(Next) PNCL Vacancy?
12-05-2011 | 01:40 PM
#92
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Nov 2006
Posts: 829
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From: 737 Left
I am an FO at a major airline with over 10K hours. I have flown both as FO and Captain at a regional airline before my current employment.
My posts may seem elementary to you, because that is exactly what this accident was. It was an elementary mistake and improper reaction to the stall by the crew.
Stall recognition and recovery IS elementary. It doesn't matter if the airplane is a Cessna, Bombardier, or Boeing.
I did reference in my earlier post that I believed training was a contributing factor. I have always thought the method previously trained at some of the regionals (no altitude loss while respecting the shaker) was incorrect training. I have witnessed some ugly stall demonstations in the CRJ sim where the stick pusher was pushing and the pilot was pulling. An ugly oscillation resulted and always with very excessive altitude loss and sometimes a crash. It is unfortunate that loss of lives had to occur before that training was changed.
I know that fatigue is a very real concern for all of us, and some reform is necessary in our work and rest rules. I also believe fatigue has been a contributing factor in many airline accidents, I just do not believe it was an issue in this one. I fully understand how important it is to be rested when you report for work. It is my understanding that this was the first leg of the trip for this crew (I could be wrong). If this was the case, these individuals bear the responsibility to report to work in a rested condition. If they did not, this was a disservice to the passengers they were paid to serve.
With that said, I still believe that poor airmanship and poor training were responsible for this accident. Once the stall occurred, adrenaline and training kick in. Crying "fatigue" is just a scapegoat to the real issues that caused this accident that need to be addressed.
I apoligize for my participation in this thread drift. If anyone wants to further debate the Colgan accident, please direct me to the proper thread to participate.
My posts may seem elementary to you, because that is exactly what this accident was. It was an elementary mistake and improper reaction to the stall by the crew.
Stall recognition and recovery IS elementary. It doesn't matter if the airplane is a Cessna, Bombardier, or Boeing.
I did reference in my earlier post that I believed training was a contributing factor. I have always thought the method previously trained at some of the regionals (no altitude loss while respecting the shaker) was incorrect training. I have witnessed some ugly stall demonstations in the CRJ sim where the stick pusher was pushing and the pilot was pulling. An ugly oscillation resulted and always with very excessive altitude loss and sometimes a crash. It is unfortunate that loss of lives had to occur before that training was changed.
I know that fatigue is a very real concern for all of us, and some reform is necessary in our work and rest rules. I also believe fatigue has been a contributing factor in many airline accidents, I just do not believe it was an issue in this one. I fully understand how important it is to be rested when you report for work. It is my understanding that this was the first leg of the trip for this crew (I could be wrong). If this was the case, these individuals bear the responsibility to report to work in a rested condition. If they did not, this was a disservice to the passengers they were paid to serve.
With that said, I still believe that poor airmanship and poor training were responsible for this accident. Once the stall occurred, adrenaline and training kick in. Crying "fatigue" is just a scapegoat to the real issues that caused this accident that need to be addressed.
I apoligize for my participation in this thread drift. If anyone wants to further debate the Colgan accident, please direct me to the proper thread to participate.
Your earlier post volunteers that the fact that the Captain and FO were 'chatting it up' is the sole basis for the speed reduction. That is NOT the case.
The CVR shows from 3 minutes prior to LOC movement (the beginning of the approach procedure) that the cockpit was sterile. That is almost five minutes prior to the stick shaker that the airplane was being flown in accordance with all FARs and provisions set fourth in the Colgan Air FOM.
So, the question remains: Why did Capt. Renslow not notice that the speed was bleeding off?
12-05-2011 | 01:51 PM
#93
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Sep 2007
Posts: 112
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From: SF340 LCA
Another interesting fact, the a/p disconnected and the stick shaker activated at about 133 kts due to the ice incrament switch. Bugged ref speed was 118 kts. When the a/p disconnected and the stall warning, occured the airplane was well above its stall speed (probably somewhere around 91kts if my math is correct which is based on ref 118 being 1.3 vso). So what did happen and why did the airplane stall. The incorrect control inputs resulted in an accelarated stall which caused the airplane to stall at a faster speed than 91 kts. What is the reason for the incorrect inputs, I would guess confusion. Why the confusion, the captain had just over 100 hrs in type and all previous experience was in round dial airplanes (be1900 and sf340).
12-05-2011 | 02:47 PM
#94
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Joined: Jun 2010
Posts: 1,792
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From: Doing what you do, for less.
Another interesting fact, the a/p disconnected and the stick shaker activated at about 133 kts due to the ice incrament switch. Bugged ref speed was 118 kts. When the a/p disconnected and the stall warning, occured the airplane was well above its stall speed (probably somewhere around 91kts if my math is correct which is based on ref 118 being 1.3 vso). So what did happen and why did the airplane stall. The incorrect control inputs resulted in an accelarated stall which caused the airplane to stall at a faster speed than 91 kts. What is the reason for the incorrect inputs, I would guess confusion. Why the confusion, the captain had just over 100 hrs in type and all previous experience was in round dial airplanes (be1900 and sf340).
