I made no editorial comment as to why it happened, just pointed out it did happen. Didn't even compare to the two. Nor did I try to legitimize their errors.

I was simply responding to a poster that specifically stated you don't see incidents with 777, 767, and MD-11 aircraft. The posters comment is simply untrue.

 

All of us need to learn from the most inexpensive school of all-the mistakes of others. Major or Regional it makes no difference. See and avoid.

Majors have their share of blunders-if you have ever looked at FOQA data you know there are plenty of mistakes for everyone. We can walk away from most of them, but physics does not respect age or experience or pay. It is the one true equal opportunity destroyer.

 

I heard today from my friend at PSA that the pilots have been fired.

Can anyone confirm?

 

You need to grow up, and STOP trying to legitimize an error made by major airline flight crew who failed to exercise SOP's, failed to verify/crosscheck, failed to back each other up, failed at CRM, failed to notice there was NOTHING what so ever resembling a runway before they landed.

If you don't understand that a major airline crew can completely screw up and kill people the same as a regional crew can, clearly you aren't capable of having an honest and intellectual conversation about aviation accidents.

But yeah, keep trying to rationalize why people in ATL aren't dead. They were lucky, NOT good.

Who here in an emergency situation is going to accept runway changes from a controller in a situation that has so much potential for error?

Jungle says it best;

 

My earlier point that it could happen to any of us is this: - WE CAN ALL MAKE MISTAKES. PERIOD. Ok, so yes - the V1 concept is simple. I'll give you that - but do you all REALLY think you can react within a second 100% of the time, at ANY TIME? I'd be willing to bet the only time many of you have dealt with something as critical as a V1 cut is in the sim, when you are expecting it to happen (or have freshly prepared in some manner) I've not flown the CRJ but can anyone confirm when the levers were moved and how long it took for the power decrease sound? Thats just one factor anyway, the big things changing config on TO, and distractions in the cockpit, breaking the routine etc. Normal day, Sick, Tired, bored, conversing? Oh, none of you have ever flown sick, tired, violated sterile cockpit because you're gods gift to aviation... Maybe I went too far in that statement but you get my point. We ARE human and we CAN screw things up. I don't belive for a second that there is anyone on here who has brought their A game to the cockpit ONE HUNDRED PERCENT of the time. I know I havn't. The times that I've not, I've thought to myself, man - that flight didn't go how I wanted it - maybe my descent rate wasn't as spot on as I liked it, maybe I missed a checklist item - analize and see how I can do it better the next time and prevent an "off day" thankfully minor things that I'm aware of, and work hard to fix or prevent. but those of you who really belive you are SO CLOSE to that 100% A game, just thank god you havn't been caught with something out of the ordinary, or a bad situation on that .001% not on your A game day. - Professionals have habits, discipline, and proper training to prevent mishaps - but its NOT foolproof. A safe pilot excersises those things and learns from others to do the best and be the best - but if for one second you think you can't, or won't ever make a potentially major error (some are unnoticed with little consequence, and a fraction of a second can separate routine from disaster - mind you) I don't want myself or any of my family on your airplane. And check your arrogance at the door. End rant.

edit - and I also stick to my guns that while what they did was wrong, I belive in second chances and I would be willing to bet that from now on those two guys will be more saftey consious than some of you who think that it will never happen to you - and would rather fly with them. (provided that they are professional enough to learn from it, eat that humble pie and move on, in a better direction) Which I hope they did.

 

Seems like you're trying to legitamize the errors of this major crew. Just because there were abnormal things going on does that give them a free pass to not tell the difference between blue lights or white lights? I think not. That could have ended bad too.

 

If you read the CVR transcript the majority of the personal conversation cited was not a violation of sterile cockpit because it occurred before taxi with the parking brake set. http://www.ntsb.gov/Dockets/Aviation...022/439435.pdf

It should have been deleted from the CVR transcript as non pertinent.

Instead you get spin implying that the crew's violation of sterile cockpit was the cause of the incident.

The NTSB has an agenda which is Senate Bill S.3048.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-3048

That's why you get inflammatory news stories like this.
Transcript: Pilots were musing about sports cars - Yahoo! News

Yes, Their was a violation of sterile cockpit, About 37 seconds worth and that is all that should be included in the transcript.

The real distraction comes from an ATC radio call just as the flaps are set.

 

Let's get the facts straight here: the 767 on the taxiway had quite the string of problems and a pretty bad case of fatigue before putting it on the taxiway. There had been numerous other attempts to land on the taxiway under those lighting conditions and sidestep conditions, so obviously there were more factors at play. It absolutely doesn't excuse them, but there needs to be an understanding of what happened. There was a major reason they were allowed to keep their jobs. Tower noticed them about to touchdown on the taxiway and let them land there after scanning and checking for anyone on the taxiway. That alone is a bit scary.... anyhoo....



Now then, this PSA crew displayed a significant lack of procedural maturity. There is some understandable shock involved in the post wreck stuff, but leading up to that point, come on! Just on the takeoff roll: 1. moving the flaps on the takeoff roll after realizing there is an error. 2. not understanding that when you take the flaps inbetween settings the config alarm is going to go off. 3. going against the hundreds of lives already lost in high speed aborts and aborting WELL above V1.



As far as performance stuff, it is very very simple to not jack up variable flaps settings... we use 5, 15, and 20 on the 767 and 757. About 80% of the time we use Flaps 5 which produces V-speeds in excess of CRJ flaps 8 speeds. The book procedure is on the salute to select the flaps setting from the data, and then during the checklists verify lever position and indication.

For technique augmenting our required procedure, on the checklist call I point to the data for the flaps setting, move to the indicator and verify, and then physically grasp the handle and verify it's position again. We do that check twice- once in the taxi checklist and once in the before takeoff. You use that technique combined with the double checks and you will never jack up the flaps setting.

The reason for the double checks are both the NW MD-80 back in 1986 and the DL 727 in DFW in 1987. Let's respect the dead and not make the same mistakes that have already killed hundreds....

 

Your song Popular was pretty good but this could be the single most ludacris statement I've ever read on these message boards...and thats sayin ALOT. You have to have some serious brass to spout off a comment like that. Your total and utter complacency scares me to death.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RNc45FTenhg

 

A string of problems that could have been prevented. Which STILL begs the question, when exactly did the third, as well as required crew member become ill?

The point was made in another thread by another poster. There have been crews facing a hell of lot more problems than the DAL crew did. You know, fire, imminent structural failure, etc.They still managed to put on the actual runway.