Bluedriver

Well this should be easy to settle. Kellwolf is near the bottom of the list, has your seniority number moved up dramatically yet? Recognizing it takes time for class dates, he can let us know over the next month or 2 if he moves up 200 numbers.....

I won't hold my breath.

Rabid Seagull

It's not that (it shouldn't be a surprise), it's the total lack of direction that is unfolding:

- reliance on NPS score. If you do the speech and 30 minutes late, that equals an NPS score of on-time and no speech ...how about focusing on "on-time" (the 38 minute PBI turns just aren't working)

-"Blue class" on LAX/SFO transcons...yeah, good luck keeping specific aircraft on specific routes. Feel sorry for the gate agents/ FA's that have to say "sorry" when replaced with a normal 320.

Leisure routes, 3 round trip a day "business routes", transcon "first class"

identity crisis?

Softpayman

Would making a sub-fleet really be akin to reinventing the wheel? Plenty of airlines handle much more complicated sub-fleet scenarios. I think having 1 subfleet is well worth the effort in exchange for an improved, tailored product.

Thinking about it some more, even the 321 is basically a subfleet.

txbusdriver

Nice post copied from BP. A clear and concise synopsis of JetBlue pay and benefits.

Rhino says:
Blah, blah, blah, company looks at it this way, blah, blah, blah, we have a contrarian model that we can't manage properly, blah, blah, blah, it wouldn't be fair to put that strain on the company, blah, blah, blah...

Interesting that he has absolutely no industry data or methodology to support why JB should continue to short its growing pilot population and why a benefit cost is kept to a minimum other than an easy way to control CASM-- another "on the backs of the employee" approach to running the airline.

So, if you're keeping score in the "total compensation" category...

Base Pay-- Below average and now way below average

Retirement-- Below average and now way below average

401k Program-- Below average

Profit sharing-- Well below average

Medical Benefits-- Not even in the ballpark of professional pilots

Sick Time-- Below average

PTO-- Below average

Loss of License Insurance-- None

Life Insurance-- Below average

Short- and Long Term Disability-- Well below average

Legal Support-- When JB wants to, thus well below average

Premium-- Average...if you can get it

International Override-- Where?

Night Override-- Limited

Vacation-- Well below average

Scheduling tempo-- Well above average

Productivity-- Slightly above average

Stage lengths-- Above average

Average work day-- Above average

RASM-- Above average

ASM-- Above average

CASM-- Well below average

Cockpit costs-- Well below average

Total pilot costs relative to revenue stream-- THE LOWEST IN THE INDUSTRY

Tell me again why 10%, or even 20% base pay increase would sway folks NOT to vote for a union???

Send in your card and get someone else to as well...

txbusdriver

The DR is a fraud and the PVC has no power to stop it. As chronicled on bluetruthpilots.com...


Posted: Mon Feb 11, 2013 8:07 am Post subject: Timeline of events for those that don't know.........
For a PDF document go here: Page 99


