Delta 56 Severe Turbulence
#351
#352
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Joined: Jul 2013
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We aren’t talking about anything other than standard abort criteria, or as we affectionately call them the four horsemen. Fire failure fear or shear.
but to answer your tangential hypothetical, as long as the FO doesn’t say abort (since that’s a CA only phrase), they can call out anything else they feel necessary to aid the CA in making his decision.
but to answer your tangential hypothetical, as long as the FO doesn’t say abort (since that’s a CA only phrase), they can call out anything else they feel necessary to aid the CA in making his decision.
#353
The manual could easily change to give the FO the same authority to take the controls as the 2 challenge rule, or initiate the abort if they call out the fault but the captain does not verbalize "continue" and they assume incapacitation. None of this seems unreasonable to me. If the captain can have the reasonable expectation that the FO will call out the fault clearly and concisely, the FO can have the expectation that the CA will make a ready and prompt decision to abort or continue.
Giving the FO the agency to keep me and the passengers alive does not encroach on my captain's authority.
#354
It’s not a question of skill—the FO is fully capable of performing RTOs. However, the rejected takeoff is a rare, extreme case where removing any uncertainty, ambiguity, or decision-sharing is paramount. This is reflected in both safety reports and industry best practices.
The Captain is the designated pilot-in-command, legally and operationally responsible for the safety of the flight. During a high-risk event like a rejected takeoff—where milliseconds count and consequences can be catastrophic—the decision must rest with the individual who bears this overarching liability and authority
Takeoff is the most critical phase of flight, with few opportunities for error. Assigning the RTO decision and maneuver to the Captain eliminates ambiguity and delays caused by cross-cockpit communication—there’s no time to debate or cross-check during a high-speed abort scenario. This streamlines response, ensuring one person acts without hesitation.
High-pressure decisions with life-or-death implications require clear lines of authority.
The Captain is the designated pilot-in-command, legally and operationally responsible for the safety of the flight. During a high-risk event like a rejected takeoff—where milliseconds count and consequences can be catastrophic—the decision must rest with the individual who bears this overarching liability and authority
Takeoff is the most critical phase of flight, with few opportunities for error. Assigning the RTO decision and maneuver to the Captain eliminates ambiguity and delays caused by cross-cockpit communication—there’s no time to debate or cross-check during a high-speed abort scenario. This streamlines response, ensuring one person acts without hesitation.
High-pressure decisions with life-or-death implications require clear lines of authority.
#355
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Apr 2018
Posts: 4,098
Likes: 462
It’s not a question of skill—the FO is fully capable of performing RTOs. However, the rejected takeoff is a rare, extreme case where removing any uncertainty, ambiguity, or decision-sharing is paramount. This is reflected in both safety reports and industry best practices.
The Captain is the designated pilot-in-command, legally and operationally responsible for the safety of the flight. During a high-risk event like a rejected takeoff—where milliseconds count and consequences can be catastrophic—the decision must rest with the individual who bears this overarching liability and authority
Takeoff is the most critical phase of flight, with few opportunities for error. Assigning the RTO decision and maneuver to the Captain eliminates ambiguity and delays caused by cross-cockpit communication—there’s no time to debate or cross-check during a high-speed abort scenario. This streamlines response, ensuring one person acts without hesitation.
High-pressure decisions with life-or-death implications require clear lines of authority.
The Captain is the designated pilot-in-command, legally and operationally responsible for the safety of the flight. During a high-risk event like a rejected takeoff—where milliseconds count and consequences can be catastrophic—the decision must rest with the individual who bears this overarching liability and authority
Takeoff is the most critical phase of flight, with few opportunities for error. Assigning the RTO decision and maneuver to the Captain eliminates ambiguity and delays caused by cross-cockpit communication—there’s no time to debate or cross-check during a high-speed abort scenario. This streamlines response, ensuring one person acts without hesitation.
High-pressure decisions with life-or-death implications require clear lines of authority.
#356
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Joined: Jun 2022
Posts: 52
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If there’s truly no time, which I believe is correct, the person seeing the problem should call the abort and the PF immediately stops the aircraft. No cross cockpit comms issues, no delay in action.
You can’t have it both ways by saying there’s no time to make the call but that there’s plenty of time to have communication, decision making and control transfers.
