Quote:
Originally Posted by SenecaII
FYI, both pilots had more than that when they were hired, and the FO did instruct for many hours doing stall after stall as you put it, yet she still raised flaps at the wrong time. It would probably do you some good to research what you are talking about before you say it. Like others have said in here, training and fatigue were the issue here, not hours when they were hired at Colgan. Now back to the issue at hand
Okay, allow me to correct myself, if the CA (or PF at the time) had been hired into the 121 world with more than 360 hours then I wonder if the outcome would of been different. I think that is a fair question.
Also, if you are going to preach to others about doing research then take the time to do your own research. At issue, according to the NTSB, were the flight crew’s failure to monitor airspeed in relation to the rising position of the lowspeed cue, the flight crew’s failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures, the captain’s failure to effectively manage the flight, and Colgan’s inadequate procedures for airspeed selection and management during approaches in icing conditions. The aforementioned causes were attributed to flight crew monitoring failures, pilot professionalism, fatigue, remedial training, pilot training records, airspeed selection procedures, stall training, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversight, flight operational quality assurance programs, use of personal portable electronic devices on the flight deck, the FAA’s use of safety alerts for operators to transmit safety-critical information, and weather information provided to pilots. I think you are over simplifying by just saying it was fatigue and training