Just ask Buzz what hubs he overnights in that don't have a 737 base. :) That's where they'll open the next 737 base, in my opinion. Other than that, I think there will be a general cut in 757s in all bases over the next few years, replacing it will the 737.

Detroit, Detroit, and Detroit. ;)

See above........................

With regard to your #3 above, fuel hedging on the part of SWA management had nothing to do with why their debt is low. SWA management did NOT buy an entire commuter airline for over a Billion dollars, only to purposely wreck it later. SWA did not spend many Billions on buying back their own stock, only to see it go to zero in bankruptcy. When you don't waste billions on incredibly stupid "investments", you don't go in to that kind of debt.

With regard to #4 above, SWA's single fleet model is not why they don't believe in outsourcing. Their entire corporate culture is the way Delta's used to be under David Garrett. Mr. Garrett would never in a million years have allowed the Delta brand to be entrusted to anyone other than a Delta employee. Herb Kelleher believed the exact same thing. Gary Kelly is still running SWA that way. These men believe that whatever is gained in cost by outsourcing to bottom feeders, is more than made up by the losses and inefficiencies produced by outsourcing to bottom feeders. It's just a mindset that men like Garrett and Kelly have/had. Our current management team couldn't disagree more. That's why I say that SWA and FDX should be the first choice by our next generation of pilots.

Carl

While WN has done well overall, I think they are a horrible idea for a career choice for someone getting hired soon. Unless you want to upgrade in 2030...

Apple over all competitors
 

RA may not like Apple, but the rest of America does, demonstrated by its domineering market share.

Thomas Hazlett: The iPhone Turns Five - WSJ.com

On June 29, 2007, thousands of fan-boys and -girls camped in long lines to inhale a wisp of sweet techno fairy dust. The new iPhone rocked the world. Revolutionary in design, function and ecosystem, it set off the mobile data tsunami. In three days, Apple sold a million of them. The Economist asked: "Where would Jesus queue?"

The iconic innovation of the Information Age, however, inspired a fierce counterattack. Columbia University Law Prof. Tim Wu condemned the iPhone business model as "iPhony." The handset was cool, he said, but the business model tied the customer to AT&T's wireless network (where Apple struck a four-year exclusive deal) and to iTunes (Apple's content store). Soon the Apple App Store would deepen the master-slave relationship.

This supposedly condemned users. "The closed iPhone," wrote Prof. Wu, "stands in contrast to the open-platform design that has been the bedrock of both the personal computer and Internet revolutions. . . . Once Big Brother's foe, [Apple is] now more like Little Brother, happy to sell cute little devices that are easy to use, make money, and spread false consciousness."

"False consciousness" is an excellent way to characterize this view, too—a perspective that arbitrarily divides markets into "open" and "closed." Gold stars are pinned to the former; the latter are dubbed anti-innovation and referred to regulators for investigation.

Are you kidding me? The iPhone—the "defining consumer item of its age," as the Atlantic recently dubbed it—is craved by consumers who have shelled out (at hefty premiums) for some 200 million of them. These happy campers presumably include Prof. Wu, who announced that he was unable to resist the 3G iPhone in 2008.

The novelty has not worn thin. In the first quarter of 2012, iPhone global sales doubled, according to industry data, accounting for more than 400,000 activations per day. These "locked" models bolted to a "closed" platform are opening fantastic opportunities for others. Downloads from the proprietary Apple App Store reached 30 billion this year, with 650,000 applications available. Independent software developers who create those apps are feasting in the Apple ecosystem. They receive 70% of store revenues, so their share is more than $5 billion thus far.

Apple's genius—maniacally detailing and bundling the "user experience"—is not the only inspirational theme music heard in the market. While Apple smashed RIM BlackBerry with its disruptive entry, it inspired another competitor. In 2008, Google launched the open-source Android operating system, licensing mobile software to any and all device makers (at no cost), allowing others to tweak their code and innovate without permission. The foray has been hugely successful, crushing Nokia and its Symbian platform. The Google approach—give away the software, let others make the devices, and make your own money in mobile ad revenues—positioned the search giant as the "anti-Apple."

