Ethiopian 737 MAX 8 crash
#662
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2005
Posts: 8,898
It's certainly a stumbling block for the incompetent.
For any flyer worth his or her weight in wet salt, it's not a problem.
It's easy to tell the difference from one's response to the matter. Those who think it's a real problem....it shows, but it says a lot more about the observer than either the FAA or Boeing.
For any flyer worth his or her weight in wet salt, it's not a problem.
It's easy to tell the difference from one's response to the matter. Those who think it's a real problem....it shows, but it says a lot more about the observer than either the FAA or Boeing.
Boeing itself labeled the failure of MCAS a "hazardous" level failure. ANY critical or hazardous level failure item in aviation requires that it not be hooked up to a sole (single) source. That's just airplane design and certification 101. It sounds like you really don't care about the rules but it definitely matters here.
It was purposefully hooked up to only 1 AOA sensor, the CA side. The entire system and certification process happened based on a competition timeline. Boeing was already behind the Airbus NEO program and were playing catch mode to keep market share. Period. For you to write off 4 dead pilots is a scape goat. "They let themselves fly out of the envelope blah blah"
Boeing knew hooking MCAS up to both sensors would very well end up requiring Level D training. They wanted to get away with Level B training which is an iPad course of 1-2 hrs. Just like the NEOs, they did not want any additional training in a sim. Boeing engineers have already come out and said the whole thing was rushed that no one thought of the failure modes and consequences of MCAS.
Treat it like a stab trim runaway, Boeing said. Never mind that once the CA AOA malfunctions, the stick shaker is going off, low speed cues creeping up on the PFD, the airplane is showing some other signs here other than a stab trim running away.
So no, it's not that simple. 2 757s (Birgenair and AeroPeru) crashed when nothing more than their speed sensors were messed up (and altitude for Aeroperu). The pitch indicator and thrust levers worked. But in the case of Aeroperu, they had multiple warnings all chiming at the same time. Low speed stick shaker, then overspeed, mach trim, rudder ratio, almost every item was conflicting. It's easy to look back now and say "pitch+power" but clearly that never happened with an over-loaded crew. The same is the case here for Lion Air and Ethiopian. The crew is loaded with more than just what looks like a stab trim runaway.
The aircraft should absolutely have been grounded the day after the Ethiopian crash. While you blame dead pilots, educated people around the world are looking at the overall system, the system failure that allowed the crews to be in the position they were to begin with. Boeing getting their own employees to be approved by the FAA for certification and then pressuring their employees with time. Time they didn't have, to compete with NEOs. The FAA for allowing so much of the aircraft to be certified by the Boeing employees approved to do so, but failed to step in and provide true oversight of the process.
For the aicraft to fly again, MCAS will need to be hooked up to both AOA sensors and compare them before activating to eliminate erroneous data activation. MCAS needs to go 0.6 deg down like Boeing originally said in the paperwork, and not 5 deg down like it does. Limit the amount of MCAS activation to 1 down cycle per high alpha event, and finally put it in all the manuals, checklists, abnormals, etc. so airlines and pilots know about MCAS, how it works, and what its repercussions are. Then the aircraft can safely fly again.
Too bad the FAA already got so much egg in its face. Even once the FAA and Boeing say the plane is safe and try to un-ground it, no one else in the world will do so until they also feel it is safe. China was the first to ground it, then Asia/Africa, EASA, Candians, and finally the FAA. The FAA has brought all those countries together and their full goal is to try and make sure everyone is happy so the grounding is lifted at once smoothly.
Btw Burke, how about the Citation jet crash in Indiana that is being blamed on the new revolutionary Tamarack active load alleviation winglet? EASA grounded them pretty much immediately, but the FAA didn't until just now. Yet again, it looks like the FAA works at a snail pace, a pace that allows full benefit of any doubt for the manufacturers and anyone else who is a "customer" of the FAA. What a joke.
