Tracking Regional Outsourcing
#51
shiz- notice how the company has drawn down the 50 seaters earlier than required by the contract and has shown intention to operate 76 seaters at below the maximum amount.
We got meager pay increases and gave workrules concessions in exchange for allowing the company to do what it wanted to do anyways. How is that in any way a victory?
We got meager pay increases and gave workrules concessions in exchange for allowing the company to do what it wanted to do anyways. How is that in any way a victory?
#52
Tell me something shiz...when you ALPA mouthpieces sit around planning spin sessions, do you really think half the story will go unnoticed among the pilots you "represent"?
Carl
#53
Thread Starter
Flies With The Hat On
Joined: Aug 2006
Posts: 1,339
Likes: 0
From: Right of the Left Seat
Lets keep in mind that ALPA cannot negotiate any scope changes that will drastically hurt ALPA regional airlines. Lee Moak signed the DAL PWA. So make no mistake when I tell you that ALPA National represents regional airlines and through that representation regional ALPA carriers have influence in Delta's scope negotiations.
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP forcast that more scope will be surrendered:
Delta would have done anything to get rid of the 50 seaters. They would have done to their other regionals what they did to Comair and Mesa—The 50 seats would have gone away anyway. CAL was ready to hold the line, but AMR's Bankruptcy and US Airways's weak union leadership presented liability.
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP forcast that more scope will be surrendered:
Delta would have done anything to get rid of the 50 seaters. They would have done to their other regionals what they did to Comair and Mesa—The 50 seats would have gone away anyway. CAL was ready to hold the line, but AMR's Bankruptcy and US Airways's weak union leadership presented liability.
The 2012 PWA Delta Connection Breakdown:
- 218 50-seat CRJ200 aircraft (10,900 seats)
125 50-seat CRJ200 aircraft (6,250 seats)
102 70-seat CRJ700/E170 aircraft (7,140 seats)
153 76-seat CRJ900/E175 aircraft (11,628 seats)
+ 70 76-seat CRJ900/E175 aircraft (5,320 seats)
36 76-seat E175 aircraft (2,736 seats)
9 44-seat ERJ140 aircraft (396 seats)
Unlimited 37-seat EAS turboprops serving (? seats)
DAL is losing 148 aircraft, but physically outsources seats are only decreasing by 18% from 37,189 Current Seats to a maximum of 31,559 Potential Seats.
125 50-seat CRJ200 aircraft (6,250 seats)
102 70-seat CRJ700/E170 aircraft (7,140 seats)
153 76-seat CRJ900/E175 aircraft (11,628 seats)
+ 70 76-seat CRJ900/E175 aircraft (5,320 seats)
36 76-seat E175 aircraft (2,736 seats)
9 44-seat ERJ140 aircraft (396 seats)
Unlimited 37-seat EAS turboprops serving (? seats)
DAL is losing 148 aircraft, but physically outsources seats are only decreasing by 18% from 37,189 Current Seats to a maximum of 31,559 Potential Seats.
Shiny Objects Syndrome – Part I: The Delta Tentative Agreement
Posted on (OPERATION ORANGE | Protecting the Flying Public & Restoring the Piloting Profession) 06/10/2012 by The Committee
Anyone that has dealt with pilots for any length of time knows all too well that they, like everyone else, have many strong points, as well as a few weaknesses. One of the seemingly universal weaknesses of airline pilots is their propensity to be distracted by shiny objects. This can come in many forms, but all serve the same purpose of drawing attention away from the longer-term objectives to the here-and-now. Saving for retirement, or for a strike fund may not pay off for ten to twenty years, but blowing five grand on a wrist-watch pays off right now.
All three major airline pilot groups (United, Delta, & American) have recently had developments commanding their immediate attention. This installment will examine the recent hoopla over the Delta-DALPA Tentative Agreement.
Delta seems to be firing on all cylinders: profits are way up, pilots are generally content, acquisition targets abound, and bankruptcy seems to be a distant memory. Their contract is soon to be open and they have a CEO that “wants to run an airline.”
What more could a pilot want?
How about not having to go through a decade of negotiations, like their peers at American, United, and US Airways are doing? How about a bunch of shiny new airplanes to fly? How about a pay raise?
What’s not to like? As the saying goes, “The devil is in the details.”
