How often do you run NNC's prior to thrust reduction? How often do you gain experience maneuvering extreme, out of trim stabs, in either direction, throughout the envelope? How often is any of it encountered during un-canned LOFT events? Anyone recall a 747-400 lunching #3 out of SFO before flat hatting San Bruno mountain? Nearly a 100' of shake, rattle and roll.

 

I haven't heard anybody say that there isn't a design flaw. That's all anybody is talking about. The engineers will fix the software and the FAA will recertify.

The problem is that nobody is talking about crew performance. The training that the two accident crews needed wasn't in MCAS, though. It was additional training in managing an emergency while continuing to fly the airplane first. That skill is important for all pilots and the lack of it has contributed to many accidents including the 747 in SFO, Asiana in SFO, and AF447 in the Atlantic.

 

I agree with your view on training, but that does not apply to this situation. The FAA has no control over training standards at foreign carriers. I actually think the FAA is doing a great job with regard to training. The new extended envelope training, upset training, CRM, and encouragement to hand fly are all things that make it less likely for the same thing to happen to a US crew.

While this accident proves that well trained pilots are valuable, it also uncovered a design flaw and problem with the certification standards. The FAA and Boeing can’t fix the training, so they can only address the design and process.

Having a 737 fall out of the sky every year is bad for Boeing and bad for the FAA. Telling the rest of the word to make better pilots will only cause the US to give up influence in the international aviation community.

 

A lot of interesting info has been posted on this thread. I currently have over 10,000 hrs of 737 time, and have flown the Max a few times before it was grounded (was great to fly and extremely fuel efficient). But the more reading I’ve done on this the less I trust Boeing and the FAA. I’m starting to wonder if they are hiding other issues from us. It’s a serious problem when the people that operate your equipment hundreds of hours a year don’t trust that its safe. I’m glad ALPA at least is involved in this mess.

 

That is NOT true. I just looked up a 737 QRH from 2014, the Runaway Stabilizer Checklist included step 3 as “Autothrottles if engaged, disengage”.
After the first accident they made the first 4 steps immediate action memory items (boxed). Ethiopian Airlines should’ve had this change in their QRH and QRC before their accident but I believe they only had received a memo, according to what I skimmed at avherald.com.

 

Thanks for finding that.

I thought that was the case but wasn't having any luck finding a reference. Everything old disappears from the iPad as soon as it's updated!

 

I agree.

The problem is that so many people are judging the MAX based on the outcome--two fatal accidents in a short period of time--But they're not considering crew performance.

 

Honest question for you...definitely not trying to poke the bear, but shouldn’t the goal for a passenger airplane be to NEVER put the crew into a situation where their excellent training saves the day? Let’s say crew after crew recovered from this situation.....you think Boeing and/or the airlines would have fixed it to the proper extent they will now be FORCED to?

It seems like most people are emotionally involved with this because it affects the fleet they fly on. I don’t think so many would be such ardent defenders of such a flawed design if it didn’t threaten their wallet.

 

What people? The media? The general public? Those don't matter. a year after the MAX starts flying again, no one will remember.

My mother in law hated MD-88s because of the Alaska crash. When she found out I was flying the 717 she said she was happy I wasn't in the MD-88. They both have the same jack screw, but that means nothing to her.

The people that do understand the issue, Boeing engineers, test pilots, and the FAA have plenty of experience separating pilot error from aircraft design. Even if no one died, I am sure the FAA would still be pressuring Boeing to fix the problem. Having crews routinely running the same QRH procedure for a critical flight control is unacceptable.

 

Interesting point. Attitudes might be way different if this thread was about a design flaw on a Sukhoi Superjet that crews had to respond to