LOA17 is out
03-28-2022 | 05:31 AM
#271
The REAL Bluedriver
Joined: Sep 2011
Posts: 6,935
Likes: 0
From: Airbus Capt
Thanks for your post. You make 2 points here that I'm digging into:
1. Maybe he acknowledged that, but that doesn't mean anything in regards to his ruling. You and others seem 100% sure that if we vote this down, he will tell the company to stop doing what they're doing that we say is violating the contract. I'm not saying you're wrong, but what if you're wrong? What if he doesn't do that? What if there is no cease and desist, and the company gets to keep doing what they're doing? It's a serious question that no one will answer. There's definitely a chance (and it's a good chance in my opinion, after having gone through the Trans States/GoJet debacle, where the company got away with blatantly violating the contract), that the arbitrator will do nothing to the company, will not force them to stop anything, will not help us out at all. What then? I'm seriously trying to understand what would happen then.
2. How does voting this down give us leverage in our contract negotiations? You say it like it's a fact, not an opinion, so I'm wondering how it is exactly that we would get leverage from voting this down? Again, I'm not necessarily disagreeing with you or telling you that you are wrong, I'm trying to dig deeper here and understand why people think these things.
1. Maybe he acknowledged that, but that doesn't mean anything in regards to his ruling. You and others seem 100% sure that if we vote this down, he will tell the company to stop doing what they're doing that we say is violating the contract. I'm not saying you're wrong, but what if you're wrong? What if he doesn't do that? What if there is no cease and desist, and the company gets to keep doing what they're doing? It's a serious question that no one will answer. There's definitely a chance (and it's a good chance in my opinion, after having gone through the Trans States/GoJet debacle, where the company got away with blatantly violating the contract), that the arbitrator will do nothing to the company, will not force them to stop anything, will not help us out at all. What then? I'm seriously trying to understand what would happen then.
2. How does voting this down give us leverage in our contract negotiations? You say it like it's a fact, not an opinion, so I'm wondering how it is exactly that we would get leverage from voting this down? Again, I'm not necessarily disagreeing with you or telling you that you are wrong, I'm trying to dig deeper here and understand why people think these things.
But yes, there are risks, and each pilot needs to decide for his or herself if they'd rather take those risks or reward the disrespectful behavior.
03-28-2022 | 05:38 AM
#272
Line Holder
Joined: Jul 2006
Posts: 614
Likes: 2
From: A220 CA
I think several have answered your number 1. Many would rather risk a loss than to reward the company's behavior and disrespect. But let me ask you this, if the company didn't think a cease and desist was a very real possibility, then why offer the 30 million, the extra 3%, the UTS, the part 91 restrictions? Does that sound like the company you know to offer these things for no reason?
But yes, there are risks, and each pilot needs to decide for his or herself if they'd rather take those risks or reward the disrespectful behavior.
But yes, there are risks, and each pilot needs to decide for his or herself if they'd rather take those risks or reward the disrespectful behavior.
03-28-2022 | 05:45 AM
#273
The REAL Bluedriver
Joined: Sep 2011
Posts: 6,935
Likes: 0
From: Airbus Capt
those things are almost meaningless from the overall corporate point of view. they are offering them because they have to do something to get us to vote "yes" so they can say that we agreed to let them violate our contract (after the fact, but still). i don't think the company is risking anything at all. they've laughed all the way to the bank this whole time.
03-28-2022 | 05:57 AM
#274
The REAL Bluedriver
Joined: Sep 2011
Posts: 6,935
Likes: 0
From: Airbus Capt
those things are almost meaningless from the overall corporate point of view. they are offering them because they have to do something to get us to vote "yes" so they can say that we agreed to let them violate our contract (after the fact, but still). i don't think the company is risking anything at all. they've laughed all the way to the bank this whole time.
03-28-2022 | 09:16 AM
#275
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Nov 2005
Posts: 2,685
Likes: 26
LOA17 is out
Exactly right.
1.F.8 is worth them making an offer. They do fear losing it or they wouldn’t bother at all!
I’m not convinced that they are ok moving forward without it, and I’m even more convinced that AA isn’t ok moving forward without it. Dare I say it’s the entire reason the NEA exists!
Don’t believe me, then take the airlines own words.
https://news.aa.com/news/news-detail...nal%20networks.[/url]
The partnership enables new strategic growth opportunities for both airlines. As a result, American will launch international service from New York ... JetBlue will grow in greater New York City, adding flights at LaGuardia (LGA) and Newark (EWR), while also increasing its presence at JFK for seamless connections to American’s expanded international network.
https://thepointsguy.com/news/americ...nce-codeshare/
American has been pulling back on New York flights for years amid intense competition. Now, the partnership will allow it reassert itself in the country’s economic center. American can fill its lucrative international flights without investing to expand its network of domestic routes at JFK
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03-28-2022 | 09:33 AM
#277
Line Holder
Joined: Dec 2009
Posts: 301
Likes: 0
From: 1Durrty5
I'm not happy with the MGIA and it's attempt to circumvent 1.F.7, but the risk of letting one person determine it's not a JV as defined by the CBA and therefore free from the other 1.F.7 restrictions is opening a pandoras box of pain especially at an airline like jetblue that has codeshare agreements with numerous airlines, big and small, domestic and international and is always on the lookout for more partners.