12-05-2011 | 02:51 PM
#95
Gets Off to Weekends
Joined: Jan 2007
Posts: 649
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From: A320 FO
Another interesting fact, the a/p disconnected and the stick shaker activated at about 133 kts due to the ice incrament switch. Bugged ref speed was 118 kts. When the a/p disconnected and the stall warning, occured the airplane was well above its stall speed (probably somewhere around 91kts if my math is correct which is based on ref 118 being 1.3 vso). So what did happen and why did the airplane stall. The incorrect control inputs resulted in an accelarated stall which caused the airplane to stall at a faster speed than 91 kts. What is the reason for the incorrect inputs, I would guess confusion. Why the confusion, the captain had just over 100 hrs in type and all previous experience was in round dial airplanes (be1900 and sf340).
Everyone pay special attention to this post. Systems wise, this is the most pertinent explanation for the INITIAL startle. Couple this with a crew unfit to fly (fatigue, failures etc.), and the chain of events presents itself.
12-05-2011 | 02:53 PM
#96
Da Hudge
Joined: Oct 2006
Posts: 17,473
Likes: 0
From: Poodle Whisperer
Another interesting fact, the a/p disconnected and the stick shaker activated at about 133 kts due to the ice incrament switch. Bugged ref speed was 118 kts. When the a/p disconnected and the stall warning, occured the airplane was well above its stall speed (probably somewhere around 91kts if my math is correct which is based on ref 118 being 1.3 vso). So what did happen and why did the airplane stall. The incorrect control inputs resulted in an accelarated stall which caused the airplane to stall at a faster speed than 91 kts. What is the reason for the incorrect inputs, I would guess confusion. Why the confusion, the captain had just over 100 hrs in type and all previous experience was in round dial airplanes (be1900 and sf340).
As far as why they didn't recognize the speed reduction, I would be willing to bet that due to both of their own poor rest in the preceding 24 hours (him sleeping in the crew lounge and her commuting in on a redeye sick- both due to financial burden rather than rest rules burden), that they were both probably just along for the ride and lost focus. They had a long delay in getting out which I've found sharply contributes to my fatigue level. Their lack of focus is also why it was such a startled reaction to the shaker.
12-05-2011 | 03:59 PM
#97
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Joined: Dec 2005
Posts: 9,499
Likes: 505
What is the reason for the incorrect inputs
12-05-2011 | 04:07 PM
#98
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Mar 2006
Posts: 567
Likes: 0
From: retired
Renslow responded in a manner similar to what I have seen of people of his personality type and training/experience background (in the simulator and in real life). Something happened that startled him and he jumped at it and made some control inputs, and hoped he guessed right. Why would his first reaction be to haul back on the stick at the onset of the shaker? Because that is what he has as a rote response to a shaker because of the maintaining altitude training in stalls that Pinnacle/Colgan taught.
As far as why they didn't recognize the speed reduction, I would be willing to bet that due to both of their own poor rest in the preceding 24 hours (him sleeping in the crew lounge and her commuting in on a redeye sick- both due to financial burden rather than rest rules burden), that they were both probably just along for the ride and lost focus. They had a long delay in getting out which I've found sharply contributes to my fatigue level. Their lack of focus is also why it was such a startled reaction to the shaker.
As far as why they didn't recognize the speed reduction, I would be willing to bet that due to both of their own poor rest in the preceding 24 hours (him sleeping in the crew lounge and her commuting in on a redeye sick- both due to financial burden rather than rest rules burden), that they were both probably just along for the ride and lost focus. They had a long delay in getting out which I've found sharply contributes to my fatigue level. Their lack of focus is also why it was such a startled reaction to the shaker.
12-05-2011 | 05:49 PM
#99
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Joined: Jul 2009
Posts: 519
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Didn't you get the memo? Just a few of the larger bullet points: Your choice of 900 bases (left seat of course), a Pinnacle or Mesaba pilot (can be Captain or FO, your choice) to act as a "bag boy" for you, and a month of unrestricted access to one of Phil Trenary's 3 vacation homes (sorry, the liquor cabinet will be locked)
12-05-2011 | 08:32 PM
#100
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Sep 2007
Posts: 112
Likes: 0
From: SF340 LCA
There is absolutely no doubt that this accident is pilot error. The crew paid for their mistakes with their lives. The point I am trying to make is that there are human factors involved. Colgan 3407 was a stall spin accident. Air France 447 was a stall spin accident from about 38,000 feet. The Pinnacle accident on the repo flight both crew members pulled back against the stick pusher. If all we ever do is say those pilots were bad pilots and now they are dead so the problem is solved then we are no better than management. If we, as educated pilots, recognize that when an upset occurs be it because of flying on the edge of the flight envelope as was the case with the Pinnacle repo or some sort of instrumentation error as was the case with af 447 or be it startle and confusion as was probably the case with 3407, human factors will become a factor, then we will go a step towards making learning from others mistakes. At Colgan Air prior to 3407 we were taught approach to stall recovery. Before coming to the airline I as any pilot had stall training as a student pilot, private pilot, instrument pilot and commercial pilot. As a cfi candidate I had spin training. My experience prior to 121 taught me to reduce the angle of attack. At Colgan I was taught to power our of a stall with minimal loss of altitude. I can't speak for other training curriculums at other 121 carriers but I believe there are probably other carriers that had a similar philosophy.
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