PENNY to the pilots if they don't have to. The fact that they are offering a raise, $30 million donuts, part 91 restrictions that will require hiring additional line pilots, etc... show they think a partial or complete loss from the arbitrator as a very real possibility.
I have come to think the NEA may not work without 1F8 relief. That is quite the incentive to quickly renegotiate a better offer. This is a much different time and position than 1 year ago for the company.
That's my view anyway.


