Ethiopian 737 MAX 8 crash
#501
Banned
Joined APC: Oct 2008
Position: Window Seat
Posts: 1,430
#502
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2018
Posts: 166
the whole premise of aviation certification standards are, that planes should not have failure modes that require skills that only the top 1% of pilots have.
It's easy to sit here and say how you would just "fly the airplane" and "control the airspeed" etc, when you're not in the hot seat as multiple conflicting messages and warnings are presented to you at the same time, with insufficient training to understand the system logic that might cause all of them.
It's easy to sit here and say how you would just "fly the airplane" and "control the airspeed" etc, when you're not in the hot seat as multiple conflicting messages and warnings are presented to you at the same time, with insufficient training to understand the system logic that might cause all of them.
Yes, it is easy, but some accident crews make it easier than others, especially when the apparent deficiency lies in basic flying fundamentals. And yes, appropriate and judicious application of pitch trim is something I would reasonably expect from any pilot with a solo endorsement, let alone a type rating in a transport category aircraft. I certainly remember in primary training how quickly I learned the importance of pitch trim; could not hold altitude or airspeed worth a darn unless I used it, and used it often; it eventually became instinctive. If this is a skill that only the "top 1%" have...then that's a problem.
While everyone is busy piling on Boeing, nobody is asking about the basic training and experience (or lack thereof) that the accident crews had. Here in the states, we get up in arms whenever someone suggests relaxing the 1500 hour/ATP rule. Whereas apparently in Ethiopia, pilots get typed at 100 TT, and that gets a pass.
#503
In a land of unicorns
Joined APC: Apr 2014
Position: Whale FO
Posts: 6,469
But you obviously would've immediately realized that oh, the stick shaker is false (look at the yoke reaction - he initiated a stall recovery due to the shaker), and pulled back on the thrust levers even when you're not exactly sure why the shaker is going off, your airspeed readings are off, and you have all sorts of other warnings and conflicting messages showing up.
I'm glad everyone here is such a superior pilot that something that has killed 2 qualified crews would not be "much of a challenge".
#504
In a land of unicorns
Joined APC: Apr 2014
Position: Whale FO
Posts: 6,469
While everyone is busy piling on Boeing, nobody is asking about the basic training and experience (or lack thereof) that the accident crews had. Here in the states, we get up in arms whenever someone suggests relaxing the 1500 hour/ATP rule. Whereas apparently in Ethiopia, pilots get typed at 100 TT, and that gets a pass.
#505
Banned
Joined APC: Oct 2008
Position: Window Seat
Posts: 1,430
Clicking off the A/T wouldn't have done anything in this case. TL's would've stayed at the climb setting.
But you obviously would've immediately realized that oh, the stick shaker is false (look at the yoke reaction - he initiated a stall recovery due to the shaker), and pulled back on the thrust levers even when you're not exactly sure why the shaker is going off, your airspeed readings are off, and you have all sorts of other warnings and conflicting messages showing up.
I'm glad everyone here is such a superior pilot that something that has killed 2 qualified crews would not be "much of a challenge".
But you obviously would've immediately realized that oh, the stick shaker is false (look at the yoke reaction - he initiated a stall recovery due to the shaker), and pulled back on the thrust levers even when you're not exactly sure why the shaker is going off, your airspeed readings are off, and you have all sorts of other warnings and conflicting messages showing up.
I'm glad everyone here is such a superior pilot that something that has killed 2 qualified crews would not be "much of a challenge".
Groundspeed and looking out the window could've helped as well.
Only one side had activated for the shaker (big clue right there).
At no point did anyone pull back the thrust levers.
I get it, initial reaction, shaker goes off, yeah probably try a stall recovery... it's what they spring load us to do in training.
None of that excuses the next 5 minutes of staying at basically full thrust. Nearly 3 minutes of which was in overspeed. If you can't comprehend this basic fact of how this accident happened then you do not belong anywhere near an aircraft.
#506
In a land of unicorns
Joined APC: Apr 2014
Position: Whale FO
Posts: 6,469
Airspeed was close enough to be reliable for discerning a stall (or not) the whole time.
Groundspeed and looking out the window could've helped as well.
Only one side had activated for the shaker (big clue right there).
At no point did anyone pull back the thrust levers.
I get it, initial reaction, shaker goes off, yeah probably try a stall recovery... it's what they spring load us to do in training.
None of that excuses the next 5 minutes of staying at basically full thrust. Nearly 3 minutes of which was in overspeed. If you can't comprehend this basic fact of how this accident happened then you do not belong anywhere near an aircraft.
Groundspeed and looking out the window could've helped as well.
Only one side had activated for the shaker (big clue right there).
At no point did anyone pull back the thrust levers.
I get it, initial reaction, shaker goes off, yeah probably try a stall recovery... it's what they spring load us to do in training.
None of that excuses the next 5 minutes of staying at basically full thrust. Nearly 3 minutes of which was in overspeed. If you can't comprehend this basic fact of how this accident happened then you do not belong anywhere near an aircraft.
#508
Banned
Joined APC: Jan 2019
Posts: 408
While everyone is busy piling on Boeing, nobody is asking about the basic training and experience (or lack thereof) that the accident crews had. Here in the states, we get up in arms whenever someone suggests relaxing the 1500 hour/ATP rule. Whereas apparently in Ethiopia, pilots get typed at 100 TT, and that gets a pass.
It’s easy to read a “report” from the comforts of your own home playing xbox and eating Doritos, judging the crew on what they should/shouldn’t have done. The point is they were set up for failure from the very beginning, out of their control unfortunately.
#509
Disinterested Third Party
Joined APC: Jun 2012
Posts: 6,023
It's hard to claim that pilots followed procedure if they cut off stab trim, then put the switches back again.
Which procedure is it that directs crew to re-establish stab trim by returning the stab trim cutoff switches to their former position?
No, not well said, at all. You're responding to the statement that any event is recoverable.
This is not true. Not every event is recoverable. Not by a long, damn shot.
Which procedure is it that directs crew to re-establish stab trim by returning the stab trim cutoff switches to their former position?
No, not well said, at all. You're responding to the statement that any event is recoverable.
This is not true. Not every event is recoverable. Not by a long, damn shot.
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