Johnso, not sure if you actually read the referenced Operational Excellence memo from KS.
The inefficiencies mentioned, are in the context of reducing gate latency and taxi time...

BTW, I'm not against improving our operation...

I'm just not sure how the law of unintended consequences will create some interesting results when gate-latency and D-0 are pitted against each other...

Do the airlines with the lower taxi times have the same success rate as Delta when it comes to D-0?
Should the APU-sheriff be made the Gate-sheriff to ensure a marshaling crew is ready when a jet pulls up at a gate?

Cheers
George

Uh.... BOOM. I'd say that's a head shot, haha.

FWIW, from what I heard from a north perspective when the DL pension scheme was introduced, that it would likely eventually bankrupt the company.

counterargument: NW went bankrupt too....

What pension scheme? The pension had been in effect since at least the early seventies and was a standard 60% FAE plan.

Uneccasary, especially for a mod

Our skill set doesn't change nor does our worth based on the profitability of the company. With your ideology here we would be working for much less or free when they are bankrupt. It should move up at a reasonalbe rate and stay steady, not making large fluctuations with the profitability or lack there of from the company.

I like you want to see our pay as high as our company can viably pay. That in itself we all know is a very hard measure to put a finger on. I look at the world financial markets and specifically our passenger airline industry and right now our pay is good and near or at the top for what we do. I hope we will continue to see gains as we go forward.

You left out the part of about 10 billion in debt, thats with a B.

Don't forget that DAL de-peaked all of the banks around 2005 or so. Operation Clockwork anyone? This initiative is what really cut down on the money lines. No more peaks and valleys on departures. Now we have a constant flow of arrivals and departures. (sans the 0930 to 1100 am or so time frame, where the operation is gate critical)

While you regale your decent deal, do you remember that you were lied to many times by the agent you pay to bargain for you? Do you look at the outsourcing and growth at code share partners, JVs and alliances and say your deal is decent?

Your deal is better than being kicked in the nutz, but it could have been much better.

Delta might have been setting records, but the music on those records was written during the Continental & US Air bankruptcies. When United filed in 2002 (using the same consulting group already on the Delta property) an astute watcher could correctly assume that the same model was going to be used on Delta. This began before C2K and before 9/11. The decision to strategically bankrupt Delta was probably made with the decision to bring on Leo Mullin with no experience in running an airline ... Leo Mullin was a banker / airline consultant who worked for the firm advising United on their bankruptcy.

In the spring of 2000 at a private lunch attended by Hollis Harris and other retired senior management the topic at the table was Delta's unsustainable pensions & pay (not just pilots, although that was a part of the puzzle) and the need for bankruptcy. For me this resonated with a couple of speeches I had heard from Fred Reid and Leo Mullin where they made the point that "costs do not matter. ... our competition will meet our costs and exceed them." Some friends who had helped with another airline's Section 6 bargaining were with me and none of us could believe what was being said. Some senior D-ALPA Admin were in this presentation as well, so Alpha, Slow and probably Sailing have institutional knowledge about the management roadshow during those days. I have spoken with some Delta pilots who had first hand conversations with Leo Mullin who had heard him reflect the same sort of "who cares? We will never honor those contracts anyway ...." attitude.

At the regional carriers money could not be spent fast enough. Collins was given tens of millions for equip RJ's with dual FMC / Heads Up Guidance Systems (of which more than $50,000,000 just sat on account for quite a while). The ASA and Comair divisions of Delta Air Lines Holdings reportedly paid 8 to 10 million MORE for per CRJ200 than AirTran acquired 717's for. Comair built new gates in CVG and MCO and ASA was brought out of the stone age to near Delta standard for tech and maintenance.

IMHO after 9/11 the plan got away from Leo Mullin and senior Delta management. American drastically cut costs and became a competitive monster, as did US Air. Leo, Fred and Michelle's profligate ways immediately put Delta into a much worse situation than they had anticipated. They had intended a well organized "planned burn off" (my term) and they now had an out of control forest fire on their hands.

IMHO D-ALPA did a very good job in a very tough situation, as did a lot of Delta managers. The airline had no legitimate long term plan other than to try to get through the next year, six months, week, etc. Senior management and their consultant buddies were picking the meat from Delta's bones. Leo Mullin was at best reactive according to this writer:

Airline Without A Pilot - Leadership Lessons/Inside Story of Delta's Success, Decline and Bankruptcy: Harry L. Nolan: 9780977207602: Amazon.com: Books

If I were to write a history of Delta's bankruptcy (and I've always thought one should be written), C2K would stand out as a last act of hubris which was irrelevant before it was signed (as was the United contract there). The agreement assumed economic conditions which no longer existed. It is my opinion management signed the agreement with the full expectation (at least among the senior management if not the actual signatories) that the contract would not be honored.

The scope sections of C2K began to fail within 6 months. Given that the aircraft commitments were made (and reported in the press) 18 months prior, it is pretty obvious at least one of the signatories at the table had no intention of honoring the agreement when they signed it. ... and the path to breaking that contract ... bankruptcy.

Conclusion: Management knew, and ALPA should have known, bankruptcy was coming. Why else order 500+ CRJ's to replace the 727 / 737 fleets, when your scope agreement predicates mainline growth? Why hire a banker and bankruptcy expert to run the airline? Why allow them to gild their exit packages? Why run around stating "costs don't matter" unless you never intended to pay when the bills came due?