Med Jet Lear 35A down @ El Cajon/Gillespie
12-31-2021, 10:29 AM
#21
Perennial Reserve
Joined APC: Jan 2018
Posts: 11,501
Originally Posted by Stan446
Wow, guy is dead,.
“Those who fail to learn from the past are doomed to repeat it.”
― George Santana
12-31-2021, 10:31 AM
#22
Gets Weekends Off
Thread Starter
Joined APC: Dec 2017
Position: Retired NJA & AA
Posts: 1,918
Dan Gryder took down the video I linked above, he explains in this new video that he received a reasonable request to do so. I'm guessing it was because of the ATC audio from the last seconds of the flight:
https://youtu.be/a-VfaNixr90
YouTube videos about aviation accidents are de-monetized so there's no profit motive. Videos on several subjects are de-monetized. If the poster says the word "porn" it's demonetized. They have to spell it, or use an abbreviation.
This is the 3rd accident I'm aware of that involved a business jet circling. There was the LearJet at TEB, then more recently the Challenger at Truckee.
Dan makes a good point about training. In the Sim at FSI I never had to do circling except at MEM or JFK and those were easy (usually). Not very realistic. He mentions those 2 airports so I get the impression it's not just FSI using only those two.
My B737 and CL65 type ratings both have a restriction of "CIRC APCH-VMC ONLY". In my 12 years flying at NetJets I can count on the fingers of one hand how many "for real" circling approaches I did (excluding the ILS6 circle to 1 at TEB, did that a number of times). Very high pucker factor depending on the airport.
https://youtu.be/a-VfaNixr90
YouTube videos about aviation accidents are de-monetized so there's no profit motive. Videos on several subjects are de-monetized. If the poster says the word "porn" it's demonetized. They have to spell it, or use an abbreviation.
This is the 3rd accident I'm aware of that involved a business jet circling. There was the LearJet at TEB, then more recently the Challenger at Truckee.
Dan makes a good point about training. In the Sim at FSI I never had to do circling except at MEM or JFK and those were easy (usually). Not very realistic. He mentions those 2 airports so I get the impression it's not just FSI using only those two.
My B737 and CL65 type ratings both have a restriction of "CIRC APCH-VMC ONLY". In my 12 years flying at NetJets I can count on the fingers of one hand how many "for real" circling approaches I did (excluding the ILS6 circle to 1 at TEB, did that a number of times). Very high pucker factor depending on the airport.
12-31-2021, 02:27 PM
#24
Speed, Power, Accuracy
Joined APC: Sep 2007
Position: PIC
Posts: 1,702
Originally Posted by JohnBurke
The guy being dead is the reason he's being discussed. If he didn't do something that made him front page news, nobody would know who he was.
We all fly the same airspace. While it's inappropriate to speculate, it's not inappropriate to discuss elements of the event, because the airmanship issues impact us all.
Being dead is not a ticket to sainthood, nor does it elevate one to beyond reproach, or exempt one from the topic of discussion. Rest assured, make a smoking hole in the ground, and you'll be the prime topic around the aviation dinner table. Gain enough notoriety for your actions, and you'll be a prima facie case at every groundschool, recurrent, and training event for the next 40 years. Lots of deaths at Tenerife, yet it remains an obvious choice for CRM, ADM, and numerous other topics. Do you think a training class for the Lear 35 passes without discussion of the Payne Stewart mishap? Of course not, and yes, they all died.
A good share of the regulations, rules, and policies by which we are all required to abide exist based on a loss of life and event that caused the rule change or initial development; the policies, procedures and regulations which guide and govern us are written in blood, and there is great benefit at times in discussing how they came to be.
A pilot flew an RNAV approach which prohibited circling to runway 27R, at night. The pilot elected to do it anyway, circumventing the prohibition by cancelling his IFR clearance under conditions in which he should not. This decision, and his actions in attempting to make that circle, far below circling minimums for either runway (where circling wasn't allowed to that runway at night) ultimately cost him his life, as well as that of his crew. He broadcast his terror on the air, captured and rebroadcast now on public video, and video was captured of his descent and death. We have also the death of the crew to consider as the result of this decision tree, and it may be a minor miracle that no one on the ground was killed by these actions.
The bodies, or what little remains of them, are scarcely cold at present, with an investigation left to go, and little but the words of talking heads vying for youtube exposure (and revenue) to stir the waters: speculation is unwarranted, and unprofessional. Discussion of what is known, and the nature of the airport, approaches, procedures, runway lengths, atmospheric conditions, etc, is not unwarranted, and is as open to discussion as any other airport, procedure, or weather yesterday, today, or tomorrow.