The late Steve Jobs, pledging to go "thermonuclear" over this "stolen product" (Android), touted Apple's distinctiveness: competitive superiority in building an ecosystem. Leaving product design to others who may not share the Apple dream would be crazy. Yet the Jobsian vision was anticompetitive, argued policy experts, and a business error, thought Google. Former Google CEO (now chairman) Eric Schmidt, citing the advantages of open business models, flatly declared: "Android will beat the iPhone."

Not today. The iPhone is not only the world's single most popular smartphone, it is insanely lucrative. Apple sells just 9% of the cellphones out there (smart or otherwise) but accounts for 73% of industry profits. Meanwhile, the tablet—a new industry invented by Apple in 2010—features a 68% share for the iPad. Since June 2007, Apple has increased an astounding $422 billion in market cap; Google shares, by about $13 billion.

As of now, the Android universe is fragmenting. The hands-off "openness" of Google lets device makers put out whatever products might generate sales for them without giving thought to what makes the whole ecosystem better. This has some distinct advantages (ask Bill Gates), but also some drawbacks, as when the platform splinters, confusing consumers and making app developers work harder for the same returns.

Now top developers, according to numerous reports in the tech press, are ditching Android for Apple—for a company that maintains dictatorial control over its content. That very coordination is yielding unmatched benefits, particularly in customer ease-of-use that drives iPhone and iPad owners to be truly massive consumers of apps and online media.

Call the company's latest quest "business model search." Google has purchased the major cellphone maker, Motorola Mobility, and will be supplying devices directly to mass-market consumers. It has redesigned its app store, Android Market, branding it "Google Play" and tying it to other company products. It is bringing Google TV more tightly into the Android mix, engineering complementary components of in-home networks to improve ease-of-use for online content.

There is no guarantee that this enhanced vertical integration will improve products, or that Apple's rival platform will continue to print money. All business structures are a mix; there are no pure strategies. "Closed" Apple relies on thousands of suppliers; iTunes sells the artistic works of a diverse marketplace. The App Store thrives on software written by developers who couldn't find Cupertino even if they logged onto Google Maps or Apple 3-D.

The magic is not in a particular model but in the dynamics of platform competition. Shouting out "open" or "closed" as a prescription for categorical success is at best a mirage and at worst a predicate for anticonsumer public policy, like the government's long antitrust crusade against Microsoft.

The late Joseph A. Schumpeter put it well: Capitalism "never can be stationary. . . . The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers, goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates."

That relentless innovation process delivers the goods.

Mr. Hazlett is a professor of law and economics at George Mason University, where he directs the Information Economy Project. He was chief economist at the Federal Communications Commission from 1991 to 1992.

The US will halve its reliance on Mideast oil by 2020 and could eliminate it completely by 2035 with increased domestic production and decreased demand...Wow.

Expanded Oil Drilling Helps U.S.Wean Itself From Mideast - WSJ.com

This would be a huge benefit to the US airline industry and particularly Delta, with it's own refinery.

What's upgrade at DAL after another merger and then down to fewer than 10K pilots in 2020?

Have you seen this article from WSJ a couple days ago? It was posted in the cargo section

Also you never answered me where were you furloughed 5 times in 5 years?


