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[QUOTE=Scoop;1403675]
Originally Posted by Carl Spackler
(Post 1403184)
No, it was literally a feet on the floor maneuver because using rudder at high alphas can turn Dutch Roll into a stall/spin situation really quickly.
Another misconception that this discredited AA briefing perpetuated is what you excerpted above: Ailerons on swept wing transport aircraft are very effective at high alpha. Where they are not effective is at stall alphas and beyond because they are receiving disrupted airflow from the wing stall. Even this is mitigated in today's aircraft by wing twist or "washout angle". This is where the wing's angle of incidence is twisted lower as you approach the wing tip so that wing tips stall later than the rest of the wing which gives you good aileron control even when the rest of the wing is stalled. Conversely, rudder becomes decreasingly effective at high alphas because the rudder is increasingly blocked by the fuselage and receives turbulent airflow. Exactly the opposite of what this briefing asserted. That AA briefing was a great example of a few training department guys going rogue and thinking they could apply F-4 Phantom flying qualities to a transport airplane without ever checking with the manufacturer or flight testing their theories. I recall the NTSB report being particularly scathing on this point. Carl[/QUOTE I am having flashbacks to reading "Fly the Wing" which I must have read about 10 times during my interviewing for an airline phase. Good stuff. Scoop :) |
Originally Posted by ShyGuy
(Post 1403797)
That's only part of the picture. Look at the final report section of other Captain comments about the FO. One was a 727 CA who after a wake encounter thought they had lost an engine because the yaw was real bad. Turns out it was the FO stomping on the rudder pedals. The CA was very surprised and told the FO that all his actions did is make the problem worse and introduce large side loads. Of course the FO got defensive. On the accident FDR, his reactions are over the top. The ntsb commented on his very quick action on the yoke, how the aircraft hasn't even gotten enough time to respond to one input and he already reverses it. Not to mention, him asking twice for more power. Positive rate of climb and still climbing at close to 250 kts. More power? For wake? I don't know how much you can blame the AA AMTP, evidence shows this FO didn't really understand wake and what stomping on a rudder actually does.
Originally Posted by forgot to bid
(Post 1403781)
Tis true, they did rip them for it:
3.0 Conclusions 3.1 Findings: 7. The first officer had a tendency to overreact to wake turbulence by taking unnecessary actions, including making excessive control inputs. 8. The American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program ground school training encouraged pilots to use rudder to assist with roll control during recovery from upsets, including wake turbulence. 9. The American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program excessive bank angle simulator exercise could have caused the first officer to have an unrealistic and exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence; erroneously associate wake turbulence encounters with the need for aggressive roll upset recovery techniques; and develop control strategies that would produce a much different, and potentially surprising and confusing, response if performed during flight. 10.Before the flight 587 accident, pilots were not being adequately trained on what effect rudder pedal inputs have on the Airbus A300-600 at high airspeeds and how the airplane’s rudder travel limiter system operates. 2.6 As discussed in section 2.3.2.2, the Safety Board’s investigation found deficiencies in the American Airlines AAMP, including the following: • ground school training that encouraged the use of rudder for roll control; • a simulator exercise in which pilots were encouraged to employ large rudder inputs without being fully trained in the operating properties of the specific rudder control system or fully understanding the structural loads that might be imposed on the airframe by certain inputs; • a simulator exercise that provided unrealistic portrayals of an airplane response to wake turbulence and significantly suppressed control input effectiveness to induce a large rolling potential that was unlikely to occur with an airplane as large as an A300-600; and • a simulator exercise that encouraged the use of rudder in a highly dynamic situation without portraying the large buildup in sideslip angle and sideload that would accompany such rudder inputs in an actual airplane. http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2004/AAR0404.pdf |
Do we still get Microsoft discount for Delta employees? I've looked all over deltanet and couldn't find it.
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Originally Posted by Howgozit
(Post 1403852)
Do we still get Microsoft discount for Delta employees? I've looked all over deltanet and couldn't find it.
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Originally Posted by Howgozit
(Post 1403852)
Do we still get Microsoft discount for Delta employees? I've looked all over deltanet and couldn't find it.
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Originally Posted by SailorJerry
(Post 1403893)
It's under the Employee Services menu, delta perks, then electronics, and the MSFT employee purchase program.
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Originally Posted by forgot to bid
(Post 1403807)
I think they covered that, see bold...