JetBlue Key Pilot Historical Points
Pre-2004 Events
 Promises of keeping JetBlue pay scales within 5% of Southwest Airlines.
 Our stock options will make us millionaires based on planned growth rates, this is part of our retirement, and makes up for lower wages.
 JetBlue will grow its infrastructure to support planned growth by at least 12 months. For example, increase the capability of System Operations before increasing the size of the fleet or network.
 Expect upgrade within a year of date of hire.
2004 Events
 Jan – May ’04 – JetBlue leadership is discussing in general terms how it plans to formulate the E190 pay tables
 Sep ’04 – JetBlue offers new employment agreement to all pilots to incorporate existing policies into the PEA prior to the first pilot classes’ evergreen renewal. The new contract included:
o First E190 pay tables.
o Expanded dispute resolution process.
o Changes “Shall” to “May” in paragraph 3A.
o Increased per diem to $2.00 per day.
 Sep ’04 – JetBlue rescinds offered new employment agreement after pilots respond negatively to the rewrite.
o Host series of road shows to determine why pilots are displeased with new contract.
 Oct ’04 – Issued amendment to PEA incorporating the following key items:
o Same E190 pay tables as in original offering.
o Increased per diem to $2.00.
o Eliminated transcon meal voucher program.
o Promised a review of E190 pay tables one (1) year after the aircraft begins service so JetBlue could better understand the economics of the aircraft.
o Amendment did not change dispute resolution, merger and acquisition provisions, or paragraph 3A language.
2005 Events
 E190 began service Nov 7, 2005.
 JetBlue announced loss for the year.
2006 Events
 Jan ’06 – JetBlue formally announces Return-to-Profitability campaign.
o Cost cutting is primarily focused on reducing full-time equivalent employee numbers, but healthcare costs increase and changes to benefits like buddy passes occur designed to help return company to a profitable path.
o JetBlue chooses not to hedge after the summer of ’06 until management reinstates a hedging program in late ’07; impacts annual financial performance negatively due to oil increasing in price through ‘08.
 Jul ’06 - JetBlue announced creation of the Pilot Compensation Group (referred as PCG I). PCG I’s charter was to perform an analysis of our compensation package and to make a recommendation to honor the promise of reviewing / adjusting the E190 pay table one (1) year after the aircraft began service.
o Promised the pilots would receive the results near-simultaneous with the Executive Crew (what senior execs called themselves before changing their name to ELT) in the interest of transparency.
o Expected to receive the PCG I’s recommendations within 60 days of beginning its work.
 Aug ’06 – PCG I began its work.
o Conducted a series of road shows to gather pilot feedback on compensation needs.
o Conducted a Company-Proprietary (i.e. secret from the pilots) analysis of JetBlue pilot total compensation package.
 Late Aug ’06 – Dave Bushy announces departure from JetBlue.
 Sep ’06 – Leadership publicly acknowledged they were close to releasing the results of the PCG I review during a Pocket Session on Sep 27, 2007.
o Vinnie Stabile quote, “You’ll have the results in weeks, not months.”
 Sep ’06 – Scott Green replaces Dave Bushy as VP Flight Operations
o Craig Hoskins announced as new System Chief Pilot.
o JFK Chief Pilot Office undergoes radical restructure as it eliminates more than 50% of the Assistant Chief Pilots.
 Oct – Nov ’06 – Complete silence regarding the PCG’s recommendations.
o Speculation ruled the day as to what was occurring behind the scenes.
o Many pilots questioned when we would receive the findings through the Chief Pilot’s Office, but no one really knew the status.
 Dec 19, 2006 – VP Flight Operations, Scott Green, briefs pilots on results of PCG I.
o First time pilots receive results of study and company’s response to the study.
o The actual work of the PCG pilots was not presented and was considered confidential. These pilots were prohibited from sharing their work due to non-disclosure agreements, contrary to what they believed was going to occur.
o Compensation Methodology – W-2 review creating “blended rate” versus industry published rates (no CBA incentive pay included)
 Blended rate utilized an 86-hour month for A320 and an 83-hour month for E190 pilots
 See 2006 Pilot Pay Comparison (attached)
o No discussion of benefits
o Pay raises for E190 CA and FO.
o Lowered first year First Officer pay rates.
 Grandfathered existing first year First Officers.
o No other benefit changes for every other pilot.
2007 Events
 Jan – Dec ’07 – JetBlue ultimately loses 10+% of its seniority list due to pilots leaving JetBlue for other employers (recall, hired by other Part 121 operators or left industry).
o JetBlue liberalizes hiring requirements.
o First time offering conditional employment offers prior to Phase I / II process being completed.
o Hired some pilots during open house events at OSC.
o Extreme difficulty filling E190 First Officer new hire classes.
