(Next) PNCL Vacancy?
#81
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Dec 2005
Posts: 9,501
Likes: 510
Because both were ranting well below 10k, and didn't have their briefings complete. Both were behind the curve, and both neglected to monitor their airspeed. Even a little adherence to sterile cockpit might have forced them to spend that energy on something else, like monitoring their airspeed.
While I didn't agree with that old method either, no where in the old manuals did it ever say to pull the yoke back into your stomach (essentially what he did), nor did it say to pull the yoke until your airspeed went into the red/black checkerboard! NOR did my stall training ever teach me to override a stick pusher.
Lets stop scapegoating things like rest rules, and place blame on violation of FARs (constant chatter below 10k) and poor airmanship all around. Add a history of failed checkrides both prior to the airline and AT the airline, and you can see where the blame lies.
Are you sure you work for Pinnacle?
To loosely quote an old "stall profile":
"Pull back on the yoke (respecting the stick shaker) to avoid losing altitude."
I wouldn't have believed it if I hadn't read it with my own eyes. We were taught to pull up (and if we got the pusher, to release enough pressure to get the pusher to stop, then continue pulling back).
Why do you think the company quietly issued a revision to the manual shortly after Feb 12, 2009, effectively removing the stall profiles from the CFM? Why do you think that it's now no longer a pass/fail item on the PC? It's a demonstration only, one in which we definitely establish at least some sort of descent to trade our altitude for airspeed...
To loosely quote an old "stall profile":
"Pull back on the yoke (respecting the stick shaker) to avoid losing altitude."
I wouldn't have believed it if I hadn't read it with my own eyes. We were taught to pull up (and if we got the pusher, to release enough pressure to get the pusher to stop, then continue pulling back).
Why do you think the company quietly issued a revision to the manual shortly after Feb 12, 2009, effectively removing the stall profiles from the CFM? Why do you think that it's now no longer a pass/fail item on the PC? It's a demonstration only, one in which we definitely establish at least some sort of descent to trade our altitude for airspeed...
Lets stop scapegoating things like rest rules, and place blame on violation of FARs (constant chatter below 10k) and poor airmanship all around. Add a history of failed checkrides both prior to the airline and AT the airline, and you can see where the blame lies.
#82
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Nov 2006
Posts: 829
Likes: 0
From: 737 Left
He allowed airspeed to diminish while he chatted up the FO during sterile operations. He then reacted improperly to stall warning and stick pusher by pulling, when he should have been pushing.
You will never convince me that fatigue will make you forget which way the yoke is to be moved during a stall.
You will never convince me that fatigue will make you forget which way the yoke is to be moved during a stall.
The entire approach was sterile.
Your post does not demonstrate the comprehension of an airline pilot. Can you elaborate on your experience because your posts are quite elementary as best.
#84
and nowhere in the manuals does it teach pilots to crash airplanes, and yet it happens! By your reasoning, every crash deemed as pilot error is simply due to incompetent pilots. If you don't understand the significance of the time of day, the amount of rest involved, and it being the last leg...you're NEVER going to get it.
You sure you're not a management hack, Shy? You do realize that flying your desk and flying the line are two totally different things, right?
#85
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Sep 2009
Posts: 425
Likes: 0
From: B737 F/O
Agreed 100%, AxialFlow.....
These people don't have the critical thinking ability to figure out how various human factors can influence the safety of flight. Just glad that most accident investigators are more open minded.
These people don't have the critical thinking ability to figure out how various human factors can influence the safety of flight. Just glad that most accident investigators are more open minded.
#86
Bracing for Fallacies
Joined: Jul 2007
Posts: 3,543
Likes: 0
From: In favor of good things, not in favor of bad things
Are you sure you work for Pinnacle?
To loosely quote an old "stall profile":
"Pull back on the yoke (respecting the stick shaker) to avoid losing altitude."
I wouldn't have believed it if I hadn't read it with my own eyes. We were taught to pull up (and if we got the pusher, to release enough pressure to get the pusher to stop, then continue pulling back).