#357
But the idea that my authority trumps the safe conduct of the flight is wrong. This is literally the basis for why CRM started. Aviation safety has never been plagued by streaks of accidents caused from outspoken FO's or FE's. The issue has always been the opposite: A captain unwilling or unable to listen. A lot of this discussion has focused on the breakdown of communication from CA to FO when we have dozens accident records showing the opposite. I'm willing to wager Captain Van Zanten might have retired from an illustrious career at KLM if the FO had been encouraged by good CRM and training to call and abort.
The manual could easily change to give the FO the same authority to take the controls as the 2 challenge rule, or initiate the abort if they call out the fault but the captain does not verbalize "continue" and they assume incapacitation. None of this seems unreasonable to me. If the captain can have the reasonable expectation that the FO will call out the fault clearly and concisely, the FO can have the expectation that the CA will make a ready and prompt decision to abort or continue.
Giving the FO the agency to keep me and the passengers alive does not encroach on my captain's authority.
The manual could easily change to give the FO the same authority to take the controls as the 2 challenge rule, or initiate the abort if they call out the fault but the captain does not verbalize "continue" and they assume incapacitation. None of this seems unreasonable to me. If the captain can have the reasonable expectation that the FO will call out the fault clearly and concisely, the FO can have the expectation that the CA will make a ready and prompt decision to abort or continue.
Giving the FO the agency to keep me and the passengers alive does not encroach on my captain's authority.
#358
So if there’s no time to debate and cross check, how is it better to have the person who sees the problem call it out, then the Captain process that call and the issue, then call the abort, then potentially take control of the aircraft and bring it to a stop?
If there’s truly no time, which I believe is correct, the person seeing the problem should call the abort and the PF immediately stops the aircraft. No cross cockpit comms issues, no delay in action.
You can’t have it both ways by saying there’s no time to make the call but that there’s plenty of time to have communication, decision making and control transfers.
If there’s truly no time, which I believe is correct, the person seeing the problem should call the abort and the PF immediately stops the aircraft. No cross cockpit comms issues, no delay in action.
You can’t have it both ways by saying there’s no time to make the call but that there’s plenty of time to have communication, decision making and control transfers.
Also with the Captain's hand on the thrust levers, every takeoff the Captain has at least partial control and can get to the thrust reversers quickest in the event of a high speed abort.
#359
It's better because the Captain has their hand on the thrust levers, is trained to make that decision, and is the ultimate authority for the safety of the flight.
Also with the Captain's hand on the thrust levers, every takeoff the Captain has at least partial control and can get to the thrust reversers quickest in the event of a high speed abort.
Also with the Captain's hand on the thrust levers, every takeoff the Captain has at least partial control and can get to the thrust reversers quickest in the event of a high speed abort.
Also, how is an RTO is any different than a balked landing or a very low altitude go around? Both maneuvers require quick decision making and action in an area of high vulnerability. Yet, the FO is perfectly capable of calling and performing both maneuvers.
#360
And I'd argue the FO as PF already has their feet on the pedals, and maintaining centerline is just as important. I would even argue transfer of pedals is more of a risk than transfer of who has the thrust levers.
Also, how is an RTO is any different than a balked landing or a very low altitude go around? Both maneuvers require quick decision making and action in an area of high vulnerability. Yet, the FO is perfectly capable of calling and performing both maneuvers.
Also, how is an RTO is any different than a balked landing or a very low altitude go around? Both maneuvers require quick decision making and action in an area of high vulnerability. Yet, the FO is perfectly capable of calling and performing both maneuvers.
it’s not about the maneuver I have 100% confidence an FO could safely reject. I have seen it hundreds of times in the SIM on FO/FO training pairings.
it’s about the decision and the execution. I have a go mindset. If you say generator failure to me we are going airborne because it is safer. However if an Amber caution illuminates and the FO rejects before I have the opportunity to say continue I can no longer stop him. And I gurantee you CAs will try to stop their FOs which is extremely dangerous.
or as I mentioned previously I as the Captain call reject and the FO either doesn’t hear me because Audio is gone or hearing issues without an intercom or doesn’t react now I have to TAKE the airplane which is much different than a positive transfer of controls.
if the Captain has undisputed reject or continue authority (which is different than actually saying Reject by the FO when there is a perceivedsafety issue) then the Captain needs to perform the maneuver for safety
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