Sorry if I missed it in the thread, but do you guys have a timeline on when you might see the language?

 

No, best guess maybe July

 

Quote:

Originally Posted by Aquaticus

The RLA isn't on our side.

The above is a quote from back on page 43 of this thread. I haven’t read through the entirety of the thread since then, so my apologies if this has already been addressed. But, I feel like it’s important to address this notion that seems to exist among most pilots that the RLA is slanted against pilots. The following is an adaptation of a post I made on a SWA thread on a similar subject:

True, The RLA isn’t “on the side of" pilots. But, it’s also not “on the side of” management either. It’s there to protect the public from a major economic disruption that might result from an airline strike or lockout. But, in the end, the RLA still preserves the right of labor and management to eventually use the full complement of economic weapons available to them.

The perception exists among many pilots that the RLA is slanted against labor. It truly is not. It is slanted, though, like most things in life, against those who are more poorly educated (in this case, on the subject of the RLA) and who have a weaker grasp on how the game is played. In that sense, then, the RLA is slanted against pilots because pilots almost uniformly have a poor understanding of the power available to them via the RLA, esp compared to management.

The RLA, if leveraged correctly, can be an extremely powerful tool for labor. The problem is that it requires patience ("It is well recognized that the Board is entitled to use time alone to wear down an obdurate bargainer" [930 F.2d 45]) and a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the RLA game beyond having studied the RLA flowchart a time or two.

An excellent resource for gaining a deeper understanding of the RLA is the web page of John Livingood, senior mediator for the NMB, particularly his sub-page entitled "RLA Conundrums." On Livingood's RLA Conundrums page, the discussion of what he calls the "book-away" phenomena is a key concept in understanding the power available to labor via the RLA. Another key point to understand is that a genuine book-away effect that motivates management to bargain cannot be achieved without entering, and spending a substantial amount of time in, mediation. That is because the NMB will never release the parties involved in a labor dispute into a cooling off period without having traversed the purposely long and drawn out period of mediation required by the RLA. There is no real leverage available under the RLA until a considerable amount of time has been spent in mediation. A release will not begin to be considered by the NMB until the parties have spent an amount of time in mediation equal to or greater than at least the average for other cases handled by the NMB ("The time during which disputes between employees and commuter rail companies are in mediation must be compared with all other carrier disputes mediated before the Board. In this case, the Board has offered evidence that the time in mediation falls within the range of average times in other mediation cases." [888 F.2d 1428])

The NMB has tacitly acknowledged this desirability (from the perspective of labor) of entering into mediation sooner rather than later in their 2010 review of the RLA entitled the "Dunlop Report" when they explained, "Collective bargaining under the RLA is a two-step process which begins with direct negotiations and generally moves into the mediation phase. One problem noted is that a party may prematurely file for mediation. This may be motivated by a desire to ―get on the clock to establish an early start date in order to more persuasively argue later for a release." Notice that the NMB describes "prematurely" filing for mediation as a problem because it allows a party to "more persuasively argue later for a release." This IS a problem for the NMB because their charter is to avoid an interruption to commerce that could result from a strike or a lockout. But it's not a problem for labor if their goal is to attain leverage under the RLA. The NMB does not have the power, according to numerous federal court opinions, to indefinitely hold parties in mediation without releasing them (for example: "To be sure, the law gives much power to organized labor. It discourages, on every hand, industrial and railroad labor strike, walkouts, lockouts, and strikes. But when the machinery of industrial peace fails, the policy in all national labor legislation is to let loose the full economic power of each. On the side of labor, it is the cherished right to strike. On management, the right to operate, or at least the right to try to operate [336 F.2d 172]). The sooner the parties enter into mediation, without appearing to try to game the system, the sooner the clock starts, and the less ability the NMB will later have to argue that they cannot release the parties into a cooling off period.

Important bit of knowledge: the NMB DOES have the power, and is encouraged, to lie to one or both parties in order to "spur" them to feel pressure to settle sooner than they otherwise might ("Successful mediators often liberally use blarney (hoomalimali in Hawaiian) as one of their mediation tools. The Chairman's statement may well have been a ploy. By inquiring as to the true meaning of such a statement we could well undermine its entire purpose by forcing the Board to admit it was a tactic to spur negotiations. [930 F.2d 45] ... "An NMB member may legitimately indicate an unwillingness to move a dispute out of mediation in order to pressure the parties to settle. The Board may let a case sit as a mediation tactic, and it may tell parties that it will let a case sit [888 F.2d 1428]). So, when you hear one of your fellow pilots express the fear, "The mediator will just put us "on ice" forever!!", know that they have simply fallen for one of the NMB's primary tactics to try to get labor to settle for less than they might otherwise be able to obtain.

