In my view, you are already a Delta pilot.


Do we call Gate Agents "Gate Agents." Would we say Jim Graham, or Ryan Gumm, aren't "Delta" employees?


We have made this distinction. There is no difference.

 

Good point.

 

Bar,


So when the company was bending us over in BK to the tune of:

42% pay cuts
Termination of DB
loss of vacation weeks
Numerous QOL degradation’s etc

We were supposed to draw a line around Scope and fight that one to the death? You are proving my point - trying to limit the damage with the BK gun to your head under the very real threat of having our whole PWA thrown out is not “selling Scope.”

The company was coming after everything. Did we sell 42% of our pay to protect QOL issues. How about the DB - what else should we have “sold” to protect that. Trading credits would hold water if that was all we surrendered. One could just as easily argue we traded 42% of pay cut credits to minimize Scope degradation. I guess it’s all perspective.

I am coming at this from the perspective of a furloughed DAL Pilot while DCI was hiring hundreds if not thousands of Pilots. So as I said apparently DALPA should shy, away from all forms of bartering.

I agree with you that DAL flying should all be done by DAL Pilots and we should do whatever we can to bring all aboard on a single seniority list but when I hear guys talking about DALPA Selling Scope I am more thinking a monocled DALPA fat cat smoking a cigar with a bag of cash. The situation you describe is more like a drowning man pleading for a lifeline from the company while going under.


Excuse me while I go look for an ATM. No not for that, I am going to enjoy a White Russian.

Scoop

 

You make a very valid point.

When ALPA negotiated nobody knew for sure if a judge would throw out labor protective provisions (scope) during bankruptcy because these job protections were non-pecuniary (not directly dealing with money). Such a question had never been resolved at court before. It was not until American Airlines (APA) attempted to hold the line on scope, took the matter to the bankruptcy court and Judge Lane threw out the pilots' contract in September 2012 that we really knew.

With hindsight, the Delta MEC's bankruptcy dealings were very smart and benefitted the Delta pilots. Delta pilots got something for scope. American got nothing for their scope, along with the rest of their contract getting powerwashed by the judge.

The instinct to protect scope comes from old school notions of unionism and labor law. These fundamentals bind the company to our contract today and are the basis for our current fight for contract enforcement.

 

racist, imho. j/k

Have a great weekend.

 

So why did ASA not file a single carrier petition? Why did ASA and Comair not file to merge and have more clout? The answer with ASA is the outcome would not have been favorable. If Delta management thought there was any chance they would be forced to merge ASA they would have completed a sale in hours. Remember how SWA handled both Frontier and AirTran.

 

SWAPA was in cahoots with management. Anybody could see that.

 

The bankruptcy judge threw out their codeshare/joint venture restrictions, not their labor law protections. Even in bankruptcy, management can't operate any RJ's that aren't permitted flying by the pilot group.

 

ASA was represented by the Airline Pilots Association, and this representation was bound by the Constitution & Blylaws of the association. ASA's MEC made an application via the ALPA Board of Directors. The Delta MEC Chairman is a member of ALPA's Executive Board. The BOD is made of airline status representatives and the MEC Chairmen have floor privledges. The Delta MEC Chairman made edited the resolution for a policy implementation date (a procedural step for a single carrier petition) by adding the word "not" via an edit from the floor. The United Chair seconded and the amendment was passed by a roll call vote. Chuck Giambusso stated very clearly he wanted to protect the career path of his squadron mates who would not want to start their careers in RJs.

Management was both formally and informally agnostic.

To Delta management, the transaction was about revenue. It was about creating a semi monopoly on Atlanta; increasing prices and avoiding competition. Delta wanted the third of Atlanta gates on C&D that ASA got when Eastern went away. As long as ASA held those leases ASA was a very valuable asset (even if under contract through SkyWest).

 

Actually, Judge Lane gave American Management access to more & much larger regional jets than provided for in the labor protective provisions that were struck down. Here is a portion of the relevant section of the ruling:

a) Regional Jets

Network carriers often enter into partnerships with smaller regional airlines, known as commuter air carriers, under which the commuter carriers will fly smaller-sized aircraft referred to as regional jets on behalf of the network carrier. The use of regional jets is meant to assist larger carriers in their network planning, by allowing the carriers to match the type and size of aircraft with the demand in certain local markets. In this way, passengers can be connected from smaller airports to larger airports that serve as hubs for the larger carriers. The APA has concerns about regional flying, because it is not done by APA members.

For purposes of this decision, the term “regional jet” refers to the flying of these aircraft by commuter air carriers, and not by the network carrier itself.


