How to staple ALL the scabs!!??

 

along with career expectations, longevity, and status and category.

"We begin with a high-level view of the pre-merger airlines, their respective business models and the state of the airline industry in 2010. Simply put, United was, as of the merger date, one of a small group of the preeminent U.S. (and, for that matter, international) global carriers, with a highly evolved and extensive domestic route network, with multiple hubs, geographically well-dispersed and well-situated in strong local markets (Chicago-O'Hare, Washington-Dulles, Denver, Los Angeles, and San Francisco), feeding into a comprehensive international route system serving all major continents and geographic areas with a large fleet of widebody aircraft configured to accommodate both leisure, but more importantly, the more valuable premium business traffic.

For at least half a century, United has been one of the “big three” U.S. carriers, along with Delta and American. Post-deregulation, each of these carriers spearheaded a global alliance – Delta was a charter member of SkyTeam, American a founding member of Oneworld, and United a founder of what is the largest and most comprehensive airline alliance – Star Alliance.

Each of these three airlines had an extensive domestic footprint in O&D markets to complement its global reach. Separate and apart from its role in Star Alliance, United's worldwide reach, with its extensive route rights (many of which were limited and not available to others), its substantial portfolio of scarce slot and gate assets, and its highly developed and extensive sales organizations, could not be matched or replicated. Taken together, these assets produced a powerful global brand unequalled by any other U.S. airline.

Prior to the merger, Continental was a smaller network carrier with primarily domestic, narrow-gauge operations, with much smaller and less favorably located hubs (Houston, Newark, Cleveland, and Guam) and a smaller, less nationally-articulated domestic route system. Internationally, Continental had a patchwork of less valuable routes, served to substantial degree with narrowbody aircraft (including regional jets flown by regional partners) more typically found serving domestic markets and a heavy focus on low-yield leisure traffic. Thus, much of Continental's international presence in Latin America was made up of short-haul, narrowbody vacation (low yield leisure) traffic and service to destinations in and around the Caribbean and Mexico.14 In the Pacific, Continental's presence was mostly the remnants of Air Micronesia, which was basically a network of narrowbody commuter runs built around a Guam hub designed more to cater to the very low-yield “honeymoon traffic” from Japan and unconnected to traffic flows involving the mainland United States."

 

along with career expectations, longevity, and status and category.

"As one might expect, an analysis of each carrier on a standalone basis shows that junior CAL pilots simply never would have had the opportunity to enjoy meaningful widebody, international flying. Absent the merger, most CAL pilots' careers would have peaked at narrowbody captain."

 

Fasle - False - False...2005 hire here and I was going to retire in the single digits based on Age 60 - even greater age 65...the 'facts' can be easily disputed on the ual side just by actually looking at the pre merger lists

enjoying that meaningful flying how???

according to who...

 

along with career expectations, longevity, and status and category. But at least they're using CAL's own argument--from 1991.

"The second key issue implicating the career expectations equity is the dramatic imbalance between United's jumbo and widebody-focused pre-merger fleet and Continental's fleet, which contained only a small number of widebody craft. As of the snapshot date, United had a total of 111 widebody aircraft, 76 of which were the largest, “jumbo” aircraft – Boeing 747-400s or Boeing 777s – which are the largest aircraft in either carrier's fleets and command the highest rates and best routes. Continental had only 46 widebody aircraft, of which only 20 were jumbos. Continental had no 747-400s, uniformly acknowledged to be the most desirable aircraft, see Continental-People Express at 120 (Ross 1991) (noting the “mystique factor in B-747 flying”), in its fleet.“

 

The MEC Chairmen’s complaints matched the views of industry analysts. On March 19, 2008, noted airline analyst Bob Reed of Bloomberg BusinessWeek wrote that Mr. Tilton was “squeezing every possible dime out of existing operations by postponing orders for new aircraft or refusing labor an extra nickel. There’s no need to invest for the future, he seems to be thinking, if you’re going to be gone anyway.”

 

After a decade of divergent profits and fleet trends, Continental and United operated nearly identical fleet sizes: 349 and 359 aircraft, respectively, when the corporate merger closed. In addition to the aircraft on hand, Continental had 75 aircraft on firm order (and had options for another 98 aircraft), many of which represented growth aircraft. Continental has taken delivery of numerous aircraft that it had on firm order prior to the merger, including B737-800s, B737-900ERs and North America’s first B787s. Although in early 2010 United ordered 25 B787s and 25 A350s—initially scheduled to be delivered between 2016 and 2019—its fleet was destined to remain static, at best, because the orders were “part of the Company’s international fleet replacement program which provides for retirement of its international Boeing 747s and 767s between 2016 and 2019.” United Air Lines, Inc., SEC Form 8-K (Mar. 11, 2010).

 

anyways...I digress, I could go back and forth all day posting snippets and counter disputes but you get the idea of where this is headed in the courts..should be an interesting debate

 

The CAL side IGNORED ALPA merger policy..........good luck with that!

 

That's a false statement

ual is trying to redefine terms of longevity and equity while at the same time telling the board it is neither their place nor the boards place to do so - very jumbled methodology