True.

RU, yes. Also DPRK.

PRC gets treated with respect for other reasons, more like the US. Vast economic footprint, and also very difficult to mess with conventionally. They actually don't have that many nukes (yet). They also mostly behave according to international norms, and don't invade people (yet).


This is not true. Unless we chose to just let them do it, and also unfreeze assets and remove sanctions so they can pay for it and import the tech they need.

We have already taken away a lot of their toys and infrastructure, including the relevant industrial base. They do not just snap right back to their pre-war condition the day after.

And even if *we* let them, IL would not... backed into a corner they'd just use nukes to prevent IR from going there.

PK and IN is apples to oranges... they have nukes as *deterrence* because they share a border and are historically prone to conflict. The balance works. IL and IR is not a balance of power thing because neither can invade the other. It's simply an issue because one of them has promised to eradicate the other... MAD only works if both sides plausibly wants nukes only as deterrence, not offensive weapons, and can reasonably be trusted to behave in a certain manner.

 

No basic objections to your situation summary. A 10 year Iran superpower capability forecast notwithstanding.

 

See stability–instability paradox and then apply that to a country run by terrorists. That ignores of course the possibility that they would just use the weapons for end of days or whatever other fanatical reason.

 

The mullahs aren't stupid. They didn't get to seize power and spend half a century controlling a vast country of 90 million people by being stupid. They're well aware that any first use of a nuclear weapon would result in their entire country being turned into radioactive dust. Their only interest, like any regime, is holding onto power. Not transporting themselves to the next world.

This is not meant to ignore or minimize their role in supporting terrorist groups across the Middle East. But the assertion that 'Iran will use a nuclear weapon in a first strike' is, I believe, entirely wrong. They're not crazy; they're very determined to hold onto power by any means possible.

And yes, it's possible that genuinely rogue actors could seize control of a future Iranian weapon and use it, but that risk exists across a number of states, Pakistan being the most obvious. Plus, Lord only knows if we've accounted for each and every one of the nuclear devices formerly possessed by the satellite countries of the former USSR. Are we going to bomb Pakistan and force them to give up their nukes, because of the miniscule chance that some AQ sympathizers in the ISI or Pakistani military might somehow gain control of a weapon and lob it across the Kashmir in India's direction?

Given the state of nuclear technology, the only ways to reliably ensure a country doesn't ever develop nuclear weapons, are to 1) invade and occupy it completely, or 2) sign a meaningful treaty with ironclad monitoring procedures that are genuinely enforced.

Option 1 is not something we're prepared to do. I'm not saying we should just stand by and let Iran develop a weapon without hindrance; I thought the cyber attacks on their centrifuges, the Israeli assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, and last summer's aerial attacks on their nuclear sites, were justified and measured efforts to slow or halt their progress.

I would have (very reluctantly) supported the current war if our administration had approached it completely differently. First, we should have enlisted the support of our allies, just as the first Bush administration did in the runup to the Iraqi invasion. If I was president and I learned that we really, truly possessed intelligence that convincingly indicated Iran would use any nuclear weapon it developed, I would have done two things in parallel:

1. Attempt to reactivate the prior treaty with Iran, with very strict conditions that Iran permanently cease all enrichment activities, with frequent and pervasive inspections. In return, unfreeze Iranian assets and lift existing sanctions on the Iranian economy.

True, this would strengthen the Iranian regime by increasing their cash flows and giving them more international legitimacy, but if the return on that investment was an Iran without nuclear capabilities, then I'd say it would have definitely been worth it.

2) If those talks were to fail, I'd work to assemble a multinational coalition of force (as was done in 2002), including our allies in Europe and Asia (who are all very dependent on the free flow of energy through the SoH), and the Gulf states (whose prosperity depends on a stable Gulf). That coalition would give Iran a simple choice: either sign the treaty proposed above, or face a complete blockade of Iranian energy exports, and an expansion of coordinated international sanctions on their economy. I also would have gone to Congress to secure war powers in the event that the blockade and sanctions were to fail.

Of course, it's entirely probable that a blockade and additional sanctions would have driven oil and LNG prices to where they are now, and also very possible that Iran would have retaliated by launching strikes on the Gulf countries, as they're now doing. From a practical economic perspective, the difference between my approach and the Trump approach might not actually be very different.

So then what's the difference between my approach and the approach the administration has taken? The difference is that my suggested approach is that of a superpower, of a nation that treats war as a last resort and as an undertaking that requires allies who share your interests and cause.

