Ethiopian 737 MAX 8 crash
#141
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2007
Position: It's still a Guppy, just a bit longer.
Posts: 727
These weren't kids. They were aircraft. Opposite sides of the world. Different continents. Not at the end of the same street. Different companies.
The only two commonalities presently known are three: both were the same type aircraft; both involved a crash, and both are under investigation with the common link that we don't know what happened in either case.
If two prius crashed somewhere in the world, would you refuse to drive a prius? If two people choked on a hamburger somewhere in the world, would you refuse to eat a humburger? If two people on two different airlines on two different continents got sick from the same brand of inflight food, would you refuse to eat again? Straw and irrelevant, all, much like the mythical kid on the street, though that example is worst of all, as it implies and assumes too much of the irrelevant.
Many moons ago I had a job interview for a Cessna 207 in which the owner sat in the right seat and directed the trim run full nose up. Take off, fly a left pattern at 200, and land. Run trim full nose down. Takeoff, fly a right pattern at 200' and land. It's not the way I would conduct a screening flight, but I've seen weirder and worse. His view was that many pilots wouldn't think to keep the airplane slow and manageable, and wouldn't focus on flying the airplane; he could tell from the pilot's reaction and behavior, quite a bit about the makeup of that pilot.
While I don't advocate that practice, there are those who seem to feel that automation is there to fly the airplane for them, to do the dirty work of actually manipulating controls, and who all but advocate decision making to alerts, displays, annunciators, messages, etc. A trim which moves at a third of a degree/second isn't really an imminent threat unless one isn't flying the airplane. If one takes off, goes to automation, and waits until it runs far enough to disconnect the autopilot with a full deflection, then accelerates, the problem may become harder to handle than it needs to be; it's not like the warning signs aren't there, if one is flying the airplane and staying situationally aware. Even with automation engaged.
Presently we don't know what happened. Speculation is neither professional nor warranted. An investigation is underway. The FDR is in hand. It's prudent to wait to see what is revealed.
The only two commonalities presently known are three: both were the same type aircraft; both involved a crash, and both are under investigation with the common link that we don't know what happened in either case.
If two prius crashed somewhere in the world, would you refuse to drive a prius? If two people choked on a hamburger somewhere in the world, would you refuse to eat a humburger? If two people on two different airlines on two different continents got sick from the same brand of inflight food, would you refuse to eat again? Straw and irrelevant, all, much like the mythical kid on the street, though that example is worst of all, as it implies and assumes too much of the irrelevant.
Many moons ago I had a job interview for a Cessna 207 in which the owner sat in the right seat and directed the trim run full nose up. Take off, fly a left pattern at 200, and land. Run trim full nose down. Takeoff, fly a right pattern at 200' and land. It's not the way I would conduct a screening flight, but I've seen weirder and worse. His view was that many pilots wouldn't think to keep the airplane slow and manageable, and wouldn't focus on flying the airplane; he could tell from the pilot's reaction and behavior, quite a bit about the makeup of that pilot.
While I don't advocate that practice, there are those who seem to feel that automation is there to fly the airplane for them, to do the dirty work of actually manipulating controls, and who all but advocate decision making to alerts, displays, annunciators, messages, etc. A trim which moves at a third of a degree/second isn't really an imminent threat unless one isn't flying the airplane. If one takes off, goes to automation, and waits until it runs far enough to disconnect the autopilot with a full deflection, then accelerates, the problem may become harder to handle than it needs to be; it's not like the warning signs aren't there, if one is flying the airplane and staying situationally aware. Even with automation engaged.
Presently we don't know what happened. Speculation is neither professional nor warranted. An investigation is underway. The FDR is in hand. It's prudent to wait to see what is revealed.
This is like the Comet fiasco.
#142
I'm not going to comment on whether the Max should or shouldn't be grounded. However consider this: When the Chinese authorities decide to take the most conservative position on health and safety it is likely politically motivated. Ask your American-Chinese expat friends how the work environment is these days. They are VERY safety conscious particularly towards Americans these days. As in career ending checkride safety conscious. The Comac 919 should be ready soon.
#143
I'm not going to comment on whether the Max should or shouldn't be grounded. However consider this: When the Chinese authorities decide to take the most conservative position on health and safety it is likely politically motivated. Ask your American-Chinese expat friends how the work environment is these days. The are VERY safety conscious particularly towards Americans these days. As in career ending checkride safety conscious. The Comac 919 should be ready soon.
The flip side is that the FAA may be too reluctant to do the hard thing. I'm actually watching EASA... they don't want to go there, but if they do it before the FAA that would be telling IMO.
#146
Line Holder
Joined APC: Oct 2014
Position: right seat
Posts: 28
You lost me with 2 = 3...
These weren't kids. They were aircraft. Opposite sides of the world. Different continents. Not at the end of the same street. Different companies.
The only two commonalities presently known are three: both were the same type aircraft; both involved a crash, and both are under investigation with the common link that we don't know what happened in either case.
If two prius crashed somewhere in the world, would you refuse to drive a prius? If two people choked on a hamburger somewhere in the world, would you refuse to eat a humburger? If two people on two different airlines on two different continents got sick from the same brand of inflight food, would you refuse to eat again? Straw and irrelevant, all, much like the mythical kid on the street, though that example is worst of all, as it implies and assumes too much of the irrelevant.