Everyone knows by now that DALPA has secured a tentative agreement that will hike the pay across the board and secure the 88 new airplanes Delta is acquiring from Southwest. The first reaction across the piloting corps was, “WOW! Look at those pay rates (shiny objects)!!!” Never mind that the pay still lags what they had going into bankruptcy; a raise is a raise. Having the ability to bypass the intentional “can kicking” management is allowed to do under the RLA, while calling it “good faith bargaining,” is certainly a favorable development.
Self-funding: Not a Two-way Street
The pay rates are a step in the right direction, and should be seen as a “win” for ALPA, so long as the pay rates are viewed as a stand-alone item. The problem is they are not a stand-alone item. ALPA had to indulge management in a bothersome trend that has developed across the industry – “self-funding.”
ALPA had to pay for those new pay tables by agreeing to allowing management the ability to increase the size of the jets in their regional jet fleet, along with abandoning profit sharing, allowing more utilization of reserves, and a few other items. The new “industry standard” in pilot negotiating is forcing pilots to “pay” for enhancements to their contracts by providing concessions in other areas. As we shall see in the next installment of “Shiny Objects,” the pilots of American Airlines (and US Airways) are going to have to “self-fund” the pay raises APA said are part of the new labor agreement with US Airways management.
We note that this “self-funding” concept was not in play when management used the bankruptcy system to amend our contracts over the past decade. They didn’t “self-fund” the pay cuts by enhancing scope, medical, or retirement. No, they were able to achieve across-the-board concessions in pay, retirement, medical, scope, vacation, work rules, scheduling, etc., without any nod toward “self-funding.”
The question remains, “Why do our pilot associations need to “self-fund” improvements to their contracts?
They don’t. They only need to do so if they are unwilling to wage a fight through the RLA process and prepare their membership for a strike. Self-funding is the path of least resistance, so that’s what they choose, because politicians always choose the path of least resistance. We should be able to secure net gains, or even across-the-board gains if circumstances allow.
Small Jets = Big Problems
Delta Air Lines, along with all the major carriers operating small jet outsourcing operations, have a very real problem with their Barbie jets. The 50 seat airplanes are an albatross around their bottom line, and they desperately need out from under their small jets. High fuel prices have forced the hand of management, and they need to send the airplanes to the desert. However, they don’t want to lose the primary reason for buying those jets in the first place: the ability to whipsaw them against the pilots of the mainline for purposes of lowering compensation, and as a stop-gap measure to ameliorate the effects of a work stoppage by the mainline pilots.
The solution is to “up-gauge” the outsourcing operation to offset the punishing fuel costs of operating small jets. The larger the jet, the more efficient the fuel burn per paying passenger. Mike Boyd, of Boyd Group International made this prediction almost a decade ago when airline after airline was involved in a two-fisted grab for small jets flown by cheap and inexperienced pilots, and subsequently formed the conga line into federal bankruptcy court as their costs skyrocketed.
DALPA wrote about how there will be a net drop in the amount of small jets Delta will be able to utilize, but failed to highlight how increasing the average size of the outsourcing aircraft makes the outsourcing operation more viable – a detriment to the mainline pilots, but a boon to the R-J pilots ALPA represents. Crowing about securing the grounding of all but 125 50-seat jets is like wanting credit to secure the next sunrise – it was going to happen anyway. DAL management secured a concession for something they would have to do, with or without an agreement. This can only be seen as an unqualified “win” for management at the expense of the future flying at Delta mainline.
Now, Delta has the ability to extend the viability of their outsourcing, as AMR is forcing through the bankruptcy process, and CUH is likely trying to force this in its negotiations, which is why it is dragging out.
It’s The Viability, Stupid.
DALPA misses the mark when it talks about reducing the amount of R-J aircraft and calling it a win. Yes, the amount of lift generated by DAL ’s outsourcing operation will be reduced, but it will become more viable. This is the danger, as it is the lack of viability of the outsourcing operation that ALPA and APA originally thought would constrain the R-J threat. They never thought airlines would absorb the high CASM and poor customer satisfaction to the point of bankruptcy – but they did, and our profession teeters on the brink of destruction for that miscalculation.
It appears that we have not learned our lesson.