Very clearly there was nothing stable about this approach to land. The procedure in use is a matter of public domain. It's not a secret. The minimums for that approach are 1000-1100' above field elevation, with a clear prohibition on circling to runway 35 or 27R, even though circling minimums are published. Straight-in, the lowest minimums were 1000' above field elevation. The pilot asked for brighter lighting on the runway, with the response that lights were full brightness. Did the pilot see the lights, or just a glow? Did experience at that field prompt him to step beyond the legal limitations, use some "tribal knowledge," and let himself down to 27R, despite the prohibition? The rules won't let me, but I'll do it anyway, but changing the rules? Is there a point at which a pilot in instrument conditions may legally cancel his instrument clearance and proceed visually, while unable to maintain cloud clearance and other VFR requirements? An investigation will touch on all of that, but presently we are left with a smoking hole, high approach minimums, circling restrictions, an airplane that attempted to cancel and circle anyway, and dead crew that the pilot's decision making also caused. https://aeronav.faa.gov/d-tpp/2113/05402R17.PDF
Runway 27 has an approach, but it has a seven degree glidepath to the runway, which is clearly more appropriate for getting to the field, then entering the traffic pattern from the overhead, and even that approach, the LOC-D, offers only circling minimums (despite alignment with the runway) and also prohibits circling to 27R at night. Regardless of whether the crew had flown the RNAV 17 (as they did) or the LOC-D, either would have required circling to get to 27R, and both prohibited it. https://aeronav.faa.gov/d-tpp/2113/05402LD.PDF
I am a proponent of not speculating. That said, there are elements of this very public mishap which are beneficial to discuss, will impact those using that airfield or procedures with high minimums in low weather, and perhaps should be considered, without requirement to wait out a mourning period, or the two years that it will take to read the final report. This isn't a case in which a pilot reported a mechanical issue. The timbre of his voice on the radio did not sound tense, nor concerned. The impression one might have is that this action, flying the RNAV 17, then circling to 27R, wasn't a first-time event for the pilot. The specifics are not known, and will be investigated. The generalities are well known and haven't changed because a death occurred.
If you think that a death exempts one from discussion, or that all talk and examination of the deceased actions are verboten and off-limits, or that somehow being deceased exonerates a pilot from examination, you. must be very new to aviation. You may not be familiar with the pilots prayer, Dear God, don't let me screw up. I can tell you that one of my great motivating factors in how I plan is not only how my actions will be dissected in an investigation and in court, and in consideration of the safe outcome of the flight, but also from the simple fact that I don't want to be 'that guy' at the center of discussion and the center of a smoking hole in the ground. There before the grace go we all, but grace does not exempt us from examination. Neither does death.
We all fly the same airspace. While it's inappropriate to speculate, it's not inappropriate to discuss elements of the event, because the airmanship issues impact us all.
Being dead is not a ticket to sainthood, nor does it elevate one to beyond reproach, or exempt one from the topic of discussion. Rest assured, make a smoking hole in the ground, and you'll be the prime topic around the aviation dinner table. Gain enough notoriety for your actions, and you'll be a prima facie case at every groundschool, recurrent, and training event for the next 40 years. Lots of deaths at Tenerife, yet it remains an obvious choice for CRM, ADM, and numerous other topics. Do you think a training class for the Lear 35 passes without discussion of the Payne Stewart mishap? Of course not, and yes, they all died.
A good share of the regulations, rules, and policies by which we are all required to abide exist based on a loss of life and event that caused the rule change or initial development; the policies, procedures and regulations which guide and govern us are written in blood, and there is great benefit at times in discussing how they came to be.
A pilot flew an RNAV approach which prohibited circling to runway 27R, at night. The pilot elected to do it anyway, circumventing the prohibition by cancelling his IFR clearance under conditions in which he should not. This decision, and his actions in attempting to make that circle, far below circling minimums for either runway (where circling wasn't allowed to that runway at night) ultimately cost him his life, as well as that of his crew. He broadcast his terror on the air, captured and rebroadcast now on public video, and video was captured of his descent and death. We have also the death of the crew to consider as the result of this decision tree, and it may be a minor miracle that no one on the ground was killed by these actions.
The bodies, or what little remains of them, are scarcely cold at present, with an investigation left to go, and little but the words of talking heads vying for youtube exposure (and revenue) to stir the waters: speculation is unwarranted, and unprofessional. Discussion of what is known, and the nature of the airport, approaches, procedures, runway lengths, atmospheric conditions, etc, is not unwarranted, and is as open to discussion as any other airport, procedure, or weather yesterday, today, or tomorrow.