o Recruiting Department changed how it assigned pilots to new hire classes. This decision ultimately creates first major contractual dispute JetBlue faces when many E190 First Officers claim the seniority provisions of their PEA were violated by the aircraft assignment process.
 Jan – Mar ’07 – Flight Operations, Chief Pilots Office and Pilot Values Committee executed PCG II in response to pilot displeasure with the results of PCG I.
o Performed new compensation analysis
o Utilized data purchased from Air Conference.
o Issued “2007 Annual Compensation and Benefits Report”
 Compensation Methodology - Analyzed pilot W-2s
 Excluded the following from the analysis:
o Check Airmen
o Those who changed position during the year (upgrade or moved from reserve to lineholder)
o Lineholders with yearly credit less than 840 hours
o Reserve pilots with less than 900 hours
o Management pilots
o Those not “active” for the entire year (long-term disability, leave of absence, etc) in 2004, 2005, & 2006
 Benefits Methodology – Benchmark JetBlue benefits versus other airline benefits plans
 Data obtained from industry consultant Air Conference
 Data was not validated against actual airline CBAs (determine during PCRB project in Feb ’0. Information was presented assuming it is accurate.
 Data was deidentified as per Guidelines for Membership with Air Conference
 Jan – Mar ’07 – PCG II discussion continued.
o PCG II promised annual compensation and benefits reviews.
 Jan – Mar ’07 – PCG II discussion continued.
o PCG II results:
 Annual compensation review process formalized
 Issued second pay raise for E190 pilots.
 Increased First Officer first year pay rates 26.67%
 Issued pay raise for 12-year (none on property) A320 Captains and First Officers.
 First update to merger and acquisition language protections from original PEA offering of preferential interviews.
 Increases made to retirement plan:
 5% 401(k) match
 5% non-discretionary profit sharing contribution. Any profit sharing in excess of 5% will be paid to pilot as compensation and subject to applicable federal, state and local taxes.
 This was planned to be offered to pilots but Legal Department pointed out this would violate ERISA and the increase was subsequently offered to all Crewmembers.
o The role of the PVC morphed during PCG II as committee members were asked how the pilot corps would respond to compensation improvement suggestions.
 JetBlue never updated the charter of the PVC until mid-09. The PVC was created by JetBlue and the corporation has the responsibility to clearly identify the role, responsibility and authority of the committee so all parties understand the committee’s scope of authority.
 The PVC lacked internal structure to handle its new role, and this issue haunts the committee today.
 Jan – Oct ’07 – Transitions Flight Scheduling Guide into the Flight Scheduling Manual
o Created Long Call Reserve
o Launched new FLiCA features without advance communication or incorporating rules into the Flight Scheduling Manual
o Promised leg-by-leg pay protection
 Flight Operations / Chief Pilot Office manual interpretation changes the policy during 2008 after multiple manager changes creating what is referred to as “averaging”.
 Pay protects by leg to the point of disruption.
 Determines remaining scheduled block from point of disruption, subtracts actual block flown to determine pay protection.
o Any over-block after disruption dilutes pay protection due the pilot. Essentially over-block goes unremunerated unless pilot breaks scheduled value of original pairing.
 Source of multiple complaints due to interpretation not matching what was communicated during introduction of 2007 FSM.
 Feb 14, 2007 – Valentine’s Day Massacre
o Management promised to fix IROP abilities multiple times in response to pilot / Crewmember feedback after every IROP preceding the operational meltdown.
o Event placed Crewmembers at risk due to customer response to JetBlue’s lack of operational control.
 Apr ’07 – John Ross replaces Scott Green as VP Flight Operations
 May ’07 - David Neeleman replaced by Dave Barger as CEO.
o Board held David accountable for Feb ’07 event.
 Sep – Nov ’07 – Reserve Working Group works to help improve Crew Services’ execution of reserve protocols.
o Required changes to the Long Call process sit on Flight Operation’s desk until incorporated into the FSM as a Temporary Revision in Aug ’08.
o Flight Operations never transmitted communication campaign of needed changes to the FSM. This lack of communication is causal to significant conflict between reserve pilots and Crew Services.
 Jun – Nov ’07 – Internal conflict in PVC interferes with the committee’s ability to perform its duties.
o The committee writes its first set of by-laws in response to the lessons learned solving the internal conflict.
 Committee majority believes by-laws should be controlled by committee and should not include recall procedures.
 Nov ’07 – PVC works with Flight Operations to take “ownership” of next compensation review.
2008 Events
 Jan ’08 – First all Values Committee summit occurs in OSC
o Summits initially scheduled quarterly, ultimately three occur in 2008.
o The summit schedule goes to a semi-annual schedule.