FedEx Corp. Chief Executive Fred Smith predicted fundamental changes in the global freight business, with air carriers facing added competition from ships and the industry putting more focus on providing clients with customized, door-to-door delivery options.
The FedEx founder, who pioneered the modern airfreight business and has built the world's largest cargo airline by revenue, cautioned that the traditional airport-to-airport business "is not growing."
"It's very clear that the door-to-door express segment is growing, and the movement of goods on the water is growing," Mr. Smith said Tuesday on a conference call after FedEx reported a 1.4% decline in profit for its fiscal fourth quarter. The company also promised to release details in the fall on a plan to cut costs.
Mr. Smith said FedEx is in a strong position to take advantage of the industry's shifting trends, despite the company's history in the express-air segment, citing FedEx's scale and combined air, ground and freight capabilities. The company also operates a freight-forwarding business, FedEx Trade Networks, which provides logistical services and arranges third-party shipping for customers, including via sea.
Recent industry changes have hurt FedEx as some customers have opted for slower-moving, nonpremium delivery services in the soft global economy. Volume for FedEx's international-priority-airfreight business declined 3% in the company's fourth quarter, which ended May 31, after falling 1% in the fiscal third quarter. U.S. domestic-express volume fell 5% in the fourth quarter, compared with a 4% decline in the third.
The Memphis, Tenn., company plans to disclose a "comprehensive program" in October to cut costs and better align the size of its express air fleet with anticipated market demand, Mr. Smith said.
The company predicted earning $1.45 to $1.60 a share for the current quarter, below the $1.70 forecast by analysts polled by Thomson Reuters.
FedEx predicted earning $6.90 to $7.40 a share for the year, compared with a forecast by analysts of $7.39 a share, although the company stressed that its full-year forecast didn't include the impact of "significant" cost reductions that are under review.
BB&T Capital Markets analyst Kevin Sterling said it has been evident for some time that growth in the traditional air-cargo segment is on the wane, although he said Mr. Smith's comments were significant. "When he speaks…people listen," Mr. Sterling said.
The analyst said he thinks the three biggest integrated, global airfreight shippers—FedEx, United Parcel Service Inc. and Deutsche Post AG unit DHL—stand to benefit from the broad industry changes in the long term because of the companies' scale and flexibility.
But Bill Flynn, chief executive of air-cargo carrier Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings Inc., said the airfreight industry is solid and remains a good business. "The rate of growth may be slowing down, but it is a rate of growth on a much larger absolute base of cargo," Mr. Flynn said in an interview.
He noted that there is little option for perishable and other time-sensitive items to move except by air, particularly as container ships cut fuel costs through "slow steaming."
"What we have not seen is a fundamental shift from air back to sea," Mr. Flynn said. "I just think it is going to be harder to take high-value, time-sensitive commodities off of an air carrier and onto a ship."
He agreed with Mr. Smith that there is an increasing opportunity for airfreight carriers to offer value-added services to customers, such as tracking capabilities.
FedEx said fourth-quarter earnings were hurt by volume declines in its express-shipping business and by a $134 million charge to retire aircraft because of sluggish domestic demand.
FedEx reported profit of $550 million, or $1.73 a share, down from $558 million, or $1.75 a share, a year earlier. Excluding the charge, earnings rose to $1.99 a share.
Revenue rose 3.8% to $11 billion.
Revenue for express shipping, by far the company's largest top-line contributor, rose 2.6% to $6.8 billion. The segment's operating profit declined 35%.
FedEx's ground-shipping segment posted a 9.7% increase in revenue to $2.48 billion. The segment's operating profit rose 18% as average daily volume increased 3%.
FedEx shares were up 3.2% in afternoon trading on the New York Stock Exchange.
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3. While I agree that our management made many expensive blunders, most experts have said that during the really bad times and high fuel prices, the only reason SWA made money is because of their fuel hedges. This allowed them to remain debt free when everyone else was hemorrhaging.
4. While all that is probably true, it still does not negate the fact that it remains a very simple and easy strategy to cling to when one’s business model supports it and is conducive to it.
5. If you were a junior DAL 737-800 Captain instead of a DAL 744 Captain with plenty of time remaining to reach number on the list (assuming you aren’t already number one), your recommendation for new hires to go to SWA’s might have a little more credibility. I know you mean well though.;)