A consensus on APC? You must be new here.

 

On this forum, we solve all the Industry's problems one thread at a time.

 

A noble calling!

 

At Delta the procedure was changed after the second crash to add the Autothrottles step (we've always had the entire runaway trim procedure as a memory item). My point is still valid because United changed their procedure post crash as well (making it partially memory items). We don't know what the other airlines have for procedures, so blaming the pilots or their training based on an unknown procedure (and lack of all facts) is just wrong.

P. S. I didn't know until your post that emergency procedures were different airline to airline. I always thought a runaway trim was a runaway trim regardless of the airline.

 

That seems odd to me as well. I seem to remember that LCAL was sued (after the DEN four-wheeler accident?) partly asserting they weren't using the exact Boeing non-normal checklist, but their own version of it. That changed. So I figured all airlines used the Boeing procedures, not an edited version of them.

 

We aren't blaming the pilots, we're saying that the correct procedure wasn't done. There's a difference.

I don't know why the two accident crews didn't do the correct procedure. Could have been their training. Could have been their manuals/policies. Could have been anything. That's what we need to find out and correct.

People are evaluating the seriousness of the design flaw based on the outcome of the two accident flights. That is a logical fallacy because the outcome of the flights was affected by the performance of the crews. The crews, for some reason, did not perform the procedures which would have given them the best chance of successfully handing the failures. The one crew that did perform the correct steps did land safely.

 

Boeing develops a minimum training model, FM, and MEL for each airplane it builds and sells. In the USA that becomes the starting point for the purchasing airline FAA approval to operate the model of airplane. The airline is free to add too, and modify the SOPs to fit their operations. The basic idea when seeking FAA approval is they may not make changes which are less than the manufacturer's.

Yes I have modified, developed and received approval from the FAA for new training programs, manuals, additions to the MEL list and SOPs. It is a process and quite frankly one which some airlines (and it would appear manufacturers) short cut to save money.

BTW I noticed good old Larry has changed his tune a bit. A whole lot less blame on pilot failure and now recognizing there is a problem with training and certification of their procedures.

 

I haven't changed a thing. I just keep trying to explain it differently so that people who like make discussions personal might finally understand.

The bottom line is the same. Three crews had nearly identical failures. One crew followed the procedure and landed safely. Two crews did not follow the procedure and didn't. We need to find out why.

 

Larry when will you get the fact there wasn't a procedure for MCAS inputs due to AOA failure, with stick shakers, audio warnings a trim which does not work with the control brake, and more. There was also some rumor another pilot told the first crew to shut off the electric trim switches.

Maybe you or someone else may have saved it, but two airplanes from two different airlines at opposite sides of the earth crashed and killed over 300 people. Even after Boeing was forced to provide a notice to operators of the model (not an AD BTW).

There simply wasn't a procedure for what happened to them, no QRCs, QRH, nor prescribed immediate action items for that combination of failures. Essentially these crews were " winging it" like the good old days before checklists and SOPs.

And yes you made it personal by constantly implying you had the goods to save these airplanes.

So who fault were the crashes? If the pilots did not have the proper training, experience and or procedures whose fault is it?

 

I don't know what checklists they had. If they did not have the correct procedure then that would explain why they didn't do it.

Our checklists did have the procedure.

You are stuck on blame. You think I'm assigning blame. I am not.

I am saying that you are judging the engineering failure based on the result without considering how the fault was handled. That is a logic fallacy.

We have to find out why the crews didn't do the procedure. Was it a lack of airmanship? Poor training? Lack of experience? Incomplete manuals? We don't know.