Viability is what is desired by management, as a viable outsourcing operation carries greater leveragability than an unviable operation, regardless of the size. Two thousand Gulfstream IV aircraft are a lot less viable to a part 121 common air carrier than half a dozen B-777s. A forward thinking pilot union should fear the outsourcing of B-777s more so than the Gulfstream jets, even though the 777 outsourcing represents fewer pilot job losses. The airline has no external pressure to help the pilots recapture the 777 flying, but they know the small jets are not suitable for the type of flying Delta does and economics will eventually dispose of the small jets.
The same principle works with the up-gauging of the R-J fleet. While the fleet is smaller, it now approaches the ability to stand on its own, and relieves DAL of the pressure to subsidize small-jet lift. This relief allows DAL to pack a heavier punch at the next negotiation, since its flank is covered with respect to the viability of the outsourcing operation. If DAL were constrained in the larger R-Js, economic inevitability would ground the smaller jets. To gain viability, they would have to dramatically shrink the R-J lift.
15 years ago, would DALPA (or any other major pilot association) have signed off on an outsourcing operation with an average seat capacity of 68? Of course not, but that is what ALPA and DAL have cooked up, and they expect pilots to agree, because they are mesmerized by some modestly impressive pay tables and a worthless statistic about how fewer R-J aircraft will be in operation.
Clearly, the pilot associations have the leverage to take back ground from the outsourcing operations, as customer dissatisfaction, fuel pricing, and a dearth of new pilots are forcing the issue. The goal of management’s coordinated efforts across the industry is to prevent us from exercising that leverage. They need to frustrate pilots with the RLA (United), force the issue in bankruptcy (American), or distract them with shiny objects (Delta). They can keep the hard limit of 255 of the 51+ seat R-Js, while allowing fuel to force the 50 and under jets to the desert. This is a scope victory and DALPA does not need to do anything to achieve it.
DALPA is snatching defeat from the gaping jaws of victory – a fine tradition of our pilot associations.
If Delta pilots refuse to allow the up-gauging of the outsourcing operation, and secure the upper end of the flying for their mainline, they will command future negotiations, since management will lack a viable option to go around them. By caving in, as they have done, they are risking Delta having tremendous leverage. Should the economy recess, the next scope concession would be to outsource those 88 B-717s.
That is the price of short-sighted goals.
Posted on (OPERATION ORANGE | Protecting the Flying Public & Restoring the Piloting Profession) 06/10/2012 by The Committee
Anyone that has dealt with pilots for any length of time knows all too well that they, like everyone else, have many strong points, as well as a few weaknesses. One of the seemingly universal weaknesses of airline pilots is their propensity to be distracted by shiny objects. This can come in many forms, but all serve the same purpose of drawing attention away from the longer-term objectives to the here-and-now. Saving for retirement, or for a strike fund may not pay off for ten to twenty years, but blowing five grand on a wrist-watch pays off right now.
All three major airline pilot groups (United, Delta, & American) have recently had developments commanding their immediate attention. This installment will examine the recent hoopla over the Delta-DALPA Tentative Agreement.
Delta seems to be firing on all cylinders: profits are way up, pilots are generally content, acquisition targets abound, and bankruptcy seems to be a distant memory. Their contract is soon to be open and they have a CEO that “wants to run an airline.”
What more could a pilot want?
How about not having to go through a decade of negotiations, like their peers at American, United, and US Airways are doing? How about a bunch of shiny new airplanes to fly? How about a pay raise?
What’s not to like? As the saying goes, “The devil is in the details.”
Everyone knows by now that DALPA has secured a tentative agreement that will hike the pay across the board and secure the 88 new airplanes Delta is acquiring from Southwest. The first reaction across the piloting corps was, “WOW! Look at those pay rates (shiny objects)!!!” Never mind that the pay still lags what they had going into bankruptcy; a raise is a raise. Having the ability to bypass the intentional “can kicking” management is allowed to do under the RLA, while calling it “good faith bargaining,” is certainly a favorable development.
Self-funding: Not a Two-way Street
The pay rates are a step in the right direction, and should be seen as a “win” for ALPA, so long as the pay rates are viewed as a stand-alone item. The problem is they are not a stand-alone item. ALPA had to indulge management in a bothersome trend that has developed across the industry – “self-funding.”
