Ethiopian 737 MAX 8 crash
#771
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2005
Posts: 8,898
Oh please. When there was a second smoking hole in the ground by a MAX 8, and other countries had already grounded the MAX, the Sec of Transportation herself and her staff flew the MAX 8 from AUS to Washington DC to show their support of Boeing and the MAX. It’s overdrive protection mode well known by the FAA, just like when ValuJet crashed and the Sec of Transportation stood on the swamp crash site and claimed that he had flown Valujet, Valujet is a safe airline, as is the entire transportation system.
JATR:
Created by the FAA to welcome the foreign parties that are regulatory authorities. Hart chairs this review group and he himself calls it unprecedented. Read it however you like. It’s unprecedented because for the first time, the FAA is forced to the back seat. The bottom line is the rest of the world grounded this airplane first. China. Indonesia, Ethiopia, India, Europe. The FAA was left as the lone man standing before caving in and grounding it, but saving face by saying they grounded it based on data.
When it comes time to unground it, since the FAA wasn’t the first and instead was last, they are in no position to lift the ban until those foreign regulatory authorities are satisfied. It will have to be a unified lifting of the ban.
#772
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2006
Position: C47 PIC/747-400 SIC
Posts: 2,100
I’m sure those AA check airmen are pretty good source material for that WSJ article , especially Capt . Guthrie the fleet captain for the 737 for AA , I like his take on it based on his experience, actual first hand experience with the MAX , and also his efforts to help Boeing fix it . Cheers
#776
Why do you think that? I have it even though you accused me of not reading it. It is a PRELIMINARY report. No one is arguing that the crew made procedural mistakes. We are simply saying that there is more to the investigation than, "the pilots messed up." Do you really think this preliminary report contains all the useful information? Do you really think there isn't anything else to learn?
Personally, I am more interested in the human factors of the accident. We know they left the power up and turned the stabilizer trim system back on. What we still don't know is WHY. Maybe there is something in their takeoff profile that can lead to the crew getting distracted at the wrong time. One company I worked at had a callout at a terrible time that caused pilots to mess up the altitude capture mode if we had to level off at 2,000 feet. Simply removing that callout reduced our low level altitude busts.
I would like to see something similar to US Airways 1549 where they put crews in the same scenario in the sim. If you have ever been a sim instructor, I am sure you have seen an otherwise good crew get distracted. Finding out why pilots make mistakes is way more important than simply identifying them. Look at the upset of the 717 during flight testing. Those were great pilots, yet they still made mistakes. As a result of the way they handled that upset (along with several other upsets in the 90s), the industry came up with new training methods so that a regular line pilot doesn't need to be a test pilot in order to recover from an upset safely.
Personally, I am more interested in the human factors of the accident. We know they left the power up and turned the stabilizer trim system back on. What we still don't know is WHY. Maybe there is something in their takeoff profile that can lead to the crew getting distracted at the wrong time. One company I worked at had a callout at a terrible time that caused pilots to mess up the altitude capture mode if we had to level off at 2,000 feet. Simply removing that callout reduced our low level altitude busts.
I would like to see something similar to US Airways 1549 where they put crews in the same scenario in the sim. If you have ever been a sim instructor, I am sure you have seen an otherwise good crew get distracted. Finding out why pilots make mistakes is way more important than simply identifying them. Look at the upset of the 717 during flight testing. Those were great pilots, yet they still made mistakes. As a result of the way they handled that upset (along with several other upsets in the 90s), the industry came up with new training methods so that a regular line pilot doesn't need to be a test pilot in order to recover from an upset safely.
#777
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2006
Position: C47 PIC/747-400 SIC
Posts: 2,100
Why do you think that? I have it even though you accused me of not reading it. It is a PRELIMINARY report. No one is arguing that the crew made procedural mistakes. We are simply saying that there is more to the investigation than, "the pilots messed up." Do you really think this preliminary report contains all the useful information? Do you really think there isn't anything else to learn?