What does the LAX base look like with an Alaska codeshare that includes an MGIA? FLL and MCO with an Azul codeshare and accompanying MGIA? Both of those airlines, in the case of Alaska, or their country, in the case of Azul, are mentioned in our CBA. Allowing an MGIA with Azul would steer clear of 1.F.7.d protections. I don't want to see how jetblue's greed exploits a MGIA loophole across the rest of our network.
There's potential for a very consequential loophole to be opened up if the arbitrator rules in favor of the company for 1.F.7. A 'No Vote' doesn't guarantee us protection of our scope language. A 'Yes Vote' at least sets the precedent that the MGIA in the NEA is a JV because the company negotiated a settlement with us. The LOA also keeps Javitz as the arbitrator for any further related grievances, which he surely won't look at too keenly since his reputation is on the line.
The camel got its nose in the tent with LOA 12 and the creation of the NEA. The company's greed and disregard for us pilots tried to wiggle it in farther. While far from perfect, LOA 17 stops it from going any further, ties the company's hands more with the new collars for the whole NEA, and gives us pilots the ability to kill the NEA in eight years just by withholding consent for it to continue. That's an eternity from now, but it's an expiration date for temporary scope relief that could give us a huge amount of leverage should the company need it to continue. That's no guarantee, but neither was Delta's profit sharing when it began.
At the core of this issue is the integrity of our scope language. The purpose of our strong scope language is to protect our jobs by ensuring the company can only generate the overwhelming portion of its revenue from our own flying by our own pilots. That's something we all want, have fought for and continue to fight for. While our CBA has limited exceptions, it ensures an environment where the company can't earn the lion's share of the revenue unless it's a Jetblue plane flown by Jetblue pilots. No matter how much I want to tell the company 'No' a second time, I see that as counter-productive to the ultimate goal of our scope language with too much downside risk in the future by letting the arbitrator rule unilaterally. Voting 'Yes' means strengthening the current CBA language through this process, except for the limited relief, has ensured Jetblue pilot growth throughout this decade, while also earning the ability to kill the whole agreement at the end of the decade if its not to our liking or use that threat to bargain even greater benefits for the pilot group should that leverage exist.
I havent mentioned compensation, UTS, or c91 because, while those are important to me and can be argued on their own merits, this is a scope grievance and the integrity of our section 1 language has been and remains paramount to me, so I felt my reasoning needed to be stated.
03-28-2022 | 09:41 AM
#278
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Nov 2005
Posts: 2,685
Likes: 26
LOA17 is out
We could ask that same question of why did we decided to negotiate an LOA with the company to settle this if an arbitrator's ruling in our favor is a lock and our leverage only improves?
I'm not happy with the MGIA and it's attempt to circumvent 1.F.7, but the risk of letting one person determine it's not a JV as defined by the CBA and therefore free from the other 1.F.7 restrictions is opening a pandoras box of pain especially at an airline like jetblue that has codeshare agreements with numerous airlines, big and small, domestic and international and is always on the lookout for more partners.
What does the LAX base look like with an Alaska codeshare that includes an MGIA? FLL and MCO with an Azul codeshare and accompanying MGIA? Both of those airlines, in the case of Alaska, or their country, in the case of Azul, are mentioned in our CBA. Allowing an MGIA with Azul would steer clear of 1.F.7.d protections. I don't want to see how jetblue's greed exploits a MGIA loophole across the rest of our network.
There's potential for a very consequential loophole to be opened up if the arbitrator rules in favor of the company for 1.F.7. A 'No Vote' doesn't guarantee us protection of our scope language. A 'Yes Vote' at least sets the precedent that the MGIA in the NEA is a JV because the company negotiated a settlement with us. The LOA also keeps Javitz as the arbitrator for any further related grievances, which he surely won't look at too keenly since his reputation is on the line.
The camel got its nose in the tent with LOA 12 and the creation of the NEA. The company's greed and disregard for us pilots tried to wiggle it in farther. While far from perfect, LOA 17 stops it from going any further, ties the company's hands more with the new collars for the whole NEA, and gives us pilots the ability to kill the NEA in eight years just by withholding consent for it to continue. That's an eternity from now, but it's an expiration date for temporary scope relief that could give us a huge amount of leverage should the company need it to continue. That's no guarantee, but neither was Delta's profit sharing when it began.
