Ethiopian 737 MAX 8 crash

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Quote: In Fate Is The Hunter, Gann had a scene where his captain kept lighting matches under Gann’s nose during an range approach. The point being the need to concentrate, ignore distractions. Maybe the UPT IP’s screaming, pounding on the glare shield, turning the plane upside down at zero G and asking me to recite a boldface procedure or point toward the base had value.

Being startled, distracted is an understandable, but very dangerous, reaction. Training needs to train it away or wash out the pilot. I’ve seen great guys come apart in an emergency.

GF
My initial point exactly. It wasn’t lack of skill in these crews. It was lack of training and that falls largely on Boeing for lack of disclosure.
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I don't think the 737 MAX is the problem, the problem is the new Boeing Culture.

The USAF is rejecting tankers that Boeing said were airworthy...the USAF didn't agree.

More than one airline is refusing to accept any 787s manufactured in Charleston, due to QC problems...
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https://youtu.be/Bumx4AerJUQ

Quote: What's your degree, your background?
Box of cracker jacks. Flew a couple of gliders.

I make a mean paper airplane, too. A real zinger.

Quote: All I hear is you throwing out insults.
You hear what you want to hear, but you're definitely not listening.

Or reading.

Quote: Based all on the prelim report. There is no CVR released, you don't know what they said except the tidbits in the prelim report. I'll wait until the final report is out to decide just exactly what was said from the moment of takeoff til impact.
You still haven't read it.

If you actually read it, you certainly didn't understand it, but we already know this.

Quote: Perhaps, but then again what other runaway trim crashes back to back have you seen recently? The problem isn't as simple as just "FTDP"
Runaway trim? Lately is relative. I've experienced it in light piston singles, twins, turboprops, and turbojet aircraft, large and small. I've had it in a King Air, Learjet, 747, Seneca and a few others. Some slow, some not. The learjet occurred during an atmospheric research mission; thunderstorm penetration. The Lear 24 event occurred at night at cruise altitude, and it went fast. The C-130 happened in convective weather shortly after the other pilot stepped out to see a man about a horse. None of us were particularly happy about that one, and he came back with a wet flight suit and a scowl. Where's a damn camera when you need one? There have been others.

When was your last one, by the way?

Quote: You can't carry out a conversation without resorting to personal attacks, and not once did you provide your background.
My background is irrelevant, particularly in this thread. If you want to talk about formation flight beneath powerlines, night flights into thunderstorms, chasing people around in the dark in garden spots like Iraq, spraying things people don't want sprayed, yada, yada, there are other threads that can be opened up for that, but it's entirely irrelevant here. You want it to be, lover of the straw-man argument, but it just ain't so. You need to be done with the conversation; enter it when you can say something correct, and enter it when you can stay on topic. Take a breather. Go play a video game. Go read the preliminary report (it's considerably more comprehensive than NTSB preliminaries). Watch some power rangers or whatever kids are doing these days. Take a selfie.

You'll feel better.
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Quote: My initial point exactly. It wasn’t lack of skill in these crews. It was lack of training and that falls largely on Boeing for lack of disclosure.
It was Boeing’s job to tell them that if it required a lot of back pressure to hold the nose up at 250 knots it would get worse if they throttled up to 500 knots? Or that once they shut down the power to the stab trim because it was making the back pressure too high they should LEAVE it off and just trim manually?

I believe they did that in the manual. Yes, here it is:


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Quote: It was Boeing’s job to tell them that if it required a lot of back pressure to hold the nose up at 250 knots it would get worse if they throttled up to 500 knots? Or that once they shut down the power to the stab trim because it was making the back pressure too high they should LEAVE it off and just trim manually?

I believe they did that in the manual. Yes, here it is:
Ok I’ll try one last time to get this across.

This was NOT the emergency they were fighting. They had airspeed disagree they had a stick shaker. The autopilot disengaged. They had every indication of impending stall. THEN the trim issue began.
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Quote: Ok I’ll try one last time to get this across.

This was NOT the emergency they were fighting. They had airspeed disagree they had a stick shaker. The autopilot disengaged. They had every indication of impending stall. THEN the trim issue began.
Again, if you're going to post, at least try to be right.

Read the damn report, then check back. You have no idea what you're talking about.

The crew fought a trim issue which got worse as they accelerated. They verbalized this: understand if you can. They spoke it out loud. They knew it. They stated that it was AoA related, that it was trim, and they used the cutoff switches...and they'd have been okay if they'd left it cut off and if they'd kept their speed in check (flown the damn airplane).

Stalling was irrelevant.

The captain called for autoflight; it disconnected. He called again, and made several attempts to get it, and kept trying to get it.

This was not a crew baffled and snowed by mysterious elements that they didn't understand; they verbalized the problem and addressing it. The foreign preliminary report is considerably more detailed, including CVR and FDR data and time plots, which are precise and clear.

READ the report.
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Quote: Ok I’ll try one last time to get this across.

This was NOT the emergency they were fighting. They had airspeed disagree they had a stick shaker. The autopilot disengaged. They had every indication of impending stall. THEN the trim issue began.

And I’ll try one more time to get this across:


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Quote:
They had every indication of impending stall.
No they did not. They had a massive NON-ARTIFICIAL horizon, calibrated by GOD, visible out of each windscreen that was giving them continuous update on altitude, attitude, and angle of attack. Not once did it tell them they were approaching an impending stall.

Quote:

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The accident occurred at 0544 UTC. The pertinent Addis Ababa Bole International Airport, (HAAB) surface weather observations provided by the National Meteorological Agency of Ethiopia are as follows:
MET REPORT HAAB 100500Z
Wind - runway 25: 060 degrees 8 kt, and runway 07: 050 degrees 8 kt Visibility: 10km; few cloud 750 m; temperature: 16degreesC; dew point: 10 degrees C QNH: 1029 hPa; QFE: 776.8 hPa
MET REPORT HAAB 100530Z
Wind - runway 25: 070 degrees 10kt, runway 07: 050 degrees, 10kt Visibility: 10km; few cloud 750 m; temperature: 17degreesC; dew point: 09degreesC QNH: 1029 hPa; QFE: 777 hPa
The right stick shaker never activated and the right AOA indicator never gave a false reading.
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Moreover, the crew correctly stated that was an angle of attack indication problem. They were fully aware of the issue, as stated by the captain, recorded on the CVR and cited in the preliminary report.
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Quote: My initial point exactly. It wasn’t lack of skill in these crews. It was lack of training and that falls largely on Boeing for lack of disclosure.
Allowing the jet to accelerate past VMO by the margin they did is by and large a total lack of skill and training.
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