Many moons ago I had a job interview for a Cessna 207 in which the owner sat in the right seat and directed the trim run full nose up. Take off, fly a left pattern at 200, and land. Run trim full nose down. Takeoff, fly a right pattern at 200' and land. It's not the way I would conduct a screening flight, but I've seen weirder and worse. His view was that many pilots wouldn't think to keep the airplane slow and manageable, and wouldn't focus on flying the airplane; he could tell from the pilot's reaction and behavior, quite a bit about the makeup of that pilot.
While I don't advocate that practice, there are those who seem to feel that automation is there to fly the airplane for them, to do the dirty work of actually manipulating controls, and who all but advocate decision making to alerts, displays, annunciators, messages, etc. A trim which moves at a third of a degree/second isn't really an imminent threat unless one isn't flying the airplane. If one takes off, goes to automation, and waits until it runs far enough to disconnect the autopilot with a full deflection, then accelerates, the problem may become harder to handle than it needs to be; it's not like the warning signs aren't there, if one is flying the airplane and staying situationally aware. Even with automation engaged.
Presently we don't know what happened. Speculation is neither professional nor warranted. An investigation is underway. The FDR is in hand. It's prudent to wait to see what is revealed.
The only two commonalities presently known are three: both were the same type aircraft; both involved a crash, and both are under investigation with the common link that we don't know what happened in either case.
If two prius crashed somewhere in the world, would you refuse to drive a prius? If two people choked on a hamburger somewhere in the world, would you refuse to eat a humburger? If two people on two different airlines on two different continents got sick from the same brand of inflight food, would you refuse to eat again? Straw and irrelevant, all, much like the mythical kid on the street, though that example is worst of all, as it implies and assumes too much of the irrelevant.
Many moons ago I had a job interview for a Cessna 207 in which the owner sat in the right seat and directed the trim run full nose up. Take off, fly a left pattern at 200, and land. Run trim full nose down. Takeoff, fly a right pattern at 200' and land. It's not the way I would conduct a screening flight, but I've seen weirder and worse. His view was that many pilots wouldn't think to keep the airplane slow and manageable, and wouldn't focus on flying the airplane; he could tell from the pilot's reaction and behavior, quite a bit about the makeup of that pilot.
While I don't advocate that practice, there are those who seem to feel that automation is there to fly the airplane for them, to do the dirty work of actually manipulating controls, and who all but advocate decision making to alerts, displays, annunciators, messages, etc. A trim which moves at a third of a degree/second isn't really an imminent threat unless one isn't flying the airplane. If one takes off, goes to automation, and waits until it runs far enough to disconnect the autopilot with a full deflection, then accelerates, the problem may become harder to handle than it needs to be; it's not like the warning signs aren't there, if one is flying the airplane and staying situationally aware. Even with automation engaged.
Presently we don't know what happened. Speculation is neither professional nor warranted. An investigation is underway. The FDR is in hand. It's prudent to wait to see what is revealed.
#147
Line Holder
Joined APC: Jan 2014
Posts: 96
Your arguments are unrelated to any kind of logic being discussed here. I fly the Max, am (after LionAir) familiar with MCAS, and it's pretty obvious but not confirmed that these two are very possible related. Grounding the jet is a pretty logical step vs hoping the next flight crew will be able to sort out what two others couldn't and resulted in 350+ deaths.
This is like the Comet fiasco.
This is like the Comet fiasco.
#148
Boeing is tied in Deep with lobbiest at the highest levels ... military budgets etc etc.
Even if this were TRULY a Boeing issue , it will be converted to be 2 percent their fault and the rest of the blame of a hundred other things besides Boeing ... pilots , training etc
At this level politics will protect boring probably more than truly deserved . Not saying it’s right , just saying it’s the way it is ... imo
Even if this were TRULY a Boeing issue , it will be converted to be 2 percent their fault and the rest of the blame of a hundred other things besides Boeing ... pilots , training etc
At this level politics will protect boring probably more than truly deserved . Not saying it’s right , just saying it’s the way it is ... imo
#149
The extreme case of QC for code is what NASA uses for manned spaceflight... a Red Team. They have a group separate from the developers and QC folks who actually try everything they can think of to break the code. That's their sole job. I don't know if that's required for part 25.
In many technical areas the FAA relies on industry expertise to help develop the standards and processes... they simply cannot employ enough folks to do it all themselves, and they cannot attract the requisite talent on GS pay scales. But in aviation industry does have a huge incentive to not take advantage of the situation... hull losses cost billions, and knee-jerk political reactions can be far more detrimental than reasonable, cooperative compliance with the spirit and intent of the oversight.
#150
Yes, I assume all of us with a geopolitical perspective can read between the lines on this. It was easier for the PRC to make this move than it would be for the FAA, but I don't think they did it eagerly since it does have immediate economic consequences.
The flip side is that the FAA may be too reluctant to do the hard thing. I'm actually watching EASA... they don't want to go there, but if they do it before the FAA that would be telling IMO.
The flip side is that the FAA may be too reluctant to do the hard thing. I'm actually watching EASA... they don't want to go there, but if they do it before the FAA that would be telling IMO.
As I was saying. The UK just shut down the MAX and BANNED it from their airspace.
Apparently air turnbacks were ordered
Boeing is digging in their heels.
A serious 2020 presidential candidate is calling for the FAA to ground them as well.
https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/...ash/index.html
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