ALPA had to pay for those new pay tables by agreeing to allowing management the ability to increase the size of the jets in their regional jet fleet, along with abandoning profit sharing, allowing more utilization of reserves, and a few other items. The new “industry standard” in pilot negotiating is forcing pilots to “pay” for enhancements to their contracts by providing concessions in other areas. As we shall see in the next installment of “Shiny Objects,” the pilots of American Airlines (and US Airways) are going to have to “self-fund” the pay raises APA said are part of the new labor agreement with US Airways management.
We note that this “self-funding” concept was not in play when management used the bankruptcy system to amend our contracts over the past decade. They didn’t “self-fund” the pay cuts by enhancing scope, medical, or retirement. No, they were able to achieve across-the-board concessions in pay, retirement, medical, scope, vacation, work rules, scheduling, etc., without any nod toward “self-funding.”
The question remains, “Why do our pilot associations need to “self-fund” improvements to their contracts?
They don’t. They only need to do so if they are unwilling to wage a fight through the RLA process and prepare their membership for a strike. Self-funding is the path of least resistance, so that’s what they choose, because politicians always choose the path of least resistance. We should be able to secure net gains, or even across-the-board gains if circumstances allow.
Small Jets = Big Problems
Delta Air Lines, along with all the major carriers operating small jet outsourcing operations, have a very real problem with their Barbie jets. The 50 seat airplanes are an albatross around their bottom line, and they desperately need out from under their small jets. High fuel prices have forced the hand of management, and they need to send the airplanes to the desert. However, they don’t want to lose the primary reason for buying those jets in the first place: the ability to whipsaw them against the pilots of the mainline for purposes of lowering compensation, and as a stop-gap measure to ameliorate the effects of a work stoppage by the mainline pilots.
The solution is to “up-gauge” the outsourcing operation to offset the punishing fuel costs of operating small jets. The larger the jet, the more efficient the fuel burn per paying passenger. Mike Boyd, of Boyd Group International made this prediction almost a decade ago when airline after airline was involved in a two-fisted grab for small jets flown by cheap and inexperienced pilots, and subsequently formed the conga line into federal bankruptcy court as their costs skyrocketed.
DALPA wrote about how there will be a net drop in the amount of small jets Delta will be able to utilize, but failed to highlight how increasing the average size of the outsourcing aircraft makes the outsourcing operation more viable – a detriment to the mainline pilots, but a boon to the R-J pilots ALPA represents. Crowing about securing the grounding of all but 125 50-seat jets is like wanting credit to secure the next sunrise – it was going to happen anyway. DAL management secured a concession for something they would have to do, with or without an agreement. This can only be seen as an unqualified “win” for management at the expense of the future flying at Delta mainline.
Now, Delta has the ability to extend the viability of their outsourcing, as AMR is forcing through the bankruptcy process, and CUH is likely trying to force this in its negotiations, which is why it is dragging out.
It’s The Viability, Stupid.
DALPA misses the mark when it talks about reducing the amount of R-J aircraft and calling it a win. Yes, the amount of lift generated by DAL ’s outsourcing operation will be reduced, but it will become more viable. This is the danger, as it is the lack of viability of the outsourcing operation that ALPA and APA originally thought would constrain the R-J threat. They never thought airlines would absorb the high CASM and poor customer satisfaction to the point of bankruptcy – but they did, and our profession teeters on the brink of destruction for that miscalculation.
It appears that we have not learned our lesson.

Viability is what is desired by management, as a viable outsourcing operation carries greater leveragability than an unviable operation, regardless of the size. Two thousand Gulfstream IV aircraft are a lot less viable to a part 121 common air carrier than half a dozen B-777s. A forward thinking pilot union should fear the outsourcing of B-777s more so than the Gulfstream jets, even though the 777 outsourcing represents fewer pilot job losses. The airline has no external pressure to help the pilots recapture the 777 flying, but they know the small jets are not suitable for the type of flying Delta does and economics will eventually dispose of the small jets.
The same principle works with the up-gauging of the R-J fleet. While the fleet is smaller, it now approaches the ability to stand on its own, and relieves DAL of the pressure to subsidize small-jet lift. This relief allows DAL to pack a heavier punch at the next negotiation, since its flank is covered with respect to the viability of the outsourcing operation. If DAL were constrained in the larger R-Js, economic inevitability would ground the smaller jets. To gain viability, they would have to dramatically shrink the R-J lift.