At the core of this issue is the integrity of our scope language. The purpose of our strong scope language is to protect our jobs by ensuring the company can only generate the overwhelming portion of its revenue from our own flying by our own pilots. That's something we all want, have fought for and continue to fight for. While our CBA has limited exceptions, it ensures an environment where the company can't earn the lion's share of the revenue unless it's a Jetblue plane flown by Jetblue pilots. No matter how much I want to tell the company 'No' a second time, I see that as counter-productive to the ultimate goal of our scope language with too much downside risk in the future by letting the arbitrator rule unilaterally. Voting 'Yes' means strengthening the current CBA language through this process, except for the limited relief, has ensured Jetblue pilot growth throughout this decade, while also earning the ability to kill the whole agreement at the end of the decade if its not to our liking or use that threat to bargain even greater benefits for the pilot group should that leverage exist.
I havent mentioned compensation, UTS, or c91 because, while those are important to me and can be argued on their own merits, this is a scope grievance and the integrity of our section 1 language has been and remains paramount to me, so I felt my reasoning needed to be stated.
I'm not happy with the MGIA and it's attempt to circumvent 1.F.7, but the risk of letting one person determine it's not a JV as defined by the CBA and therefore free from the other 1.F.7 restrictions is opening a pandoras box of pain especially at an airline like jetblue that has codeshare agreements with numerous airlines, big and small, domestic and international and is always on the lookout for more partners.
What does the LAX base look like with an Alaska codeshare that includes an MGIA? FLL and MCO with an Azul codeshare and accompanying MGIA? Both of those airlines, in the case of Alaska, or their country, in the case of Azul, are mentioned in our CBA. Allowing an MGIA with Azul would steer clear of 1.F.7.d protections. I don't want to see how jetblue's greed exploits a MGIA loophole across the rest of our network.
There's potential for a very consequential loophole to be opened up if the arbitrator rules in favor of the company for 1.F.7. A 'No Vote' doesn't guarantee us protection of our scope language. A 'Yes Vote' at least sets the precedent that the MGIA in the NEA is a JV because the company negotiated a settlement with us. The LOA also keeps Javitz as the arbitrator for any further related grievances, which he surely won't look at too keenly since his reputation is on the line.
The camel got its nose in the tent with LOA 12 and the creation of the NEA. The company's greed and disregard for us pilots tried to wiggle it in farther. While far from perfect, LOA 17 stops it from going any further, ties the company's hands more with the new collars for the whole NEA, and gives us pilots the ability to kill the NEA in eight years just by withholding consent for it to continue. That's an eternity from now, but it's an expiration date for temporary scope relief that could give us a huge amount of leverage should the company need it to continue. That's no guarantee, but neither was Delta's profit sharing when it began.
At the core of this issue is the integrity of our scope language. The purpose of our strong scope language is to protect our jobs by ensuring the company can only generate the overwhelming portion of its revenue from our own flying by our own pilots. That's something we all want, have fought for and continue to fight for. While our CBA has limited exceptions, it ensures an environment where the company can't earn the lion's share of the revenue unless it's a Jetblue plane flown by Jetblue pilots. No matter how much I want to tell the company 'No' a second time, I see that as counter-productive to the ultimate goal of our scope language with too much downside risk in the future by letting the arbitrator rule unilaterally. Voting 'Yes' means strengthening the current CBA language through this process, except for the limited relief, has ensured Jetblue pilot growth throughout this decade, while also earning the ability to kill the whole agreement at the end of the decade if its not to our liking or use that threat to bargain even greater benefits for the pilot group should that leverage exist.
I havent mentioned compensation, UTS, or c91 because, while those are important to me and can be argued on their own merits, this is a scope grievance and the integrity of our section 1 language has been and remains paramount to me, so I felt my reasoning needed to be stated.
The LOA doesn’t force the company to acknowledge that a MGIA is a violation of our scope.
It only says that we will no longer pursue it in this case. That this a settlement of this disagreement.
They could sign another one tomorrow and our only recourse would be arbitration again. Which I keep being told we would lose anyway?
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03-28-2022 | 09:50 AM
#279
Line Holder
Joined: Aug 2007
Posts: 1,044
Likes: 2
…
At the core of this issue is the integrity of our scope language. The purpose of our strong scope language is to protect our jobs by ensuring the company can only generate the overwhelming portion of its revenue from our own flying by our own pilots.
...
At the core of this issue is the integrity of our scope language. The purpose of our strong scope language is to protect our jobs by ensuring the company can only generate the overwhelming portion of its revenue from our own flying by our own pilots.
...
03-28-2022 | 09:51 AM
#280
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Nov 2005
Posts: 2,685
Likes: 26
LOA17 is out
This is what concerns me about the MGIA. It was presented as an “enhanced codeshare” but federal regulators said we’re “effectively merging” in Boston and New York. This circumvents the market driven protections we thought had. Our own execs have said the agreement is structured so that neither airline cares who is actually carrying the customers. This doesn’t sound anything like a codeshare and seems to make the protections of 1.F.7 even more critical.
The LOA doesn’t force the company to acknowledge the MGIA as a code share violation.
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