A way of obtaining leverage under the RLA, then, is to enter mediation ASAP after entering direct negotiations, but not too soon, so as to avoid the appearance of trying to game the system and not allowing the RLA process to work in good faith ("Finally, the court noted that the Board's inability to resolve more of the issues might have been attributable to the short time that the parties had attempted to resolve the dispute in conference before seeking the Board's mediatory assistance [888 F.2d 1428]). When courts have considered whether the NMB exhibited "patent official bad faith" (the court's litmus test) in cases involving unions arguing that they should be released into a cooling off period, the courts have almost entirely considered "time in mediation," as opposed time in mediation plus time spent in direct negotiations. As indicated in the previous quote, the courts do look at whether the parties spent too little time in direct negotiations prior to entering mediation. But "time in mediation" is the NMB's and the court's primary means of determining if a release is reasonable. Entering mediation, then, can be thought of as hacking the leverage clock. There is very little leverage at the outset of mediation, but it grows as time spent in good faith mediation increases because as a dispute approaches and surpasses the time spent in mediation compared to other RLA cases, it becomes more and more realistic that the NMB might release the parties into a cooling-off period. As that factor becomes more and more realistic, so does the threat of the book-away phenomena become more and more realistic to management as news stories begin to circulate that the pilots at Airline X might be released to a cooling-off period (and PEB), and eventual strike. One very important caveat is that if a complaint has been filed in federal court by either side during the period of mediation, the clock stops. The court "may not consider the time after a complaint has been filed ... litigation time does not count as mediation time" [888 F.2d 1428].

Another important note: the President cannot prevent a RLA labor group from striking for more than 60 days without the consent of both labor and management. The myth that the President can stop a union from striking arose from the 1997 American Airlines pilot dispute. After the expiration of their cooling-off period, they went on strike for a period of a few hours at which point, then-President Clinton established a Presidential Emergency Board (PEB), which postpones a release to self-help by 60 days. During the period of the PEB, the sides settled, so the American Airlines pilots did not go back on strike. However, the idea arose from that episode that Clinton had prevented them from striking forever. That's not what happened. In 1990, President Bush wanted to extend a PEB and sought the opinion of one of his deputy attorney generals, John McGinnis. McGinnis published his legal opinion on that question in 1990, stating, "The President does not have the authority to impose a second status quo period by convening a second Emergency Board or reconvening the original Board" without the consent of both parties.

If any pilot group is sort of on the right track at the moment, it's the Alaska pilot group given their 99% strike authorization vote approximately six months into their mediation phase. The 99% strike authorization vote is important not because it indicates the Alaska pilots will go on strike any time soon (they won't because they have only been in mediation for ~ six months), but because it communicates to management that, when the time comes, they are highly unified around the idea of allowing the book-away phenomena to play out. That is the right move to make at this juncture because it increases the pressure on Alaska management. The Alaska pilots are still at least a couple of years away from maybe being released by the NMB, but they are making the right moves so far, given their situation.

 

there would still be guys complaining about the rates. Pilots don’t math good

 

Appreciate the summary. It does beg the question of why did Alaska’s management file for mediation? It seemed they were possibly trying to get a mediated deal done before anyone raised the bar but then stonewalled right out of the gate. To the point the mediator canceled sessions.

 

It's a good question. I've wondered the same thing myself: why did Alaska management request the mediation (versus the pilot group requesting it)? I'm not sure. It could be, though, that Alaska management realizes the ignorance that most pilots have regarding mediation and the power of the NMB. The Alaska pilots did, after all, agree to binding arbitration via side letter back in the 00's, which culminated in 2005 in the infamous "Kashtration" arbitration decision that drastically slashed Alaska pilot pay. That was, from all appearances, an entirely self-inflicted disaster on the part of the Alaska pilots. IMO, agreeing to binding arbitration in lieu of the RLA bargaining process is a recipe for disaster because it completely eliminates labor's strongest leverage (if used properly): the RLA process of direct negotiation, mediation, cooling-off period, PEB, and potential strike.

So, perhaps, Alaska management was hoping that the NMB would issue it's typical threats toward the Alaska pilots like, "If you don't dial back your demands, I'll put you on ice forever!", and, "We'll never allow you to get that pay rate (or whatever) in your final agreement," and that the Alaska pilots would take the bait and capitulate as a result. I have to admit that if that's what Alaska management was hoping for, it wasn't irrational based on the Alaska pilot group's history specifically and the history of pilot groups in general.

 

Thank you.

 

Is it normal to get a TA without having a strike vote first? The current situation seems like beta nice-guy m'lady behavior. If the MEC rejects the language and doesn't move to strike that's cuckoo.

 

How would that work under the RLA?

 

I'm no expert. After 18 years with ALPA I've only ever voted on one contract. We had a strike vote during negotiations.