15 years ago, would DALPA (or any other major pilot association) have signed off on an outsourcing operation with an average seat capacity of 68? Of course not, but that is what ALPA and DAL have cooked up, and they expect pilots to agree, because they are mesmerized by some modestly impressive pay tables and a worthless statistic about how fewer R-J aircraft will be in operation.
Clearly, the pilot associations have the leverage to take back ground from the outsourcing operations, as customer dissatisfaction, fuel pricing, and a dearth of new pilots are forcing the issue. The goal of management’s coordinated efforts across the industry is to prevent us from exercising that leverage. They need to frustrate pilots with the RLA (United), force the issue in bankruptcy (American), or distract them with shiny objects (Delta). They can keep the hard limit of 255 of the 51+ seat R-Js, while allowing fuel to force the 50 and under jets to the desert. This is a scope victory and DALPA does not need to do anything to achieve it.
DALPA is snatching defeat from the gaping jaws of victory – a fine tradition of our pilot associations.
If Delta pilots refuse to allow the up-gauging of the outsourcing operation, and secure the upper end of the flying for their mainline, they will command future negotiations, since management will lack a viable option to go around them. By caving in, as they have done, they are risking Delta having tremendous leverage. Should the economy recess, the next scope concession would be to outsource those 88 B-717s.
That is the price of short-sighted goals.
Delta’s PWA Scope Changes in the Media—slight of hand:
“Delta is happy about this because with oil where it is, those 50-seaters are completely uneconomical. The pilots are happy because they get rid of a ton of outsourcing.”
Delta to Shrink Its Fleet of Small Jets, Significantly Improve Customer Experience with New Pilot Agreement
CRANKY FLIER, May 24, 2012
http://crankyflier.com/2012/05/24/de...lot-agreement/
“But the proposed new scope clauses, particularly at Delta, would result in the grounding of hundreds of 50-seat regional jets.”
U.S. Scope Clause ‘Relief’ a Double-Edged Sword AIN ONLINE, June 11, 2012
U.S. Scope Clause ?Relief? a Double-Edged Sword | Aviation International News
“All told, if Delta opts to add all 88 Boeing 717s to its fleet, Delta Connection carriers will see a net decrease in 5,580 seats due to the reduction in fifty-seat flying and the mainline would see an increase of 9,680 seats. Once completed, the so-called upgauging would raise the mainline share of domestic flying from 54 percent to 64 percent.”
Delta Deal Seals Fate of Hundreds of 50-seat Jets AIN ONLINE, July 2, 2012
Delta Deal Seals Fate of Hundreds of 50-seat Jets | Aviation International News
“On ‘small scope’ issues, some union contracts used to include limits on how much mainline operations could be cut, and sometimes those limits were not linked to the size of the regional operations. …airlines, however, usually negotiated elimination or loosening of these restrictions during Chapter 11 restructuring. The proposed deal with Delta establishes a ratio between domestic mainline and regional flying block hours that Delta must maintain.”
Delta Deal Could Change The Equation On Scope AVIATION WEEK, July 7th, 2012
AWIN Error Message
“Delta Air Lines’ (DL) fleet restructuring plan will leave it with 15% fewer aircraft but capacity will be maintained at current levels, a company executive said Monday.”
Delta to maintain capacity while cutting fleet size ATW SEPTEMBER 17TH, 2012
Delta to maintain capacity while cutting fleet size | News content from ATWOnline
“Delta is happy about this because with oil where it is, those 50-seaters are completely uneconomical. The pilots are happy because they get rid of a ton of outsourcing.”
Delta to Shrink Its Fleet of Small Jets, Significantly Improve Customer Experience with New Pilot Agreement
CRANKY FLIER, May 24, 2012
http://crankyflier.com/2012/05/24/de...lot-agreement/
“But the proposed new scope clauses, particularly at Delta, would result in the grounding of hundreds of 50-seat regional jets.”
U.S. Scope Clause ‘Relief’ a Double-Edged Sword AIN ONLINE, June 11, 2012
U.S. Scope Clause ?Relief? a Double-Edged Sword | Aviation International News
“All told, if Delta opts to add all 88 Boeing 717s to its fleet, Delta Connection carriers will see a net decrease in 5,580 seats due to the reduction in fifty-seat flying and the mainline would see an increase of 9,680 seats. Once completed, the so-called upgauging would raise the mainline share of domestic flying from 54 percent to 64 percent.”