 Jan ’08 – Discussions occur again of who runs compensation review between Flight Operations and PVC.
o Pilot Compensation Review Board (PCRB) is created during these discussions.
o PCRB Mission (see below) is jointly created between line pilots and management representatives on first day of initiative, Jan 30th.
o PVC solicits and chooses line pilot participants. Resistance is presented by some members of leadership of the PVC including pro-union pilots on board, but PVC’s resolve ensures the proper pilots participate regardless of their individual union views.
 Feb – Mar ’08 – PCRB begins.
o Pilots request data used to create the 2007 Compensation and Benefits Report
 Benefits Department never produces a complete set of data
o Pilots express concerns the PCRB will negotiate on its behalf. The PCRB and PVC is committed to not negotiating and holds itself to this standard throughout the PCRB process.
o PCRB pilots collect all CBA’s and many SPD’s of the peer set established in 2007.
o PCRB pilots expressed concern of not having dedicated legal and benefits expert support.
 Asks PVC to work with JetBlue to gain these resources.
 PVC hires, JetBlue pays for, Ron Natalie to review the PEA focusing on M&A sections of the agreement. This review occurs between Jun – Aug.
 Review shared with all pilots because the PVC mandates this.
o PCRB works to ensure all levels of leadership understand its mission when they uncovered different opinions of the mission existed throughout the leadership structure.
o PCRB pilots analyze the data and issue their findings on the deadline date of Mar 31st to the pilot corps and JetBlue leadership (see attached PCRB Final Report)
o April 1st – PCRB Presentation to the Executive Crew (EC)
 The PCRB was given one (1) hour to present its findings and host a Q&A session with the EC.
 See attached PCRB Final Report Outbrief.
 Leadership gives Vinnie Stabile and John Ross the responsibility to address the PCRB Final Report.
 The EC gives a May 31st deadline for a management response to be issued.
 Mar ’08 – PVC determines required changes to the FSM to address Long Call fixes are still sitting on Flight Operations’ desk
o PVC gets Flight Operations to agree to issue Temporary Revision so the published manual matches how Crew Services is scheduling pilots for reserve duty.
o Intent is to educate pilots of the finished project completed by the RWG.
 Apr – May ’08 – Flight Operations works to respond to the PCRB Final Report
o First official meetings including the PVC and PCRB SMEs are scheduled the second Tuesday of May.
 Two PVC members and one PCRB SME attend as observers and advisors on the work of the PCRB.
 Meetings are scheduled every Tuesday and Thursday for the remainder of May.
o Unknown what works was ongoing in April, but no official PCRB response meetings were held.
o Vinnie and John meet with EC on May 31st and the EC sends them back to do more research.
 June 26th is established as the new deadline for management to respond.
 Jun ‘08
o PVC works to address why FSM Temporary Revisions were not published in a timely fashion. Flight Ops told PVC they were in FAA’s hands when in fact they were not submitted.
o Jun 24th, 2008, PVC meets with John Ross and Craig Hoskins to address lack of TRs being issued to fix FSM.
o Jun 25th, PVC is briefed on JetBlue’s response to the PCRB Final Report.
 Changes to the response occur as late as 3:00 PM.
o Jun 26th – Flight Operations issues the PCRB Action Plan.
 Changes made to PEA to address the 5-day renewal window weakness.
 Requires JetBlue to demonstrate “cause” per Section 14 of the PEA not to renew a pilot’s PEA.
 Merger and acquisitions changes made to better define process and improve pilot protections.
 Established $2,000,000 trust fund if Transactional Event (TE) occurs
 Pilots may act individually or collectively
o Leadership did not help facilitate the creation of a plan for the pilots to act collectively in the event a TE occurs.
 PTO changed to credit toward earning premium pay, but PTS is changed to only be paid at a pilot’s Regular Rate of pay (i.e., no Premium Pay for the hours a pilot calls in sick).
 Issued pay raises to E190 pay rates and adjustments to years 2 – 7 for A320 Captains and years 4 – 12 for A320 First Officers (very few in this group).
o Created Permanent Working Committees.
 Sep ’08 – PEA Amendment issued instituting changes offered by Flight Operations
 Nov ’08 - JBPA petitions NMB to conduct representational vote.
o JBPA is established to bring a CBA to JetBlue’s pilots
o The founders initially approached JetBlue leadership to establish in-house union collaboratively like SWA and SWAPA
o Major issues for pilots were retirement shortcomings, job protection weaknesses, unilateral FSM changes, lack of legal representation and benefit deficiencies
2009 Events
 Jan ’09 – JBPA and JetBlue share their visions for representing pilot corps
o JetBlue leadership tells pilots they have a fix for retirement
o JetBlue leadership tells us “They Get It”
 Feb ’09 – JBPA loses its bid to represent the JetBlue pilot
 Feb 09 – PVC and Chief Pilots write the first “Letter of Commitment” specifically authorizing the PVC to perform actions such establish the permanent committees, communicate transparently with pilots, survey and poll pilots