1.5.2.1 Pilot Interviews Regarding the First Officer An American Airlines captain who flew several times with the first officer on the 727 (when they were a junior captain and junior first officer, respectively) told Safety Board investigators that, during one flight sometime in 1997, the first officer had been “very aggressive” on the rudder pedals after a wake turbulence encounter. Specifically, the captain indicated that, when the airplane was at an altitude of between 1,000 and 1,500 feet, the first officer “stroked the rudder pedals 1-2-3, about that fast.” The captain thought that the airplane had lost an engine and was thus focused on the engine instruments. The captain stated that he then asked the first officer what he was doing and that the first officer replied that he was “leveling the wings due to wake turbulence.” The captain, who had his feet on the rudder pedals, thought that the first officer had pushed the rudder to its full stops. The captain did not recall what type of airplane the 727 was following. He thought that the wake turbulence encounter required only aileron inputs to level the wings but did not think that the first officer had made any such inputs during the encounter. The captain recalled being startled by the first officer’s rudder inputs and indicated that they did not level the wings but created left and right yawing moments and heavy side loads on the airplane. He further indicated that the first officer did not need to be so aggressive because the 727 was “a very stable airplane.” According to the captain, he and the first officer discussed this event later in the flight. The captain pointed out to the first officer that his use of the rudder pedals was “quite aggressive,” but the first officer insisted that the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program (AAMP) directed him to use the rudder pedals in that manner. The captain disagreed with the first officer and told him that the AAMP directed that the rudder was to be used at lower airspeeds. The captain told the first officer to review the AAMP when he returned home and to be less aggressive on the rudder pedals when they flew together. The captain indicated that, during a wake turbulence encounter on a subsequent flight, the first officer modified his wake turbulence maneuver; specifically, the first officer used the rudder during the encounter but did not push the rudder to its full stop. The captain added that the first officer was still “very quick” on the rudder. The captain stated that he did not document or report this event at the time that it occurred. The captain further stated that he remembered the event with such clarity because he had never seen any pilot other than the first officer perform this maneuver. The flight engineer who flew with the captain and the first officer during the 1997 trip sequence recalled that the captain and the first officer had a discussion regarding piloting skills but added that he was not part of that conversation. The flight engineer indicated that he did not recall anything remarkable (such as a yawing event associated with wake turbulence) that would have provoked the discussion. The flight engineer also indicated that the first officer did not discuss the incident with him but that the captain made a “passing comment” to him about the incident after the flight. The flight engineer did remember a different event involving the first officer that he thought also occurred sometime in 1997. Specifically, the flight engineer and the first officer (the flying pilot) were on final approach (about 7 miles from the runway) in instrument meteorological conditions to LaGuardia International Airport, New York, when a Boeing 737 ahead of their 727 performed a go-around. The 727 encountered the wake from the 737. The flight engineer thought that the airplane rolled as a result of the wake encounter but that the bank angle did not exceed 30º. The flight engineer stated that the first officer made a “fast” decision to go around because of the wake. The first officer called for maximum power without “discussion or hesitation.” The flight engineer explained that the airplane’s tail went down as the nose of the airplane pitched up. The flight engineer stated that the go-around felt “weird” but that the first officer “flew the airplane to do what was necessary to keep the airplane under control.” The flight engineer also stated that the event happened when the airplane was at an altitude of between 3,000 and 5,000 feet above ground level (agl) and that the airplane was not in immediate danger of ground contact. In addition, the flight engineer stated that the event was one of the more memorable ones of his career. The captain indicated that the first officer’s aggressive response to wake turbulence was out of character. Specifically, the captain described the first officer’s overall flying skills as “excellent” and did not recall aggressive movements or abnormal rudder inputs during other trips with him. Also, the flight engineer stated that the first officer flew airplanes “smoothly and accurately.” In addition, the Safety Board interviewed other pilots who provided similar information about the first officer’s flying abilities. For example, one captain who flew with the first officer on the 727 stated that he was an “excellent” pilot who was “well above the norm.” This captain also stated that he never had to question the first officer’s flying ability and that he never saw the first officer fly the airplane aggressively. |
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Is anyone else not able to load next month's bid packing into Easybid? The message I get says pkg not available. Weren't they out as of yesterday? Thanks...
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Originally Posted by RockyBoy
(Post 1403977)
They have 175 of them...and now they want to replace them? W. T. F.?? :eek: From the article: "Emirates is not a customer of the Dreamliner but is the largest 777 operator with up to 175 jets that will need replacing soon." Does this guy Clark know that you don't have to replace them as soon as they paint starts to chip? How old is the oldest 777, and who has it? UAL or AA? I thought I saw one of the first ones in about 1997, and it was AA's. Meanwhile, we are still flying the DC9! :D You DC 9 guys know that if you fly it to Oshkosh, you can park in the Vintage/Antique section, and you might win an award! |
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