Delta Deal Seals Fate of Hundreds of 50-seat Jets AIN ONLINE, July 2, 2012
Delta Deal Seals Fate of Hundreds of 50-seat Jets | Aviation International News
“On ‘small scope’ issues, some union contracts used to include limits on how much mainline operations could be cut, and sometimes those limits were not linked to the size of the regional operations. …airlines, however, usually negotiated elimination or loosening of these restrictions during Chapter 11 restructuring. The proposed deal with Delta establishes a ratio between domestic mainline and regional flying block hours that Delta must maintain.”
Delta Deal Could Change The Equation On Scope AVIATION WEEK, July 7th, 2012
AWIN Error Message
“Delta Air Lines’ (DL) fleet restructuring plan will leave it with 15% fewer aircraft but capacity will be maintained at current levels, a company executive said Monday.”
Delta to maintain capacity while cutting fleet size ATW SEPTEMBER 17TH, 2012
Delta to maintain capacity while cutting fleet size | News content from ATWOnline
Last edited by flybywire44; 06-25-2013 at 09:33 PM.
#56
Line Holder
Joined: Jan 2009
Posts: 1,832
Likes: 5
From: 737 Left
shiz- notice how the company has drawn down the 50 seaters earlier than required by the contract and has shown intention to operate 76 seaters at below the maximum amount.
We got meager pay increases and gave workrules concessions in exchange for allowing the company to do what it wanted to do anyways. How is that in any way a victory?
We got meager pay increases and gave workrules concessions in exchange for allowing the company to do what it wanted to do anyways. How is that in any way a victory?
If ya'll could please keep the ball rolling in the scope tightening direction, I would appreciate it, as would most of us at DCI. I would really like to finish at Delta, and I'm closer to 50 than 40!
#58
You say 70 76 large RJs were added (Only 40 firm orders so far) to counteract Shiz saying DCI aircraft were reduced by 148 but failed to mention that 88 firm 717s are in the process of being added to mainline. Its a big shift of seats from regional to mainline, a step in the right direction, and a good win by ALPA.
The scope war wasn't going to be won in one contract. Mainline jobs are being added, while DCI jobs are being reduced is a nice first step.
Delta only had 30 something DC-9s flying around. On a frame for frame basis, one could argue the used MD-90s have already replaced the DC9s and the 717s are pure growth.
The scope war wasn't going to be won in one contract. Mainline jobs are being added, while DCI jobs are being reduced is a nice first step.
Delta only had 30 something DC-9s flying around. On a frame for frame basis, one could argue the used MD-90s have already replaced the DC9s and the 717s are pure growth.
#59
Based in what everyone knew at the time of the vote, it was a victory. A small one, but a victory nonetheless. Hindsight is always 20:20, so that isn't necessarily a good argument for the effectiveness of the last vote, but it is a good tool to prepare for the next one.
If ya'll could please keep the ball rolling in the scope tightening direction, I would appreciate it, as would most of us at DCI. I would really like to finish at Delta, and I'm closer to 50 than 40!
If ya'll could please keep the ball rolling in the scope tightening direction, I would appreciate it, as would most of us at DCI. I would really like to finish at Delta, and I'm closer to 50 than 40!
#60
Thread Starter
Flies With The Hat On
Joined: Aug 2006
Posts: 1,339
Likes: 0
From: Right of the Left Seat
You say 70 76 large RJs were added (Only 40 firm orders so far) to counteract Shiz saying DCI aircraft were reduced by 148 but failed to mention that 88 firm 717s are in the process of being added to mainline. Its a big shift of seats from regional to mainline, a step in the right direction, and a good win by ALPA.
The scope war wasn't going to be won in one contract. Mainline jobs are being added, while DCI jobs are being reduced is a nice first step.
Delta only had 30 something DC-9s flying around. On a frame for frame basis, one could argue the used MD-90s have already replaced the DC9s and the 717s are pure growth.
The scope war wasn't going to be won in one contract. Mainline jobs are being added, while DCI jobs are being reduced is a nice first step.
Delta only had 30 something DC-9s flying around. On a frame for frame basis, one could argue the used MD-90s have already replaced the DC9s and the 717s are pure growth.
Please give us that argument in full detail.