Personally, I am more interested in the human factors of the accident. We know they left the power up and turned the stabilizer trim system back on. What we still don't know is WHY. Maybe there is something in their takeoff profile that can lead to the crew getting distracted at the wrong time. One company I worked at had a callout at a terrible time that caused pilots to mess up the altitude capture mode if we had to level off at 2,000 feet. Simply removing that callout reduced our low level altitude busts.
I would like to see something similar to US Airways 1549 where they put crews in the same scenario in the sim. If you have ever been a sim instructor, I am sure you have seen an otherwise good crew get distracted. Finding out why pilots make mistakes is way more important than simply identifying them. Look at the upset of the 717 during flight testing. Those were great pilots, yet they still made mistakes. As a result of the way they handled that upset (along with several other upsets in the 90s), the industry came up with new training methods so that a regular line pilot doesn't need to be a test pilot in order to recover from an upset safely.
Personally, I am more interested in the human factors of the accident. We know they left the power up and turned the stabilizer trim system back on. What we still don't know is WHY. Maybe there is something in their takeoff profile that can lead to the crew getting distracted at the wrong time. One company I worked at had a callout at a terrible time that caused pilots to mess up the altitude capture mode if we had to level off at 2,000 feet. Simply removing that callout reduced our low level altitude busts.
I would like to see something similar to US Airways 1549 where they put crews in the same scenario in the sim. If you have ever been a sim instructor, I am sure you have seen an otherwise good crew get distracted. Finding out why pilots make mistakes is way more important than simply identifying them. Look at the upset of the 717 during flight testing. Those were great pilots, yet they still made mistakes. As a result of the way they handled that upset (along with several other upsets in the 90s), the industry came up with new training methods so that a regular line pilot doesn't need to be a test pilot in order to recover from an upset safely.
#778
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2006
Position: C47 PIC/747-400 SIC
Posts: 2,100
#779
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2005
Posts: 8,898
Why do you think that? I have it even though you accused me of not reading it. It is a PRELIMINARY report. No one is arguing that the crew made procedural mistakes. We are simply saying that there is more to the investigation than, "the pilots messed up." Do you really think this preliminary report contains all the useful information? Do you really think there isn't anything else to learn?
Personally, I am more interested in the human factors of the accident. We know they left the power up and turned the stabilizer trim system back on. What we still don't know is WHY. Maybe there is something in their takeoff profile that can lead to the crew getting distracted at the wrong time. One company I worked at had a callout at a terrible time that caused pilots to mess up the altitude capture mode if we had to level off at 2,000 feet. Simply removing that callout reduced our low level altitude busts.
I would like to see something similar to US Airways 1549 where they put crews in the same scenario in the sim. If you have ever been a sim instructor, I am sure you have seen an otherwise good crew get distracted. Finding out why pilots make mistakes is way more important than simply identifying them. Look at the upset of the 717 during flight testing. Those were great pilots, yet they still made mistakes. As a result of the way they handled that upset (along with several other upsets in the 90s), the industry came up with new training methods so that a regular line pilot doesn't need to be a test pilot in order to recover from an upset safely.
Personally, I am more interested in the human factors of the accident. We know they left the power up and turned the stabilizer trim system back on. What we still don't know is WHY. Maybe there is something in their takeoff profile that can lead to the crew getting distracted at the wrong time. One company I worked at had a callout at a terrible time that caused pilots to mess up the altitude capture mode if we had to level off at 2,000 feet. Simply removing that callout reduced our low level altitude busts.
I would like to see something similar to US Airways 1549 where they put crews in the same scenario in the sim. If you have ever been a sim instructor, I am sure you have seen an otherwise good crew get distracted. Finding out why pilots make mistakes is way more important than simply identifying them. Look at the upset of the 717 during flight testing. Those were great pilots, yet they still made mistakes. As a result of the way they handled that upset (along with several other upsets in the 90s), the industry came up with new training methods so that a regular line pilot doesn't need to be a test pilot in order to recover from an upset safely.
Nicely said, my sentiments exactly
Thread
Thread Starter
Forum
Replies
Last Post