Very clearly there was nothing stable about this approach to land. The procedure in use is a matter of public domain. It's not a secret. The minimums for that approach are 1000-1100' above field elevation, with a clear prohibition on circling to runway 35 or 27R, even though circling minimums are published. Straight-in, the lowest minimums were 1000' above field elevation. The pilot asked for brighter lighting on the runway, with the response that lights were full brightness. Did the pilot see the lights, or just a glow? Did experience at that field prompt him to step beyond the legal limitations, use some "tribal knowledge," and let himself down to 27R, despite the prohibition? The rules won't let me, but I'll do it anyway, but changing the rules? Is there a point at which a pilot in instrument conditions may legally cancel his instrument clearance and proceed visually, while unable to maintain cloud clearance and other VFR requirements? An investigation will touch on all of that, but presently we are left with a smoking hole, high approach minimums, circling restrictions, an airplane that attempted to cancel and circle anyway, and dead crew that the pilot's decision making also caused. https://aeronav.faa.gov/d-tpp/2113/05402R17.PDF
Runway 27 has an approach, but it has a seven degree glidepath to the runway, which is clearly more appropriate for getting to the field, then entering the traffic pattern from the overhead, and even that approach, the LOC-D, offers only circling minimums (despite alignment with the runway) and also prohibits circling to 27R at night. Regardless of whether the crew had flown the RNAV 17 (as they did) or the LOC-D, either would have required circling to get to 27R, and both prohibited it. https://aeronav.faa.gov/d-tpp/2113/05402LD.PDF
I am a proponent of not speculating. That said, there are elements of this very public mishap which are beneficial to discuss, will impact those using that airfield or procedures with high minimums in low weather, and perhaps should be considered, without requirement to wait out a mourning period, or the two years that it will take to read the final report. This isn't a case in which a pilot reported a mechanical issue. The timbre of his voice on the radio did not sound tense, nor concerned. The impression one might have is that this action, flying the RNAV 17, then circling to 27R, wasn't a first-time event for the pilot. The specifics are not known, and will be investigated. The generalities are well known and haven't changed because a death occurred.
If you think that a death exempts one from discussion, or that all talk and examination of the deceased actions are verboten and off-limits, or that somehow being deceased exonerates a pilot from examination, you. must be very new to aviation. You may not be familiar with the pilots prayer, Dear God, don't let me screw up. I can tell you that one of my great motivating factors in how I plan is not only how my actions will be dissected in an investigation and in court, and in consideration of the safe outcome of the flight, but also from the simple fact that I don't want to be 'that guy' at the center of discussion and the center of a smoking hole in the ground. There before the grace go we all, but grace does not exempt us from examination. Neither does death.
12-31-2021, 05:06 PM
#25
Gets Weekends Off
Thread Starter
Joined APC: Dec 2017
Position: Retired NJA & AA
Posts: 1,918
Meet the crew. The "selfie" was taken a few hours before the crash. One pilot was 67, the other 45. Of course the news got it wrong as usual "thick fog and heavy rain".
The nurse taking the photo loved her job so much that all 3 of her daughters went into medicine, 2 as nurses and 1 as a Doctor.
https://youtu.be/htcowXJD10g
The nurse taking the photo loved her job so much that all 3 of her daughters went into medicine, 2 as nurses and 1 as a Doctor.
https://youtu.be/htcowXJD10g
Last edited by AirBear; 08-26-2022 at 07:43 PM.
12-31-2021, 08:40 PM
#26
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2013
Position: A shack in Kailua
Posts: 290
Originally Posted by AirBear
Meet the crew. The "selfie" was taken a few hours before the crash. One pilot was 67, the other 45. Of course the news got it wrong as usual "thick fog and heavy rain".
The nurse taking the photo loved her job so much that all 3 of her daughters went into medicine, 2 as nurses and 1 as a Doctor.
https://youtu.be/htcowXJD10g
The nurse taking the photo loved her job so much that all 3 of her daughters went into medicine, 2 as nurses and 1 as a Doctor.
https://youtu.be/htcowXJD10g
Reminds me of early in my Coast Guard career back in the early 2000's; I remember one of my helo friends getting out of the service and going civilian as an air ambulance helo pilot. He was dead within a year of getting off active duty. He was still in the reserves at the time and had just been selected for promotion to O-4 but never got to put it on before he and two flight nurses perished in their Bell 206 as a result of CFIT. NTSB stated he busted minimums by a significant margin while trying to find the person they were supposed to pick up. This guy was an incredible pilot who flew everything by the book and did not take risks during the decade that he was a CG SAR aviator.
12-31-2021, 09:58 PM
#27
All is fine at .79
Joined APC: Sep 2016
Position: Paahlot
Posts: 4,083
Originally Posted by USMCFLYR
if you are responding to my post, I never said in order to tly a pattern lower than you should.
12-31-2021, 11:11 PM
#28
Disinterested Third Party
Joined APC: Jun 2012
Posts: 6,022
Originally Posted by paulcg77
I'm grateful for their service as first responders. I try to avoid speculating on accidents before the report comes out, but it is worth pointing out that aeromedical evacuation is definitely one of the riskier civilian professional aviation specialties. I am sure there are multiple reasons for this, perhaps including the inherently risky nature of frequently flying in marginal conditions and the effect that type of repeated risk might sometimes have on organizational/safety culture (choosing my words very carefully here out of respect).
I flew for four different medevac operations, and never found what you describe, to be the case.
12-31-2021, 11:20 PM
#29
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2013
Position: A shack in Kailua
Posts: 290
Originally Posted by JohnBurke
They're not first responders.
I flew for four different medevac operations, and never found what you describe, to be the case.
I flew for four different medevac operations, and never found what you describe, to be the case.
Thread
Thread Starter
Forum
Replies
Last Post
turk
Flight Schools and Training
29
01-13-2012 05:58 AM
