Hate to be the elephant in the room but if there was a "up or out" policy then we wouldn't be discussing any of this.

 

That's BS! If you don't realize that this could have happened to almost anyone, then you very well might be next.

 

Just the horse's a$$.

 

Supporting data, studies?
Additionally, you appear to look at a few data points and draw quick conclusions without understanding the rest of the data and history of the operations.
Think most professional aviators simply are more nuanced and patient at looking at the causal factors and letting the investigation continue to look at all the data in a balanced view to prevent a future accident. In my experience, fatigue isn't a snapshot of a few days, but a continuum over a long period of time and factors.
Integral, not a snapshot. Likewise training and operational performance.
SD

 

Of course it is always best for the entirety of the investigation to complete.... but... not a fan of your statement that fatigue could be a mitigating factor for prolonged operational and training gaps in an aviators record.

A mistake made once is that a mistake.... but consistent poor performance (even in the aviation classroom (sim)) should not be discounted either.

 

The only place that does that I know of is AA.

If your company does, hope you never have a bad day in the box. If it doesn't, $ T F U.

 

So does this mean you have evaluated the training record and determined that at least one of the crew members should have been fired? What are you trying to say?

 

Up or Out-YGTBSM.

Takes Two to Tango-change either of the crew members and this might have been a whoops, made a mistake and caught it.

The Capt didn't make Capt because he bought a bunch of UPS stock or had incriminating pictures of his instructors. He went through an FAA managed training program and passed. He might not have been Steve Canyon, but none of us have to be.
I've got no way of knowing why he chose to withdraw from his earlier Capt training events. Family stresses, maybe the realization that with the economy going in the dumps he was going to be wicked junior for awhile and would rather maintain control of his schedule. Maybe his instructors pointed out going to a computer jet and a Capt seat isn't the normal progression at UPS. Goodness knows I had more than one instructor tell me I shouldn't be able to go from a FE seat to a widebody FO seat.
He is certainly not the only Airbus Capt who's had the occasional difficulty with the whole P.Des issue....I've had way more than one Capt tell me to "set up" the FMS for the RNAV\VNAV approach.

The bottom line is they made a mistake, and failed to catch it. The WHY they failed to catch it is still to come (and even then it's just the best guess, most likely for a mishap of this nature)

I would be willing to bet that if we asked the FO's who flew with this Capt and the Capt's who flew with this FO they'd have said He\She wouldn't make a mistake like this.

Distracted? Fatigue? Training? UPS RNAV Procedures? Poor Judgement? Fear of Mgt? Disconcerting to read that one of my fellow pilots would just stick to the schedule even after telling one of the buds about falling asleep on every leg and being tired. UPS is going to maintain that they are a fatigue friendly company, but clearly many of their pilots do not have the same perception.

 

Speaking of fatigue ...

Some people say sleep is good for you

World's oldest person celebrates her 116th birthday: 'Eat and sleep and you will live a long time' - Telegraph

 

A mistake? What one mistake are you referring to?

We aren't talking about a bad day in the box. We are talking about failures over a career, a systematic problem. There were two failures for upgrade, one of which allowed the pilot to go back to a previous FO position as a withdrawal, and the other being recorded as a upgrade training failure.

http://dms.ntsb.gov/public%2F55000-5...7%2F550065.pdf

Pages 11-14.

NTSB Question: What specific training difficulties did you observe from Captain xxxxx during his attempted upgrade on the Boeing 757?

Answer: I don't recall any specific training difficulties. In general Captain xxxx appeared to have difficulty with the information required to successfully complete the program.

Answer: I don't recall any specifics other than that he had some difficulty.

NTSB Question: What was the reason for Captain xxxx voluntary withdrawal from upgrade training on the Boeing 757?

Answer: Captain xxxx conveyed to me that he felt overwhelmed with the upgrade program.


NTSB Question: What obersvations of Captain xxx upgrade training do you recall?

Answer: I recall that UPS counted his withdrawal as a training failure under the IPA working agreement.




This accident wasn't just caused for one mistake. There were a series of mistakes and/or errors if you want to call it. This job requires the highest of performance from a human. Yes, fatigue can play a role and true they were probably tired. But so far other cargo jets have not crashed like this in the US. So far it seems with the information known this accident was set up with a PIC with a checkered training history (like the Colgan case) and a FO who wasn't able to catch the mistakes and do something about it in time. True, if the A300 had an automated callout of 'Minimums' that may have triggered the PF to automatically go around with no runway in sight, but it was the PM job to call out mins and that was not done. Fatigue, tired/sleepy, etc etc are all secondary factors that added up to the accident chain.

So did the Captain of Colgan 3407. That statement isn't saying a whole lot. In a seniority system, you become CA when your number is called up in the bidding system and you pass upgrade training at some point... not necessarily the first, nor the second, or even the third. Go back to FO until one day you can pass again. Then, as long as the boxes are checked and the ride passed, you are a CA like any other.

To the guy who said this could have happened to anyone, well yes things like this can happen to a pilot. But for some pilots, this sort of thing is much more likely to happen.