o Letter is presented to Mike Barger with the intent of delivering it to the pilots when JetBlue emerged from laboratory seven days after NMB results were announced.
o Mike takes over two weeks to consider it, and the letter isn’t signed until the PVC met with the entire ELT and Dave Barger supported the authorizations.
 Mar ’09 – PVC establishes permanent committees, conducts interviews and makes final selection of members
o Work begins on compensation review picking up where PCRB stopped, updating the FSM and establishing a professional standards committee.
 Apr ’09
o Mike Barger agrees in principle to pay review process, airlines in comparable group, and communicates to CBC the trigger must increase.
 Trigger increase demand is not publicly discussed until after its increase is finalized and approved by ELT
o Mike Barger agrees to back pay to Jun 1st if it takes longer to get PEA amendments issued.
 Neglects to run this through ELT and they learn of it from PVC monthly newsletter.
 ELT suspects PVC tried to pull a fast one on them when PVC/CBC actions demonstrate both committees were acting honorably and Mike Barger dropped the ball on this one.
o WRC hosts “informal” base visits as a means to gather more input on needed change directly from line pilots.
 Chose not to survey at this point in the interest of survey fatigue on the part of the pilot corps.
 WRC has over 150 input items from line and 50+ from Crew Services
 May ‘09
o First week of May the CBC meets with Mike Barger, Flight Ops and Chief Pilots to discuss all findings but primarily to resolve premium trigger movement – PVC not invited.
 Mike Barger leaves this meeting having stated he “Sees no reason to have the trigger any lower than 81-hours”
o Multiple approvals / approval withdrawn of compensation changes occur throughout first three weeks of May
o PVC is summoned to FSC for an hour and a half meeting to resolve trigger on May 28th
 Initial PVC position walking into this meeting is:
 70-Hour trigger unless company provides data as to why it must be increased
 If we can’t get 70-hours, settle on 75-hour trigger
 Finally, if a 75-hour trigger is unobtainable introduce a new compensation process (70-90 pay scale) designed to give all pilots access to premium pay, prevent company from capping credit hours, and introducing new industry average rate as our new A320 CA pay rates with a 90% differential for E190 CAs and 66% differential for First Officers.
 Meeting extends three times longer due to two PVC members not adhering to group consensus and advocating 78-81 premium trigger with two CBC members brought into this meeting without invitation from Mike Barger.
 Several PVC members leave meeting before it ended to catch commutes home
 Remaining PVC members request a side bar five hours after meeting begins
 Internal concern is expressed over the pilots having not been briefed on trigger movement, and no polling to determine what their priorities were.
 Side bar discussion isto quickly determine what each PVC member can settle with.
o Consensus is to fight for 75 but will settle for 78 if company continues pushing 81-hours; figured they were doing what they wanted and 78 is better than 81.
 Meeting ends when the PVC Chair makes one initial statement – “The PVC wants 75 but can settle for 78.”
 Arguments end without one attempt to secure 75-hours.
 Jun ’09 – Company announces compensation and benefit changes
o Planning to implement as quickly as possible but back pay will be honored since Mike agreed to it and PVC shared this with the pilots.
o No internal work on what it will take to issue amendment or implement pay table changes occurred on behalf of Flight Operations.
o WRC continues work on FSM overhaul – project is much bigger than anticipated
 Announces FSM change process once Mike Barger approved it
 Four filters requiring consensus before final approval – working group, Chief Pilots, Flight Ops.SVP Fleet Ops and Pilots
 Vision is to publish complete implementation schedule prior to implementation so everyone can hold company accountable for a fair and balanced implementation of new work rules.
 Jul ’09 –
o Mike Barger and Flight Operations attempt a short-notice complete rewrite of the PEA although he originally agreed to implement compensation changes by way of an amendment
 PVC fights complete rewrite because it didn’t have any dedicated legal support and a project this important cannot be rushed.
 Standing ground forced them to live with their previous agreement.
o Mike Barger commissions the Boston Consulting Group to conduct a pilot efficiency study
 Aug – Sep ’09
o WRC begin four week’s worth of meetings with Chief Pilots to educate them on proposed FSM changes, answer their questions and incorporate their input to address their concerns
 Draft changed significantly, especially for reserve work rules that would have allowed reserves to make more money each month.
 Later on Flight Ops claimed the Chief Pilots were only there for a grammar review. If this were true the FSM draft would not have changed.
 Sep ’09 – PEA amendment is finally issued

