Originally Posted by at6d

Beat me to it. Flaps greater than zero kills the system.

When we did our Max requal ride, I messed up the sim because when the runaway scenario was to start I had the flaps at 1 still and pulled back the power to level off. We sat there a second while the instructor tried to figure out why it wasn’t trying to kill us….until I realized we were level at whatever (maybe 2000’) in stabilized flight at flaps 1.

We did it again of course and were able to fully control the aircraft. That being said, it was the “corrected” system.

But still, a right seat guy that got nearly all of his hours within the previous year or whatever instantly became a non-flying observer when the sh1t hit the fan. Let’s agree on that.

Originally Posted by Myfingershurt

You mean the facts of the internal conversations at that Boeing execs and managers had via memos and emails that said showed that they were purposefully deceiving regulators and customers worldwide? Yeah, those facts to indeed speak for themselves.

Originally Posted by Lonestarcaptain

So Ethiopian and Lion Air were very different events. Lion Air NOBODY knew MCAS even existed. Ethiopian there was an Emergency AD, which the crew complied with. Only AFTER they had done everything the AD and checklist provided them did they turn the Cutout switches back on. I wasn’t in the seat and don’t know what their thought process was that led to that but I do know and what the CVR and flight data show is by that point they were out of guidance and the aircraft was still not responding to full nose up elevator due to the extreme mistrim. Maybe pulling power earlier would have helped but buy this point with it aircraft in an accelerated dive thrust is just wishful thinking, gravity is in control. So faced with trying something or hitting the ground, I’m not going to criticize them from doing whatever they throught was needed after the Checklist failed them.

The Lion Air crash, yes they encountered a runaway trim caused by a faulty AoA sensor. Of note they were at cruise power, cruise altitude and cruise trim setting. The time available to the crew to assess, balance, and do was much longer (as demonstrated by the fact that it took long enough for the jumpseater to intervene). I believe the exact write up was Trim malfunction at cruise and IAS disagree. The Maintenance logbook is available to the public through the Lion Air Crash report. Maintenance action was followed per the Boeing Maintenance manual, which made no mention of MCAS or the possibility of an AoA fault. The speed trim system would have been ground checked and the aircraft signed off. I doubt any other maintenance department would do anything different given the information available to them at the time.

No one knowingly flew an aircraft that was un airworthy. It was written up and fixed according to procedures. Would you decline an aircraft that had Mx items cleared?

A runaway stab in a 737 goes from a complete non event to “holly **** what is happening” real quick. If you stop the runaway while you still have positive elevator authority it seems like no big deal. A few seconds later or if you allow the pitch to go below the horizon it’s a completely different animal.

NASA, Boeing, EASA and every major airline that operated the MAX sent pilots to Miami after ET302. Very few could handle MCAS as it was designed. These were NTPS grads, senior test pilots, evaluators etc. If you think it was just a pilot skills issue or political I suggest you search out one of the pilots your airline sent maybe they can explain the felling of helplessness. At cleanup altitude they had about 5 second to asses the runway oversets stick shaker and master caution. If they didn’t get the cutout switch’s in the first 5 seconds they were pitch limited on the elevator authority.

It truly scares me that there are people flying this machine that don’t understand what was wrong with it and what was done to fix it.

Originally Posted by Lonestarcaptain

So Ethiopian and Lion Air were very different events. Lion Air NOBODY knew MCAS even existed. Ethiopian there was an Emergency AD, which the crew complied with. Only AFTER they had done everything the AD and checklist provided them did they turn the Cutout switches back on. I wasn’t in the seat and don’t know what their thought process was that led to that but I do know and what the CVR and flight data show is by that point they were out of guidance and the aircraft was still not responding to full nose up elevator due to the extreme mistrim. Maybe pulling power earlier would have helped but buy this point with it aircraft in an accelerated dive thrust is just wishful thinking, gravity is in control. So faced with trying something or hitting the ground, I’m not going to criticize them from doing whatever they throught was needed after the Checklist failed them.

The Lion Air crash, yes they encountered a runaway trim caused by a faulty AoA sensor. Of note they were at cruise power, cruise altitude and cruise trim setting. The time available to the crew to assess, balance, and do was much longer (as demonstrated by the fact that it took long enough for the jumpseater to intervene). I believe the exact write up was Trim malfunction at cruise and IAS disagree. The Maintenance logbook is available to the public through the Lion Air Crash report. Maintenance action was followed per the Boeing Maintenance manual, which made no mention of MCAS or the possibility of an AoA fault. The speed trim system would have been ground checked and the aircraft signed off. I doubt any other maintenance department would do anything different given the information available to them at the time.

No one knowingly flew an aircraft that was un airworthy. It was written up and fixed according to procedures. Would you decline an aircraft that had Mx items cleared?

A runaway stab in a 737 goes from a complete non event to “holly **** what is happening” real quick. If you stop the runaway while you still have positive elevator authority it seems like no big deal. A few seconds later or if you allow the pitch to go below the horizon it’s a completely different animal.

NASA, Boeing, EASA and every major airline that operated the MAX sent pilots to Miami after ET302. Very few could handle MCAS as it was designed. These were NTPS grads, senior test pilots, evaluators etc. If you think it was just a pilot skills issue or political I suggest you search out one of the pilots your airline sent maybe they can explain the felling of helplessness. At cleanup altitude they had about 5 second to asses the runway oversets stick shaker and master caution. If they didn’t get the cutout switch’s in the first 5 seconds they were pitch limited on the elevator authority.

It truly scares me that there are people flying this machine that don’t understand what was wrong with it and what was done to fix it.

Originally Posted by at6d

Beat me to it. Flaps greater than zero kills the system.

When we did our Max requal ride, I messed up the sim because when the runaway scenario was to start I had the flaps at 1 still and pulled back the power to level off. We sat there a second while the instructor tried to figure out why it wasn’t trying to kill us….until I realized we were level at whatever (maybe 2000’) in stabilized flight at flaps 1.

We did it again of course and were able to fully control the aircraft. That being said, it was the “corrected” system.

But still, a right seat guy that got nearly all of his hours within the previous year or whatever instantly became a non-flying observer when the sh1t hit the fan. Let’s agree on that.

Originally Posted by Lonestarcaptain

Well runaway scenario was at 10,000ft (5,000 if you were an FO) and 250kts so yeah spoken like a true SWA pilot “FLAPs 1 cal the runway”.

Originally Posted by at6d

You got a problem?

The scenario I’m talking about was a departure scenario. We had more than one.