Originally Posted by RJSAviator76 (Post 3393543)

Until one has flown overseas, they'll have a difficult time understanding many things about these two crashes. It is a completely different world out there. Everything is based on autopilot. When doing a V1 cut, the very first item you do is turn the autopilot on at 400'. Before doing any checklist or memory items... autopilot first. When doing a visual approach, it requires to be programmed and both pilots will without fail be heads down trying to program it instead of turning off the auto-magic and flying the plane and uncoupled visual approach is practically an emergency maneuver. Autothrottle doesn't work or does something unexpected? They'll fly it right into a stick shaker and blame Boeing - see Asiana in SFO.

It's a different world out there. But careful, some of our progressive friends may call you some kind of an *ist or *phobe for even suggesting that.

Originally Posted by DeltaboundRedux (Post 3393582)

The trim bias on an auto land sequence is considerable. A go around at 50 feet with a high thrust setting coupled with a stabilizer runaway at low altitudes would be extremely challenging for even experienced 737 pilots, particularly with the “startle factor”. (For example).

Which hasn’t happened, as far as I know.

It would be interesting to have thrown some of the MCAS failures at regular crews in the sim with no warning back when this came out and see what happened.

—

(“Understanding Air France 447” was a great book if you know Airbus systems. The scenario that killed everyone on board that flight had previously been dealt with successfully a couple of times by NWA crews. There was also a known AD that was addressing the mechanical weak point over time; I suppose the takeaway is to be aware of ADs for your aircraft all the time and be ready for possible consequences).

Originally Posted by CBreezy (Post 3393564)

There are no notes in the memory items to trim out the runaway trim condition.

Originally Posted by CBreezy (Post 3393584)

My understanding was that MCAS in the accidents only activated once the aircraft was flaps 0
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Originally Posted by DeltaboundRedux (Post 3393582)

(“Understanding Air France 447” was a great book if you know Airbus systems. The scenario that killed everyone on board that flight had previously been dealt with successfully a couple of times by NWA crews. There was also a known AD that was addressing the mechanical weak point over time; I suppose the takeaway is to be aware of ADs for your aircraft all the time and be ready for possible consequences).

Originally Posted by Texasbound (Post 3393529)

Wow, so after all that training you don't realize that using the manual wheel is at the end of the checklist? If you start the memory items withing 10 seconds you will not be wildly out of trim when doing the last part. It's called flying.

Control column............................................ .....Hold firmly

Autopilot (if engaged).......................................... .Disengage

Autothrottle (if engaged)........................................Di sengage

Control column and thrust levers..........................Control airplane
pitch attitude and airspeed

Main Electric
Stabilizer trim.............................................R educe control
column forces

If the runaway stops after the autopilot is disengaged:

Do not re-engage the autopilot or autothrottle.

----

If the runaway continues after the autopilot is disengaged:

STAB TRIM CUTOUT
switches (both)............................................ ....CUTOUT

If the runaway continues:
Stabilizer
trim wheel........................................Grasp and hold

Originally Posted by CBreezy (Post 3393584)

My understanding was that MCAS in the accidents only activated once the aircraft was flaps 0
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