As a result, the existing APA agreement contains significant limitations on American's ability to use regional jets. It permits American to partner with regional carriers flying planes with 50 or fewer seats and a maximum take-off weight (“MTOW”) of no more than 64,500 pounds. (Newgren Decl. ¶ 55). These regional jets cannot exceed 110% of the number of narrow body aircraft flown at the mainline, allowing for the current use of up to 536 regional aircraft of 50 seats or less. (Eaton Decl. ¶ 13; APA Ex. 501 § 1.D.5.c). Additional restrictions include limitations on the type and number of routes on which these aircraft can be flown. (Newgren Decl. ¶¶ 63–66; Glass Decl. ¶ 74). If American does not own the commuter airline, further restrictions apply. (Newgren Decl. ¶¶ 64–66; Glass Decl. ¶ 75; APA Ex. 501 § 1.D.5). American has received permission from the APA to contract for flying with its owned regional affiliate, American Eagle Airlines, using 47 specific jets that have a maximum of 70 seats, but these jets cannot be replaced when they are retired. (Newgren Decl. ¶ 55; AA Ex. 802A).

American puts this number at 537. (AA Ex. 802a; Glass Decl. ¶ 72 n.73).


American also utilizes some turboprop planes, but their present or future use does not appear to be contested.


The March 21 Proposal would allow American's regional partners to fly aircraft with a maximum of 88 seats and a MTOW of 114,500 pounds. (AA Ex. 918). The maximum number of regional jets of 51 to 88 seats would be capped at the greater of 255 or 50% of the total number of mainline aircraft in use at the time. (AA Ex. 918; American's APA Motion at 23 n.18). The maximum number of regional jets of 50 seats or less would remain at 110% of the narrow body aircraft flown at the mainline at the time. (AA Ex. 918). Additionally, the distinction between owned and non-owned commuter carriers would be eliminated—all would be operated as if owned. (AA Ex. 918). Based on current fleet size, the APA calculates that the March 21 Proposal would permit the Company to use 536 regional jets of up to 50 seats and 304 regional jets of 51 to 88 seats. (Eaton Decl. ¶ 25). The APA's primary objection relates to the use of the larger regional jets. The APA fears that the March 21 Proposal would permit American to create or acquire a separate airline to fly a large fleet of Embraer 190 aircraft with larger seat capacity, and thus would ultimately reduce flying by APA union pilots at the mainline. (Eaton Decl. ¶ 18).

American argues that they must be permitted to expand their use of larger regional jets because the current restrictions inhibit American's ability to generate revenue. Specifically, smaller regional jets of 50 seats or less are not fuel efficient and are no longer manufactured due to a lack of commercial viability. (Newgren Decl. ¶ 56–57; Glass Decl. ¶ 73; Trial Tr. 88:13–89:14, May 21, 2012 (Kasper)). Additionally, these smaller regional jets have a much more limited range and cannot be used for certain city-pairs that could be served by larger regional jets. (Newgren Decl. ¶ 56). Smaller regional jets also cannot be configured to offer the type of two-class service that generally attracts the “high value” customers that American seeks. (Newgren Decl. ¶ 58; Glass Decl. ¶ 73; Trial Tr. 88:13–89:14, May 21, 2012 (Kasper)). Furthermore, there are markets with significant revenue opportunities that cannot be adequately served by American's mainline aircraft, which are too large and thus poorly suited for these markets. (Newgren Decl. ¶ 59). American has stated that it cannot substitute use of its own smaller aircraft for these regional flights due to the high cost of its operations in comparison to regional carriers, including pilot and other labor costs. (Newgren Decl. ¶ 59; Vahidi Decl. ¶ 19).

In evaluating what is necessary under Section 1113, courts often look to the standards in the industry, comparing how the debtor's proposed changes stack up against its competitors. See Carey Transp., 816 F.2d at 90 (labor costs). The APA argues that the request of American is inconsistent with industry standards, both in terms of maximum number of seats and MTOW. It notes that none of American's major competitors are currently using regional jets with 88 seats or any aircraft with a MTOW of greater than 90,000 pounds. (Eaton Decl. ¶ 19; APA Exs. 507, 510). Consistent with the trend in the industry, however, the Court concludes that American needs to use such jets to both compete with its peers in terms of matching market size and to generate additional revenue. The Court finds, therefore, that American has shown that the request in the March 21 Proposal is reasonable and necessary when compared to its network competitors.

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The decision goes on to consider the large number of 76 seat jets negotiated at Delta. Who knows if Judge Lane might have decided differently if Delta had not allowed the 255 76 seaters.