Pull the rates up on the internet and post them. You might find it hard to do. They keep their contracts very discreet. Anyway what is important to the NMB is how we are compensated compared to our competitors.
The other issue is trying to covert their wages to US dollars. As a example the state provides medical care for KLM workers but they are taxed by the state at a very high rate. How do you adjust for that.

The FAR changes themselves were known for over a year before they were implemented, giving DT more than enough time to program them into DBMS by Jan 1. The new FTDT limits in the contract were not finalized until the MEC ratified the LOA.

My guess is that mgt had no intention of starting to program any such changes until they knew for sure what they had. That's why we keep the old contractual limits until November when the higher ADG kicks in.

The WOCL runs between 2am and 6am, not many of our flights depart before 6am on a CDO. Looking at today's flights at 9E, none of the CDO's departed before 6:30am.

I don't see Carl's nonsense unless quoted, but wow, Carl. Way to stay classy...

Thanks to everyone else here for not stooping to that level.

Truth trumps "classy" or "stooping." That's the face of these operations in circadian lows that begin with a sleep deficit. It's ugly, but it's true.

Again, every one of these crews took off sure they could manage their fatigue.

Carl

Foul ball, Carl.

5191 wasn't a CDO- It was in the middle of a 4 day trip that was all morning flying. They arrived in LEX at 1546 the day prior, and checked in at 0515 for the fateful flight.

If you're going to bark up that tree, then every AM domestic trip we do is in the same category.

I put forth a motion before APC that Carl change his nickname to Nancy Grace.

Didn't say it was a CDO. I said it was an example of sleep deficit by all involved and operating during their circadian lows. Here's a good excerpt...emphasis mine:

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The Air Line Pilots Association commissioned a study by a sleep performance expert who concluded that the early hour of the flight and lack of adequate sleep probably played a role. But tired pilots and air traffic controllers should not be blamed for their fatigue, concluded Dr. Gregory Belenky, director of the Sleep and Performance Research Center at Washington State University, who wrote the study.

The time of the 6 a.m. flight meant that all three were working during their least productive hours, as assessed by circadian rhythms, the internal clocks that all humans have. "It is also clear that all three made nearly maximal use of sleep opportunity they did have," Belenky wrote. Circadian rhythms make it hard for people to fall asleep before 10 p.m, unless they are already sleep deprived, Belenky said. In addition, the hours between 4 and 6 a.m. are the most conducive to sleep, because of body temperature. (The captain and first officer were up by 4:30 a.m.) And the hours between 6 a.m. and 8 a.m., when the flight took off are the worst hours to perform work or other tasks. In the study, Belenky points to evidence of fatigue in all three men in the 30 minutes before the crash. Co-pilot James Polehinke yawned twice and called out the wrong flight number. He and Capt. Jeffrey Clay did not obey rules about extraneous conversation in the cockpit. The two started their shift by getting on the wrong plane.

The air traffic controller didn't notice that the plane was positioned on the wrong runway when it requested clearance, waited as long as 45 seconds after the crash to notify emergency crews and didn't help the crews find the crash site, wrote Belenky, who could not be reached for comment yesterday because he was on vacation.

Belenky reconstructed the schedules of the three men in the days before the crash. "It appears that all three were both sleep restricted and at the low point in their circadian rhythm performance at the time of the accident," he concluded. Clay arrived in Lexington around 3:30 p.m. the afternoon before the accident. He went to bed around 10:30 p.m. and rose at 4:30 a.m. Belenky estimated that the pilot actually slept for 51/2 of the 6 hours possible.

Less information was available about the first officer's schedule. He arrived in Lexington on Aug. 25, two days before the accident, and Belenky concludes that his schedule the day before was similar to Clay's and that Polehinke experienced fatigue for similar reasons.

Christopher Damron, the air traffic controller, had the most compromised schedule. On Aug. 25, he slept for about 7 hours, and then worked an eight-hour shift on Aug. 26. During the 9 hours he had off, he took a two-hour nap. Two hours is probably the most sleep that could be reasonably expected, given the time of day and the controller's schedule.

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Why we would ever agree to structurally set up this kind of situation (by allowing CDO's) is beyond me.

Carl

The fact is, Carl, that they were on a trip just like we do all the time at mainline already. They were on a domestic 4-day that had all morning reports. Both the pilots had a tremendous "rest" opportunity prior to the fateful leg, and the trip had a consistent rhythm to it (didn't flip flop days and nights like we do so often at mainline). Inserting that into the CDO argument is not helping your case.

Carl's point still stands. They say in aviation, nothing changes until people die. The CDO argument centers around fatigue, the affects of fatigue on decision making and the catastrophic results that sometimes occur when that line is routinely crossed. I've flown numerous CDO's, talked with many pilots who have also done them. They are fatiguing and the shock to the abnormal circadian rhythm doing multiple days of them causes degradation of alertness, lowering of attention to detail and inability to function at a high level.

Some might argue they can do CDO's until the cows come home and never feel an ill effect and sleep at home no problem. We don't know what pilots in the pilot group can truly do that if any. More importantly, due to the nature of a seniority based system these things can and will get forced on folks who do not like them and are unsafe/fatigued doing them. Just call in fatigued you say? The company then increases the carpet dance routine. Guys who have no fall back plan with a family to support try to solider along and avoid making any waves and so on.

If this union and pilot group were to truly adhere to the tenants the founding fathers of ALPA risked everything for, there would be zero discussion/promotion of CDO's. We would however be talking about, among other things, how to further mitigate fatigue in the flying we are already doing (ie build trips that are all AM or all PM without jackknifing human body clocks to the bare numb end of wakeful alertness and low cognitive function). Not to mention the overall health degradation that occurs from such...leading to other physical breakdowns. The pendulum should be swinging the other way in today's environment. Instead of being on the defense for the next thing we need to give up to make the company another billion we should be discussing restoration and improvements to what was taken during bankruptcy and beyond.