#663
Disinterested Third Party
Joined APC: Jun 2012
Posts: 6,026
Boeing itself labeled the failure of MCAS a "hazardous" level failure. ANY critical or hazardous level failure item in aviation requires that it not be hooked up to a sole (single) source. That's just airplane design and certification 101. It sounds like you really don't care about the rules but it definitely matters here.
There are a legion of items in aviation in which the "item" is "hooked" to a "sole (single) source." Where have you been?
Ever flown a single engine airplane? Good god. What were you thinking???
Which of those requirements did they follow, again?
Have YOU read the report?? Clearly not.
Are you kidding?
There is nothing mistakable about a trim runaway. BIG wheels by each pilots keee. You can see them moving. You can hear them moving. A BIG white stripe shows their movement. It can't b missed. MCAS ONLY works when the autopilot isn't moving. If the autopilot isn't auto trimming and the wheel is moving, GUESS WHAT?????
You have unwanted trim. The procedure for unwanted trim is the same, and has always been the same, and it's the same for the MCAS movement too, because IT IS THE SAME. Try to stop it, shut it off, dont' speed up. There it is. Rocket science.
Go do this, as you're missing some of the very basics here, even though you apparently think you know "airplane design 101" and "airplane certification 101." Go get a Cessna 172, or a piper, or an embraer, or a Boeing, or whatever you feel your wallet can afford, or go get the simulator, and run the trim nose down. Then speed up. Add ten knots. Add twenty. Add 100. Take it to over 500, and see what difference that makes in the effect on the airplane. Once you understand what should have been patently obvious to you as a student pilot, then come back and yap about it. Educate yourself, first.
So no, it's not that simple. 2 757s (Birgenair and AeroPeru) crashed when nothing more than their speed sensors were messed up (and altitude for Aeroperu). The pitch indicator and thrust levers worked. But in the case of Aeroperu, they had multiple warnings all chiming at the same time. Low speed stick shaker, then overspeed, mach trim, rudder ratio, almost every item was conflicting. It's easy to look back now and say "pitch+power" but clearly that never happened with an over-loaded crew.
You seem to be worried about cockpit noises: bells, whistles, shakers, etc. Maybe you're in the wrong line of work.
We don't do a lot of training for airplanes when everything is working, you see. We train almost all the time for nothing but abnormals and emergencies. It's why we're onboard. Judgement and all that. If nothing ever goes wrong, the flight could easily be automated to be without us. Our purpose for drawing breath on the planet earth, our reason for existence, and our value to our employers, our passengers and cargo, and mankind, is our ability to operate during an abnormal or emergency, and to make decisions.
Did no one explain this to you when you paid your quarter to ride? Are you sure you're tall enough?
You're aware that we're talking about the 737 Max here, and not 757's, right? Did you know that they're not the same airplane?
Start a new thread for your straw man argument. It's irrelevant.
We have procedures for some of those things. We even train for them. That includes immediate action items that we memorize. It's our job to handle abnormal conditions, malfunctions, emergencies, weather, delays, diversions, and so on. Among those things that we're supposed to know and do is to NOT ACCELERATE BEYOND THE DESIGN ENVELOPE FOR THE AIRPLANE WHEN WE'RE HAVING A PROBLEM. Airmanship 101: fly the damn airplane.
Sorry. Millennial terms: FTDA.
Am I typing too fast for you?
Boeing getting their own employees to be approved by the FAA for certification and then pressuring their employees with time. Time they didn't have, to compete with NEOs. The FAA for allowing so much of the aircraft to be certified by the Boeing employees approved to do so, but failed to step in and provide true oversight of the process.
2.4 units down, and it takes 9 seconds...and can be stopped at any time in several ways. Moreover, if it does trim down, one should NOT accelerate beyond Vmo/Mmo and drive the airplane into the dirt like a lawn dart on a VFR morning from 7,000'. Airmanship 101 again. FTDA (fly the damn airplane), and all that.