Why do you think the company quietly issued a revision to the manual shortly after Feb 12, 2009, effectively removing the stall profiles from the CFM? Why do you think that it's now no longer a pass/fail item on the PC? It's a demonstration only, one in which we definitely establish at least some sort of descent to trade our altitude for airspeed...
To loosely quote an old "stall profile":
"Pull back on the yoke (respecting the stick shaker) to avoid losing altitude."
I wouldn't have believed it if I hadn't read it with my own eyes. We were taught to pull up (and if we got the pusher, to release enough pressure to get the pusher to stop, then continue pulling back).
Why do you think the company quietly issued a revision to the manual shortly after Feb 12, 2009, effectively removing the stall profiles from the CFM? Why do you think that it's now no longer a pass/fail item on the PC? It's a demonstration only, one in which we definitely establish at least some sort of descent to trade our altitude for airspeed...
#88
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Dec 2005
Posts: 9,501
Likes: 510
and nowhere in the manuals does it teach pilots to crash airplanes, and yet it happens! By your reasoning, every crash deemed as pilot error is simply due to incompetent pilots. If you don't understand the significance of the time of day, the amount of rest involved, and it being the last leg...you're NEVER going to get it.
It's insulting for you to insinuate that it was the last leg as if it's something they are now tired for. It was their first operating leg for the day. Now had they done a 13.5 hr duty 5-leg day (like what I do at 9E and have done for over 4 years) and this accident happened on leg 5, I could understand. Amount of rest involved? Both had over well above min rest, in fact, almost 20+ hrs rest. But both commuted, one throughout the entire NIGHT! How can you show up to work dead tired and check in for what could be a 16 hr duty day, when your body was up all night on Fedex planes? They set themselve up for failure. The Captain, for his constant disapprovals in checkrides both pre and post Colgan, lying on his application, and the FO, for commuting throughout the night and then flying while she was obviously sick. Poor girl was too poor to call in sick to get a hotel room, that's an industry problem, so I don't blame her there. But still.
Lets be honest. If you wanted to make laws to prevent this particular crash, it's not the rest or duty rules. As already stated, afternoon checkins with plenty of rest beforehand, and it was their first operating leg for the day. Their tiredness was not due to their flight schedule that day. It was how they got there. How about a law prohibiting commuting in the entire night (before check in) on cargo carriers? How about a law that punishes you for lying on applications for failed checkrides? Obviously, the current ones didn't stop that Captain. How about a law for not flying when obviously sick? That didn't stop her either.
#89
Line Holder
Joined: Jul 2009
Posts: 432
Likes: 0
My posts may seem elementary to you, because that is exactly what this accident was. It was an elementary mistake and improper reaction to the stall by the crew.
Stall recognition and recovery IS elementary. It doesn't matter if the airplane is a Cessna, Bombardier, or Boeing.
I did reference in my earlier post that I believed training was a contributing factor. I have always thought the method previously trained at some of the regionals (no altitude loss while respecting the shaker) was incorrect training. I have witnessed some ugly stall demonstations in the CRJ sim where the stick pusher was pushing and the pilot was pulling. An ugly oscillation resulted and always with very excessive altitude loss and sometimes a crash. It is unfortunate that loss of lives had to occur before that training was changed.
I know that fatigue is a very real concern for all of us, and some reform is necessary in our work and rest rules. I also believe fatigue has been a contributing factor in many airline accidents, I just do not believe it was an issue in this one. I fully understand how important it is to be rested when you report for work. It is my understanding that this was the first leg of the trip for this crew (I could be wrong). If this was the case, these individuals bear the responsibility to report to work in a rested condition. If they did not, this was a disservice to the passengers they were paid to serve.
With that said, I still believe that poor airmanship and poor training were responsible for this accident. Once the stall occurred, adrenaline and training kick in. Crying "fatigue" is just a scapegoat to the real issues that caused this accident that need to be addressed.
I apoligize for my participation in this thread drift. If anyone wants to further debate the Colgan accident, please direct me to the proper thread to participate.
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