_________________
Basically the PEA/Committee/pilot group lives within a structure that is DICTATED (ie Dictatorship) to us.

Within a CBA we would live within a NEGOTIATED structure that is legally binding!

Kellwolf

So, looking at the email that just came out from the company, it sounds like they want the whole deal to go to the pilot group for a "vote" and the PVC just there in an advisory capacity only. My feeling is if you can't convinve the PVC it's a good deal (seeing as they get most of their directions from surveys/inputs from the pilot group), you're gonna have a hard time convincing the rest of the pilots. Then again, it's not like a majority vote of the pilot group has a legal stance anyway.

thruthemurk

Seriously? In over 9 years there has been a lot more BS to call on Chief pilot emails than most other sources.

Bluedriver

Well we will soon know if 200 pilots leave or if he was full of crap.

benzoate

It's funny really. No other major airline has chief pilots sending out emails trying to convince the masses that pilots aren't leaving. No other chief pilot is sending emails trying to convince pilots that peak vacations are bad for the airline. Other major airline chief pilots don't send out emails trying to convince you that pilots are applying at your airline for the culture.

If you ever took the time to read the Ford and Harrison document this would sound familiar. Continuously repeat the message. Continuously repeat the message. The content isn't necessarily important however the frequency is.

Keep in kind, with respect to our pay review process. The CBC was tasked with reviewing our pay and benefits and make suggestions. The company rejected the results, started its own CATCAB committee and implemented its own findings.

This pay process will go the same way.

Bluedriver

If they add more vacation periods in the summer, YOU AND YOUR FRIENDS will be the ones yelling the loudest about low bid divisors and lack of premium pay in the slow months....