Too bad the FAA already got so much egg in its face. Even once the FAA and Boeing say the plane is safe and try to un-ground it, no one else in the world will do so until they also feel it is safe. China was the first to ground it, then Asia/Africa, EASA, Candians, and finally the FAA. The FAA has brought all those countries together and their full goal is to try and make sure everyone is happy so the grounding is lifted at once smoothly.
I gave you a couple of links as a primer. Go read.
The Citation is not a 737. The mishap is unrelated. That is, it's irrelevant. Focus.
#665
Ethiopian 737 MAX 8 crash
I don’t know you Burke but you really come across as someone who may have a hard time playing well with others. Why the constant need to talk down to others and spew a bunch of nasty garbage just because they have a differing opinion?
I don’t think anyone here is saying these crashes were entirely Boeing’s or the MCAS’s fault or that there is no blame to be placed on the pilots. I think most just think it’s a garbage system that was certified in a shady manner and on those particular days the crews couldn’t handle it malfunctioning.
Now do I want to go fly a plane that may pitch me into the ground shortly after flap retraction due to some system that relies on a single source of data? No I don’t. Do I think I would be able to handle it? I certainly think so, but just because I feel confident in myself doesn’t mean I think it’s ok to have some screwy system certified on a passenger aircraft.
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I don’t think anyone here is saying these crashes were entirely Boeing’s or the MCAS’s fault or that there is no blame to be placed on the pilots. I think most just think it’s a garbage system that was certified in a shady manner and on those particular days the crews couldn’t handle it malfunctioning.
Now do I want to go fly a plane that may pitch me into the ground shortly after flap retraction due to some system that relies on a single source of data? No I don’t. Do I think I would be able to handle it? I certainly think so, but just because I feel confident in myself doesn’t mean I think it’s ok to have some screwy system certified on a passenger aircraft.
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#667
Disinterested Third Party
Joined APC: Jun 2012
Posts: 6,026
He can stand on my lawn during daylight hours, with supervision, but I'm not getting on an airplane as his passenger. Not until he can learn to handle all those scary bells, buzzes, whistles, shakers, alarms, alerts, noises, and sounds.
https://youtu.be/WtlBZx0yV_M
https://youtu.be/WtlBZx0yV_M
#668
He can stand on my lawn during daylight hours, with supervision, but I'm not getting on an airplane as his passenger. Not until he can learn to handle all those scary bells, buzzes, whistles, shakers, alarms, alerts, noises, and sounds.
https://youtu.be/WtlBZx0yV_M
https://youtu.be/WtlBZx0yV_M
https://ntsb.gov/investigations/Acci...ts/AAR9701.pdf
See:
paragraph 1, page 45
2.2.5.2 Role of the Captain (50 years old, 3 type ratings, and 17,500 hours at the time) beginning on page 47
Or maybe as this small 2005 study showed aural warnings can either be ignored or induce a startle response?
https://interruptions.net/literature/Peryer-IJAP05.pdf
See results on document page 241. (Those pilots included in the survey average 9900 hours with the mode being 15,000. Hardly spring chickens.)
Or this study that said aural warnings can slow reaction time to the issue the warning system was designed to indicate?
https://www.mcgill.ca/mpcl/files/mpc...08_jepappl.pdf
I found several others. To varying degrees (between about half and three quarters of the time), all stated aural warnings either startled/slowed response time to the issue and/or were often entirely ignored by the crews.
I could list more research, but nah, I'll follow your lead and blame those dang millennials for for thinking a tramp stamp, "tribal," or Chinese character tattoo prove they are counter cultural individualist. They are nothing like the Baby Boomers who proved they were all rugged individualist by all growing their hair long, all wearing army surplus jackets, all smoking weed, and all rejecting everything their square parents believed. Those Boomers sure knew a thing or two about being independent, free thinkers.
Last edited by FlyJSH; 05-27-2019 at 05:14 AM.
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