I would disagree. Expectations are not about equipment, they're about compensation (rules, benefits, pay).

The UAL Pre Hearing statement also mentions "largest aircraft...best routes," "747-400s, uniformly acknowledged to be the most desirable aircraft," "mystique factor in B-747 flying," "most CAL pilots' careers would have peaked at narrowbody captain," and "Approximately 500 of United's furloughees – over two-fifths of the group – had an expectation of flying as a jumbo widebody captain by the end of their careers."

It seems the pure status of flying such aircraft is important.

Yet if I "peak" at narrowbody captain at 40 I'll get more than if I peak at widebody captain at 64. For some, that's better career expectations.

 

This is not a good analogy. UAL pilots aren't going to be narrow body FOs until age 64 then spend a year as a widebody Captain. We are going to spend far more time in all better statuses and categories because we brought more to the table.

It would not be unusual for a UAL pilot to spend 10 years as a widebody Captain (and no a 757 Captain who might fly a 767 is not a widebody Captain). With 72 of those aircraft, it is likely.

The last CAL system bid showed that the 22 777 aircraft generated 188 total Captain jobs.

So you can flip the scenario above where it is more likely a CAL pilot to barely fly the 777 as a Captain.

Actually most furloughees will spend at least 5 years as a 777 or 747 Captain given the status quo. Currently ALL the 747-400 Captains hired before the strike were furloughed at one time

 

CAL proposes that a 2007 CAL hire who JUST MADE Captain to be the same seniority as a 1995 UAL hire who has been a Captain continuously for 15 years.

Its really a ridiculous argument. It's also not in ALPA merger policy. It also completely ignores Longevity which HAS to be considered.

The other ridiculous part of this is that CAL has FO's on their own seniority list that are senior to Captains. So those 80's hires that are 777 FOs should now be junior to a UAL 1995 hire that is an Airbus Captain using CALs own argument.

 

Refreshing to see the Ual proposal does not mention the arguments "pay banding is a seniority grab" or "Guppies were parked to right size for the merger". Two ridiculous points I have heard countless times over the past year.

 

Oh, its there. Just in flowery language.

As a final note, this case presents compelling, unique factual circumstances that further
support integrating furloughed pilots into the active list – the fact that most of the furloughs can
be traced to management decisions aimed at accomplishing the merger itself. As the United
Committee will show, events between 2008, when the first merger discussions between United
and Continental were terminated, and the MAD in 2010 demonstrate that United’s trajectory, its
aircraft ordering, and its route decisions – and the resulting furloughs – were driven by
something other than management of the airline for a standalone future. We will not elaborate
here, but as the case proceeds, we will show that United was preparing the airline for a future
merger with a domestic-focused airline, either Continental or US Airways. These decisions
resulted in a smaller narrowbody fleet than United would have had if management were not
pressing for a merger, and more and lengthier furloughs as a result. Cf. Alaska-Jet America at 13
(criticizing one aspect of the Alaska pilots’ proposal, which took into account reduced Jet
America flying, as “improperly attribut[ing] to Jet America pilots [post-merger] decisions that
were solely at the discretion of Alaska management”). Stated differently, the United furloughees
paid for the merger even before it happened.

 

...and shouldn't be made to pay again!

Hey, is that a light at the end of this tunnel? Or....

 

In just a little over 10 years from now, this airline will have just 2 models of airplanes. The B737 and B787.

The days of the 20+ year old airplanes are over in the passenger airline industry. The Aging Aircraft Inspection Program under Operation Specification D485 effectively makes any airframe in the program unable to operate at a profit. If you haven't seen this list of airplanes, you'll be surprised to see the number of UAL aircraft that are already on it and are a drain on the financial position of this airline. Let alone the reliability of the overall system.

Take a look at the order-books at Boeing and Airbus. No one is ordering big airplanes. We are not going to replace the B-747-400 and their days are numbered. The B767-300 will be gone by the time the B787 gets here. Everyone knows the B757-200 economy version is history and being replaced by CAL registered and ETC financed B737's

If you could finance a new airplane when do you think you could take delivery? 6 years? 8 years?

My guess the arbitrators will look at several snap shots. They will take a few of the future also. We know the make up of the seniority lists and the retirements are a given. We also have the aircraft order-book and have an idea what is coming, that is also a given. The unknown is how long this Fat Headed Management will continue ****ing away cash on a bunch of Dead Horse airplanes.

You better make room for all those WB pilots to bump down into those damn Guppies.

It's going to be a blood bath.

 

Just curious, why was the 787 and 767-400 pay banded with the 747...





...while the 767-400 and the 767-300 were split?

 

Question is? was the 747 rate lowered in your opinion to match the 78,76 or was the 787,767 rate raised to equal the 747? What would have been the separate for the 747?

 

My question was two part. If the cal point of view of raising the bar is accepted, why were the 787/767-400 rates banded up while the 767-300 was held back?