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In the spring of 1999, Mr. Mullin was approached about opening negotiations early. Given his past missteps with the pilots, he agreed to begin negotiations in September, roughly 6 months early. This was set up in part by the United pilots attempt to negotiate a "seamless" agreement by April 12, 2000 -- their amendable date.

In the summer of 1999, many Delta pilots began choosing to no longer fly overtime at straight rates of pay. The example of the Orlando pilots the previous year caught hold. DAL management was again caught poorly prepared and understaffed. Running the operation relied too much on pilot cooperation. Voluntary Greenslips had been on a steady rise. Suddenly Green Slip with Conflict (GSWC) was the word of the day among line pilots. Crew schedulers were told to violate the contract, if need be, in order to keep the operation moving. They were also told to avoid GSWC if at all possible. Delta management very seriously considered taking the pilots to court.

We have recently become aware that experienced mid-level people in Crew Resources urged management to hire heavily starting in late '96 or early '97. Management was using a new computer program with 'softer' requirements. They apparently believed they could just ride out the post Contract '96 signing surge, where 550 furloughed pilots were rehired. The rest is history. A combination of hiring and training limitations caused Delta to get behind in manning. They never caught up. THAT is the genesis of many of our problems today.

In the midst of all this, negotiations were under way for Delta's new B-777's. The Delta MEC's opening position of $346.44 became the shot heard around the aviation world; we just didn't know it at the time. An L-1011 Captain's pay, adjusted for inflation since 1985, should have been paying over $280. It was paying $215.06. The efficiency and productivity of a B-777 mandated a rate over $300. Mr. Mullin threatened to sell the B-777's and in June '99, publicly announced this would happen. Two B-777's had been converted to B-767 orders already. But there was a problem; negotiations also had to begin on Delta's new B-767-400's. This time, Boeing was NOT going to begin production unless Delta committed to actually buying the aircraft. Delta was the launch customer. No more last minute cancellations of orders. In the end, the Delta pilots achieved $265 for the B-777, $243.80 for the B-767-400; plus a 3% raise and the end of the B-scale for ALL Delta pilots, and some small vacation improvements.

Delta's $265 for the B-777 put the United pilot negotiating team in an awkward position -- their table position was less than $265. Plus they now knew that Delta pilots would raise that rate again in Contract 2000 negotiations. UAL management spent 9 months trying to convince the UAL pilot negotiators that the DAL rate was an anomaly. The UAL negotiators knew differently.

In August 2000, the UAL negotiators approached the Delta MEC Chairman and Negotiating Committee -- they HAD to know what our compensation goals were for our Contract 2000. The B-777 agreement had given us huge credibility. The "Delta dot" of $265 was a hurdle that had to be cleared in the first year at United. The UAL negotiators could not significantly undershoot the Contract 2000 goals of the Delta pilots. Although the Delta MEC had not approved any specific compensation numbers, the UAL negotiators were shown "the target". Under the pressure of a pending merger with USAir, plus the United pilots' refusal to fly overtime, UAL management conceded. The "United line" had now exceeded the "Delta dot". "Restore the Profession,"(Delta pilot's Contract 2000 slogan), took on a whole new meaning. It was actually happening faster than many had expected.

On May 2, 2000 Delta pilots picketed for the third time in history. This marked the contract amendable date and the desire of Delta pilots to move forward from the huge concessions of Contract '96. Standing "shoulder-to-shoulder" with fellow pilots took on a whole new meaning. For the first time, Delta pilots realized that they were not alone in their willingness to act in a unified manner. Acting like a union was no longer unthinkable for Delta pilots as over 1200 pilots participated in the picketing.

To mark the one-year anniversary of negotiations, the union hosted a September 8 rally in Atlanta. Again, over 1300 pilots and family members turned out for the "It's About Time" rally. Management was getting nervous -- the pilots were acting in a truly unified manner.

Polling numbers showed that the number of pilots willing to go on strike and shut down the airline was skyrocketing. In the spring of 1996, just prior to signing on to the concessions of Contract '96, barely 20% of Delta pilots were willing to strike for any length of time. Just over four years later, over 95% were now willing to strike "for as long as it takes" in order to achieve an industry-leading contract.

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Although the Delta MEC had not approved any specific compensation numbers, the UAL negotiators were shown "the target".

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