If we had done that, I believe we'd be seeing our allies standing with us militarily. I believe we'd see wider public approval of efforts to stop Iran's nuclear program. I also believe that concerted international action could bring Iran's economy to its knees and the mullahs to the bargaining table, much more so than our air strikes have done to date. And it would have cost us much, much less from a standpoint of weapons expenditures.

But we didn't do any of that. The admin never bothered with Congressional approval. Nor did they try to build a coalition. They just took the Venezuela approach, assuming Iran would quickly capitulate. We're now seeing the fallacy of that assumption.

To me, the biggest effect of this situation isn't necessarily the increase in oil and energy prices. Those are bad enough for the global economy. The biggest long term effects of this crisis are 1) Iran has figured out that it doesn't need nuclear weapons to bring its enemies to the bargaining table; all it needs are a few drones and speedboats in the Strait, regardless of how large a force we or anyone puts into the Strait.

And 2) our allies are learning that they can't possibly predict what we'll do next. That strategy might keep our enemies guessing, but that's not how you keep allies on your side.

We're willfully and purposefully undoing many of the things that have allowed us to maintain our pre-eminent status over the last 80 years, and have helped keep the world relatively peaceful. And that's something that should give all of us pause.

 

Nice rational logic. Applies well to all of the current nuclear powers.

But little problem... amongst many complexities inherent to how the post revolutionary system evolved, one of the big ones is the (intentional) tension between IRGC and Artesh.

That intramural fun actually led to the regime promising to the IRGC that when they *did* get the bomb, command and control would reside with the IRGC.

So the actual fanatic wing gets the bomb, or at least they've been promised and would expect that. Going back on that promise would be dangerous to the regime (assuming IRGC is still in play).

I tend to suspect that promise was made with the intention of not actually crossing the finish line in the foreseeable future. Rather they intended to keep rattling sabres and looking busy so as to not trigger IL too much, while appeasing their own wingnuts.

So the real danger is this: Left to their own devices, mullahs get coerced by IRGC into sprinting to finish, or replaced by IRGC loons who chose that option. IL finds out, the region gets a lot warmer, and the global economy takes a timeout.

There's some unfortunate ambiguity as to the actual state of the bomb program, what exactly IL knows about it on any given day, and what the regime will assess as the redline. So we have a region of uncertainty where a miscalculation could be made.

Better to just keep their nuke program well short of that ballpark. Unless perhaps there's some major evolution of the regime that minimizes the influence of the system which was intentionally established with fanaticism as a core component.

Again, it's complicated and it's not like the existing nuclear powers who are inherently rational.

 

Smart Mullahs? Whatever. This culture, that culture. Still way too far apart for integration. Found out the hard way in a 20 year disaster called Iraq/Afghanistan. Maybe another 3-5 generations before such a radical bridge can be safely crossed. Of course they want atomic arrows. Israel has them. So here we are. https://youtu.be/Z7Vl7KCi6eo?si=JR0-TDoj6RFNa_T1

 

Israel has entered Iran in the past on numerous occasions. Launched drones from inside Iran. Assassinated many Iranian scientists.



Iran will announce nuclear power one day. And bombing them isn’t going to stop it. This little distraction “war” has made people entirely delusional.



Iran absolutely wants deterrence. They aren’t stupid enough to launch nukes first. The fact you think Israel would launch first shows you who the true threat is in the Middle East.

 

Oh, the irony…

 

Just based on facts. There’s only one country in the ME that has continued to bomb various neighbors (as in numerous countries) for the past several decades, using their actual military (and not a militant faction), using U.S.-made weapons, tanks, planes, helis, and bombs.





What I find funny is the amount of airline pilots who are completely committed to the cult, and despite voting for no wars, America first, more isolationism, are sitting in the bar on fire with that dog face “this is fine.”

 

I’ve come to the conclusion that American politics has developed a unique attribute over the last 30 years or so. Normal societies judge people, parties and institutions by their actions. Not so here. The “thing” being done is irrelevant, it’s the “who” that’s doing it. We have a political culture where most people will immediately establish the “who” doing it and then conduct mental contortion to determine whether the “thing” is either black and white good/bad based on if it’s the “good who” or the “bad who”.

The reason for this is largely because switching sides or changing your opinion has become weak flip flopping and something to be ashamed of, as opposed to natural learning and character growth. Americans would, quite literally, rather die than admit they were wrong, about pretty much anything.

If you’re not angry that the side whose entire foreign policy campaign centered around “no new wars, the other side will start a war with Iran” shifted entirely to starting a war in Iran, then you’re part of the problem.

Personally I thought it was all bluster and neither side was going to start any wars, but here we are. I was wrong.

Obviously just my humble opinion.